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Barbara Kamińska

Publications and source records attributed to Barbara Kamińska.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Targeting Behavior or Intention? Intervention Strategies in Expressed-Private Opinion Dynamics

Exogenous interventions, including economic incentives, can be used to promote behavioral change and the adoption of new products or practices. They may act on different levels, either directly affecting customers' behavior (expressed level) or changing intentions (private level). The key question is which intervention strategy is more effective: targeting the expressed or the private level. Although expressed-private opinion (EPO) models are especially suitable for addressing this problem, they have not yet been used in this context. To fill this gap, we extend previous agent-based EPO models by incorporating exogenous interventions and compare different intervention strategies. We analyze the resulting model using a mean-field approximation, complemented by Monte Carlo simulations on a complete graph. Our results show that there is no universal answer to whether an intervention should target the expressed or the private opinion. The effectiveness of an intervention depends on the adoption level at the moment of its introduction. Interventions acting on the expressed level are more effective when adoption is still low, whereas interventions acting on the private level are more effective when adoption is already high and the goal is to support internal acceptance and reduce dissonance. Moreover, the model shows that high adoption is accompanied by low dissonance between expressed and private opinions, which is consistent with self-congruity theory. This agreement provides theoretical support for the model and strengthens its policy implications.

physics.soc-ph↗

Competition between private and expressed opinions in binary choice: the $α$-EPO $q$-voter model

People often express opinions that differ from their privately held views, a phenomenon known in economy as preference falsification. Expressed-private opinion (EPO) models capture this by assigning each agent two dynamical variables: a private (internal) and an expressed (external) opinion. Within the nonlinear $q$-voter model, two EPO variants have been studied so far: with and without self-anticonformity. In both formulations, agents update private and expressed binary opinions, one after another and at the same rate, which has led to two update schemes studied previously: AT (act then think), in which an agent first updates its expressed and then its private opinion, and TA (think then act), in which the order is reversed. To eliminate this ad hoc distinction and quantify the interplay between private and expressed opinions, we introduce the $α$-EPO $q$-voter model with asynchronous updating -- in each elementary step, an agent updates its private opinion with probability $α$ or its expressed opinion with complementary probability $1-α$. We derive mean-field theory and, for the first time for EPO $q$-voter dynamics, a pair approximation, and validate them with Monte Carlo simulations on artificial and real organizational networks. Comparing the two model variants, we show that the collective outcome controlled by $α$ strongly depends on self-anticonformity: with self-anticonformity the results are robust to $α$, whereas without it $α$ shifts the agreement-disagreement threshold and can change the type of phase transition. In the mean-field limit this change occurs only for $q=3$, but the pair approximation reveals an additional low-connectivity regime in which both $α$ and the average degree $k$ control the emergence and width of hysteresis also for larger influence groups.

physics.soc-ph↗