arXiv subjects

Atulya Jain

Publications and source records attributed to Atulya Jain.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Dynamic Cheap Talk without Feedback

We study a dynamic sender-receiver game in which the sender observes a state evolving according to a Markov chain but does not observe the receiver's action. Despite the absence of feedback, dynamic interaction partially restores commitment. We show that any equilibrium payoff of a persuasion model with partial commitment, where the sender can deviate to signaling policies that preserve the marginal distribution over messages, can be achieved as a uniform equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game. Moreover, any convex combination of such payoffs across message distributions can also be sustained. When the sender's payoff is state-independent, she achieves the Bayesian persuasion payoff.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

On the Inefficiency of Social Learning

We study whether a social planner can improve the efficiency of learning, measured by the expected total welfare loss, in a sequential decision-making environment. Agents arrive in order and each makes a binary action based on their private signal and the social information they observe. The planner can intervene by jointly designing the social information disclosed to agents and offering monetary transfers contingent on agents' actions. We show that, despite such flexibility, efficient learning cannot be restored with a finite budget: whenever learning is inefficient without intervention, no combination of information disclosure and transfers can achieve efficient learning while keeping total expected transfers finite.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Efficiency in Games with Incomplete Information

We study games with incomplete information and characterize when a feasible outcome is Pareto efficient. Outcomes with excessive randomization are inefficient: generically, the total number of action profiles across states must be strictly less than the sum of the number of players and the number of states. We consider three applications. A cheap talk outcome is efficient only if pure; with state-independent sender payoffs, it is efficient if and only if the sender's most preferred action is induced with certainty. In natural settings, Bayesian persuasion outcomes are inefficient across many priors. Finally, ranking-based allocation mechanisms are inefficient under mild conditions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion

We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff while passing the test? For a stationary ergodic process, we characterize the optimal forecasting strategy by reducing the dynamic game to a static persuasion problem. The distributions of forecasts that can arise under calibration are precisely the mean-preserving contractions of the distribution of conditionals. We compare the payoffs attainable by an informed and uninformed expert, providing a benchmark for the value of information. Finally, we consider a regret-minimizing decision-maker and show that the expert can always guarantee at least the calibration benchmark and sometimes strictly more.

econ.TH↗