arXiv subjects

Baohan Huang

Publications and source records attributed to Baohan Huang.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Ecdysis: Efficient and Effective Training of Runtime Harnesses for LLM Agents

Self-evolving runtime harnesses can substantially improve the capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents and provide a promising paradigm for optimizing agent execution. Existing harness evolution methods typically rely on iterative search, repeatedly evaluating and revising candidate harnesses based on execution feedback from task instances. While this paradigm enables continuous harness optimization, it incurs substantial time overhead due to repeated agent executions and code modifications, and may overfit to observed tasks and specific failure patterns, resulting in degraded generalization to unseen tasks. We identify the lack of principled failure diagnosis as a key bottleneck in harness evolution: an observed failure can reflect either model-specific deficiencies or systematic harness deficiencies, and directly optimizing against individual failures can lead to unnecessary model-specific accommodation. We therefore propose Ecdysis, an efficient and effective framework that distinguishes model-specific accommodation from harness-level repair and biases adaptation toward systematic harness deficiencies by identifying recurring cross-task failure patterns. Ecdysis adopts a batch-level cross-instance failure aggregation paradigm to jointly analyze failure evidence from multiple task instances and further introduces Failure-Driven Collaborative Refinement to diagnose failure causes and iteratively refine harness modification specifications. By combining cross-instance failure analysis with multi-role diagnosis, Ecdysis enables more effective harness evolution with lower training time. Experiments show that Ecdysis achieves up to a 1.84x speedup in harness training compared with existing harness evolution methods, while improving the reasoning accuracy of the resulting harnesses by 18.56%.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

Refusal is Not Safety! Benchmarking Latent Safety Risks of LLM-Driven Content Humorization

Safety defenses for large language models (LLMs) have been extensively studied, with existing approaches focusing on attack detection and refusal mechanisms. Such fixed-form direct refusal strategies may introduce the risk of prefix injection attacks. Recent work has explored a new direction that leverages humor as an indirect refusal mechanism to mitigate over-refusal in jailbreak scenarios and reduce prefix injection risks. However, this approach implicitly assumes that humorous responses are safe. Whether humorization itself introduces safety risks remains unexplored. To address this issue, we conduct an exploratory study involving over 30,000 real-world agent interaction records and 45 stand-up comedians, revealing practical safety concerns in LLM-based content humorization. Motivated by these findings, we propose \textsc{HumorSafe}, a novel framework for evaluating latent safety risk propagation during humorization. \textsc{HumorSafe} enables LLMs to learn harmful humorization patterns and use them to transform benign content into humorous content with safety risks. Across five frontier LLMs, we find that LLMs can introduce stereotypes and toxicity during humorization. We further propose \textsc{HumorPIA}, a prompt injection attack that exploits latent risks in humor-based defenses. \textsc{HumorPIA} preserves the appearance of safe humorous refusal while covertly injecting harmful content, allowing latent risks to evade existing detection mechanisms. Experiments show that it increases toxicity by 3.14$\times$ while maintaining an apparent safety rate of 97.8\% even under defense settings. Our findings highlight a gap in existing LLM safety evaluations under humorized settings.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Spore: Efficient and Training-Free Privacy Extraction Attack on LLMs via Inference-Time Hybrid Probing

With the wide adoption of personal AI assistants such as OpenClaw, privacy leakage in user interaction contexts with large language model (LLM) agents has become a critical issue. Existing privacy attacks against LLMs primarily target training data, while research on inference-time contextual privacy risks in LLM agent memory remains limited. Moreover, prior methods often incur high attack costs, requiring multiple queries or relying on white-box assumptions, which limits their practicality in real-world deployments. To address these issues, we propose a training-free privacy extraction attack targeting LLM agent memory, which we name \textsc{Spore}. \textsc{Spore} is compatible with both black-box and gray-box settings. In the black-box setting, \textsc{Spore} can efficiently extract a small candidate set via a single query to recover the original private information. In the gray-box setting, \textsc{Spore} allows the attacker to leverage multi-ranked tokens for more accurate and faster privacy extraction. We provide an information-theoretic analysis of \textsc{Spore} and show that it achieves high query efficiency with substantial per query information leakage. Experiments on multiple frontier LLMs show that \textsc{Spore} outperforms attack success rate over existing state-of-the-art (SOTA) schemes. It also maintains low attack cost and remains stable across different model parameter settings. We further evaluate the robustness of \textsc{Spore} against existing defense mechanisms. Our results show that \textsc{Spore} consistently bypasses both detection and strong safety alignment, demonstrating resilient performance in diverse defensive settings and real-world safety threats.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Towards Provably Secure Generative AI: Reliable Consensus Sampling

Existing research on generative AI security is primarily driven by mutually reinforcing attack and defense methodologies grounded in empirical experience. This dynamic frequently gives rise to previously unknown attacks that can circumvent current detection and prevention. This necessitates the continual updating of security mechanisms. Constructing generative AI with provable security and theoretically controllable risk is therefore necessary. Consensus Sampling (CS) is a promising algorithm toward provably secure AI. It controls risk by leveraging overlap in model output probabilities. However, we find that CS relies on frequent abstention to avoid unsafe outputs, which reduces utility. Moreover, CS becomes highly vulnerable when unsafe models are maliciously manipulated. To address these issues, we propose a new primitive called Reliable Consensus Sampling (RCS), that traces acceptance probability to tolerate extreme adversarial behaviors, improving robustness. RCS also eliminates the need for abstention entirely. We further develop a feedback algorithm to continuously and dynamically enhance the safety of RCS. We provide theoretical guarantees that RCS maintains a controllable risk threshold. Extensive experiments show that RCS significantly improves robustness and utility while maintaining latency comparable to CS. We hope this work contributes to the development of provably secure generative AI.

cs.CR↗