arXiv subjects

Austin Bennett

Publications and source records attributed to Austin Bennett.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

APEX-Accounting

We introduce APEX-Accounting, a benchmark built by Mercor in partnership with Ramp, to assess whether frontier models can do the real work of accountants. Tasks include reconciling accounts, accruing expenses, posting transactions, and producing reports. The private eval set comprises 160 tasks, split across 10 worlds. Each world contains an accounting system, as well as spreadsheets, PDFs, and other files. Every task was authored and solved by experts in accounting and bookkeeping, who also wrote grading rubrics. Across nine frontier models, Claude-Fable-5 (Max) leads with 56.4% Mean Criteria@3, ahead of Muse-Spark-1.1 (xHigh) at 52.6%. No model scores more than 2.6% Pass^8 (GPT-5.6-Sol (Max+Pro)) and the highest Pass@8 is 21.5% (Muse-Spark-1.1 (xHigh)). We experiment with increasing the token budget from $1 to $50 and observe an instance of Simpson's paradox: scores increase as the token budget increases but within a given budget-constrained harness, scores are lower on tasks where the model spends more tokens. As APEX-Accounting is a closed benchmark, leaderboard evals can be run for any frontier model on request.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Concave is the New Linear: The Impossibility of Anti-Plutocratic DAO Governance

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) run protocol governance by letting token holders vote on proposals. The dominant rule, voting power proportional to wallet balance, concentrates control among a small number of large holders, fueling the token-control governance attacks that have already compromised real protocols. To counter this concentration, the community has turned to anti-plutocratic voting mechanisms such as Quadratic Voting (QV), which assign sublinear voting power per token with the goal of dampening the influence of large holders. We prove that no voting rule that derives power solely from wallet balance can succeed on a permissionless blockchain. Through a costed model of on-chain voting that captures realistic blockchain frictions -- including per-wallet splitting and voting costs, fixed setup costs, and minimum-balance requirements -- we show that whenever a wallet of any size yields nonzero voting power, a Sybil attacker who splits tokens across many wallets achieves total voting power that grows at least linearly in their token holdings. For concave rules actually proposed to dampen governance power -- those that are positive, increasing, and finite -- we show that the optimal strategy yields power that is asymptotically linear in token holdings, regardless of the cost scheme. Instantiating the model on real DAOs reveals attack costs orders of magnitude below the value at stake. Replaying the ten most recent finalized proposals of five major DAOs (ENS, Compound, Uniswap, Arbitrum, and ZKsync) under linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and power-($\beta = 0.25$) voting, we measure Sybil amplification factors between $1,172\times$ and $4,039\times$ under Quadratic Voting, and exceeding $229,000\times$ under steeper power rules.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Evaluating Voting Design Vulnerabilities for Retroactive Funding

Retroactive Public Goods Funding (RetroPGF) rewards blockchain projects based on proven impact rather than future promises. This paper reviews voting mechanisms for Optimism's RetroPGF, where "badgeholders" allocate rewards to valuable projects. We explore Optimism's previous schemes for RetroPGF voting, including quadratic, mean, and median voting. We present a proof-based formal analysis for vulnerabilities in these voting schemes, empirically validate these vulnerabilities using voting simulations, and offer assessments and practical recommendations for future iterations of Optimism's system based on our findings.

cs.GT↗