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Aubrey Clark

Publications and source records attributed to Aubrey Clark.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

The trainability of photonic quantum circuits

Variational quantum algorithms are a leading approach to near-term quantum computing, but their scalability can be limited by barren plateaus and the sampling cost of resolving small changes in the loss landscape. Here, we study the trainability of passive linear-optical quantum circuits and introduce a framework based on the ratio of sample variance to circuit variance. This ratio determines the number of circuit samples required to resolve local loss differences and gradients to proportional accuracy. We apply this framework to photon-number observables and identify both trainable and non-trainable regimes. Supported by analytic results and a numerically observed polynomial decay of the circuit variance, we find that fixed-order photon-number polynomials require only polynomially many samples as the system size grows, whereas high-order polynomials and observables based on output probabilities generally require exponentially many samples. Within the trainable regime, we further identify classes of observables in which quantum estimation achieves a polynomial speed-up over multiple classical methods. Within this family, neural network observables provide one practical construction that allow measurement outcomes to be efficiently processed into the desired polynomial. These results establish photonic variational quantum computing as a promising platform for near-term applications.

quant-ph

Capacity Constraints in Principal-Agent Problems

Adding a capacity constraint to a hidden-action principal-agent problem results in the same set of Pareto optimal contracts as the unconstrained problem where output is scaled down by a constant factor. This scaling factor is increasing in the agent's capacity to exert effort.

econ.TH

Core equivalence with large agents

This paper studies the relationship between core and competitive equilibira in economies that consist of a continuum of agents and some large agents. We construct a class of these economies in which the core and competitive allocations do not coincide.

econ.TH

Contracts for acquiring information

This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of output, a state-dependent transfer, and an optimal distortion. Under this decomposition: 1) the fraction of output paid is increasing in the set of experiments available to the agent, 2) the state-dependent transfer indexes contract payments to account for differences in output between states, 3) the optimal distortion exploits complementarities in the cost of information acquisition: experiment probabilities unalterable via contract payments stuck against liability limits are substituted for, the substitution occurring according to complementarities in the cost of information acquisition, and 4) if and only if the agent's cost of experimentation is mutual information, the optimal distortion takes the form of a decision-dependent transfer.

econ.TH