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Austin K. Williams

Publications and source records attributed to Austin K. Williams.

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Augur: a decentralized oracle and prediction market platform

Augur is a trustless, decentralized oracle and platform for prediction markets. The outcomes of Augur's prediction markets are chosen by users that hold Augur's native Reputation token, who stake their tokens on the actual observed outcome and, in return, receive settlement fees from the markets. Augur's incentive structure is designed to ensure that honest, accurate reporting of outcomes is always the most profitable option for Reputation token holders. Token holders can post progressively-larger Reputation bonds to dispute proposed market outcomes. If the size of these bonds reaches a certain threshold, Reputation splits into multiple versions, one for each possible outcome of the disputed market; token holders must then exchange their Reputation tokens for one of these versions. Versions of Reputation which do not correspond to the real-world outcome will become worthless, as no one will participate in prediction markets unless they are confident that the markets will resolve correctly. Therefore, token holders will select the only version of Reputation which they know will continue to have value: the version that corresponds to reality.

cs.CR

Decentralized Common Knowledge Oracles

We define and analyze three mechanisms for getting common knowledge, a posteriori truths about the world onto a blockchain in a decentralized setting. We show that, when a reasonable economic condition is met, these mechanisms are individually rational, incentive compatible, and decide the true outcome of valid oracle queries in both the non-cooperative and cooperative settings. These mechanisms are based upon repeated games with two classes of players: queriers who desire to get common knowledge truths onto the blockchain and a pool of reporters who posses such common knowledge. Presented with a new oracle query, reporters have an opportunity to report the truth in return for a fee provided by the querier. During subsequent oracle queries, the querier has an opportunity to punish any reporters who did not report truthfully during previous rounds. While the set of reporters has the power to cause the oracle to lie, they are incentivized not to do so.

cs.CR

Classification of Minimal Separating Sets in Low Genus Surfaces

Consider a surface $S$ and let $M\subset S$. If $S\setminus M$ is not connected, then we say $M$ \emph{separates} $S$, and we refer to $M$ as a \emph{separating set} of $S$. If $M$ separates $S$, and no proper subset of $M$ separates $S$, then we say $M$ is a \emph{minimal separating set} of $S$. In this paper we use methods of computational combinatorial topology to classify the minimal separating sets of the orientable surfaces of genus $g=2$ and $g=3$. The classification for genus 0 and 1 was done in earlier work, using methods of algebraic topology.

math.CO