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Avyay M. Casheekar

Publications and source records attributed to Avyay M. Casheekar.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Learning to Report Unsafe Tasks in a Multi-Agent Game

When a team of agents shares a reward for completed tasks, reporting and stopping unsafe work reduces the team's reward. Random audits that penalize silence can make universal reporting optimal without ensuring that a silent team learns to report. We study this problem in a game where any witness can stop a task by reporting. When a task's k witnesses share a policy and draw actions independently, the derivative of expected reward with respect to the shared silence probability at universal silence counts its benefit k times, while the comparison between universal reporting and silence counts it once. A fully shared policy can therefore be locally attracted to silence even when reporting is optimal. For any grouping into shared policies, we give an audit condition sufficient for exact policy-gradient updates to reach universal reporting and, outside boundary cases, necessary from near universal silence. In a balanced family, meeting the condition with prescribed margins costs k times as much for a fully shared policy as for one policy per role. We test these predictions with PPO on 24 witness graphs, starting from learned silence. Witness groups, which place co-witnesses in separate networks, reduce unsafe task completion by 33.59 percentage points relative to shuffled groups of the same sizes under the same audits (95% graph-bootstrap interval: 21.03-45.13). Only 9 of 48 witness-group runs achieve below 1% unsafe completion while retaining at least 90% legitimate completion. At the same audit budget, a fully shared network meets both thresholds in 0/48 runs with independent action draws and 48/48 with a common draw. On 24 further graphs with witness groups fixed, audits allocated by the condition reduce unsafe completion by 42.22 points relative to audits maximizing a static coalition deterrence ratio at the same budget.

cs.AI↗

When Is an Agent Evaluation Over? Outcome Finality and Cross-Unit Separation

Agent evaluations commonly score the state observed when a run stops and count the run as one trial. Interpreting that score as a final result from a separate trial requires outcome finality and cross-unit separation. Outcome finality requires that later events cannot change the claimed result, while cross-unit separation requires that earlier runs cannot change the relevant conditions of later ones. The endpoint establishes neither condition by itself, and the two can hold independently. Waiting for a delayed outcome may settle the label even though its state remains available to another run. Isolation may prevent carryover even though the scored outcome remains unresolved. We develop a completion argument that identifies the evidence needed for each decision. A final success or failure label is justified only when every relevant effect is resolved or bounded tightly enough to fix the outcome. Any remaining uncertainty must be reported. First, in a controlled replay with fixed agent actions, we find that endpoint and terminal labels differ for every nonzero-delay operation and that a delayed write changes the next run's score under shared state but has no such effect after namespacing or verified reset. Second, in a review of ten public protocols, we find that reset or deliberate retention is documented explicitly more often than unfinished operations or evidence for separate scoring. Finally, we propose an open-effects record for operations and resources that may remain relevant after the endpoint, their status, and their possible effects on the scored outcome or another run.

cs.AI↗

Adapting Probabilistic Risk Assessment for AI

Modern general-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems present an urgent risk management challenge, as their rapidly evolving capabilities and potential for catastrophic harm outpace our ability to reliably assess their risks. Current methods often rely on selective testing and undocumented assumptions about risk priorities, frequently failing to make a serious attempt at assessing the set of pathways through which AI systems pose direct or indirect risks to society and the biosphere. This paper introduces the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for AI framework, adapting established PRA techniques from high-reliability industries (e.g., nuclear power, aerospace) for the new challenges of advanced AI. The framework guides assessors in identifying potential risks, estimating likelihood and severity bands, and explicitly documenting evidence, underlying assumptions, and analyses at appropriate granularities. The framework's implementation tool synthesizes the results into a risk report card with aggregated risk estimates from all assessed risks. It introduces three methodological advances: (1) Aspect-oriented hazard analysis provides systematic hazard coverage guided by a first-principles taxonomy of AI system aspects (e.g. capabilities, domain knowledge, affordances); (2) Risk pathway modeling analyzes causal chains from system aspects to societal impacts using bidirectional analysis and incorporating prospective techniques; and (3) Uncertainty management employs scenario decomposition, reference scales, and explicit tracing protocols to structure credible projections with novelty or limited data. Additionally, the framework harmonizes diverse assessment methods by integrating evidence into comparable, quantified absolute risk estimates for lifecycle decisions. We have implemented this as a workbook tool for AI developers, evaluators, and regulators.

cs.AI↗