arXiv subjects
Publications and source records attributed to Bartosz Wcisło.
We describe a construction of a model of second order arithmetic in which (boldface) $\bm{Π^1_n}$-determinacy holds, but (lightface) $Π^1_{n+2}$-$\mathsf{DC}$ fails, thus showing that no projective level of determinacy implies full $\mathsf{DC}_{\mathbb{R}}$. The construction builds upon the work of Gitman, Friedman, and Kanovei.
Fujimoto and Halbach had introduced a novel theory of type-free truth CD which satisfies full classical compositional clauses for connectives and quantifiers. Answering their question, we show that the induction-free variant of that theory is conservative over Peano Arithmetic.
It is an open question whether compositional truth with the principle of propositional soundness ,,all arithmetical sentences which are propositional tautologies are true'' is conservative over its arithmetical base theory. In this article, we show that the principle of propositional soundness imposes some saturation-like properties on the underlying model, thus showing significant limitations to the possible conservativity proof.
Answering a question of Kaye, we show that the compositional truth theory with a full collection scheme is conservative over Peano Arithmetic. We demonstrate it by showing that countable models of compositional truth which satisfy the internal induction or collection axioms can be end-extended to models of the respective theory.
We investigate abstract model theoretic properties which holds for models in which a truth or satisfaction predicate for a sublanguage of the signature is definable. We analyse in which cases those properties in fact ensure the definability of the respective truth predicate. In some cases, we formulate different axiomatic theories which are indispensable for such properties to hold and we analyse the mutual definability relations between those theories.
Ali Enayat had asked whether two halves of Disjunctive Correctness (DC) for the compositional truth predicate are conservative over Peano Arithmetic. In this article, we show that the principle "every true disjunction has a true disjunct" is equivalent to bounded induction for the compositional truth predicate and thus it is not conservative. On the other hand, the converse implication "any disjunction with a true disjunct is true" can be conservatively added to PA. The methods introduced here allow us to give a direct nonconservativeness proof for DC.
We show that for every countable recursively saturated model $M$ of Peano Arithmetic and every subset $A \subseteq M$, there exists a full satisfaction class $S_A \subset M^2$ such that $A$ is definable in $(M,S_A)$ without parametres. It follows that in every such model, there exists a full satisfaction class which makes every element definable and thus the expanded model is minimal and rigid. On the other hand, we show that for every full satisfaction class $S$ there are two elements which have the same arithmetical type, but exactly one of them is in $S$. In particular, the automorphism group of a model expanded with a satisfaction class is never equal to the automorphism group of the original model. The analogue of many of the results proved here for full satisfaction classes were obtained by Roman Kossak for partial inductive satisfaction classes. However, most of the proofs relied heavily on the induction scheme in a crucial way, so recapturing the results in the setting of full satisfaction classes requires quite different arguments.
Cieśliński asked whether compositional truth theory with the additional axiom that all propositional tautologies are true is conservative over Peano Arithmetic. We provide a partial answer to this question, showing that if we additionally assume that truth predicate agrees with arithmetical truth on quantifier-free sentences, the resulting theory is as strong as $Δ_0$-induction for the compositional truth predicate, hence non-conservative. On the other hand, it can be shown with a routine argument that the principle of quantifier-free correctness is itself conservative.
Ali Enayat had asked whether there is a nonstandard model of Peano arithmetic (PA) that can be represented as $\langle\mathbb{Q},\oplus,\otimes\rangle$, where $\oplus$ and $\otimes$ are continuous functions on the rationals $\mathbb{Q}$. We prove, affirmatively, that indeed every countable model of PA has such a continuous presentation on the rationals. More generally, we investigate the topological spaces that arise as such topological models of arithmetic. The reals $\mathbb{R}$, the reals in any finite dimension $\mathbb{R}^n$, the long line and the Cantor space do not, and neither does any Suslin line; many other spaces do; the status of the Baire space is open.
We introduce a tool for analysing models of $\textnormal{CT}^-$, the compositional truth theory over Peano Arithmetic. We present a new proof of Lachlan's theorem that arithmetical part of models of $\textnormal{PA}$ are recursively saturated. We use this tool to provide a new proof that all models of $\textnormal{CT}^-$ carry a partial inductive truth predicate. Finally, we construct a partial truth predicate defined for formulae from a nonstandard cut which cannot be extended to a full truth predicate satisfying $\textnormal{CT}^-$.
We introduce a principle of local collection for compositional truth predicates and show that it is conservative over the classically compositional theory of truth in the arithmetical setting. This axiom states that upon restriction to formulae of any syntactic complexity, the resulting predicate satisfies full collection. In particular, arguments using collection for the truth predicate applied to sentences occurring in any given (code of a) proof do not suffice to show that the conclusion of that proof is true, in stark contrast to the case of induction scheme. We analyse various further results concerning end-extensions of models of compositional truth and the collection scheme for the compositional truth predicate.
Let $\mathcal{T}$ be any of the three canonical truth theories $\textsf{CT}^-$ (Compositional truth without extra induction), $\textsf{FS}^-$ (Friedman--Sheard truth without extra induction), and $\textsf{KF}^-$ (Kripke--Feferman truth without extra induction), where the base theory of $\mathcal{T}$ is $\textsf{PA}$ (Peano arithmetic). We show that $\mathcal{T}$ is \textit{feasibly reducible to} $\textsf{PA}$, i.e., there is a polynomial time computable function $f$ such that for any proof $π$ of an arithmetical sentence $ϕ$ in $\mathcal{T}$, $f(π)$ is a proof of $ϕ$ in $\textsf{PA}$. In particular, $\mathcal{T}$ has at most polynomial speed-up over $\textsf{PA}$, in sharp contrast to the situation for $\mathcal{T}[\textsf{B}]$ for \textit{finitely axiomatizable} base theories $\textsf{B}$.
In the following paper we propose a model-theoretical way of comparing the "strength" of various truth theories which are conservative over PA. Let $\mathfrak{Th}$ denote the class of models of PA which admit an expansion to a model of theory Th. We show (combining some well known results and original ideas) that $$\mathfrak{PA}\supset \mathfrak{TB}\supset \mathfrak{RS}\supset \mathfrak{UTB}\supseteq\mathfrak{CT^-},$$ where $\mathfrak{PA}$ denotes simply the class of all models of PA and $\mathfrak{RS}$ denotes the class of recursively saturated models of PA. Our main original result is that every model of PA which admits an expansion to a model of CT${}^-$, admits also an expanion to a model of UTB. Moreover, as a corollary to one of the results we conclude that UTB is not relatively interpretable in TB, thus answering the question of Fujimoto.
We prove that the theory of the extensional compositional truth predicate for the language of arithmetic with $Δ_0$-induction scheme for the truth predicate and the full arithmetical induction scheme is not conservative over Peano Arithmetic. In addition, we show that a slightly modified theory of truth actually proves the global reflection principle over the base theory.
This paper is a follow-up to "Models of PT${}^-$ with internal induction for total formulae." We give a strenghtening of the main result on the semantical non-conservativity of the theory of PT${}^-$ with internal induction for total formulae (PT${}^- +$ INT(tot)). We show that if to PT${}^-$ the axiom of internal induction for all arithmetical formulae is added (PT${}^-$), then this theory is semantically stronger than PT${}^- +$ INT(tot). In particular the latter is not relatively truth definable (in the sense of Fujimoto) in the former. Last but not least we provide an axiomatic theory of truth which meets the requirements put forward by Fischer and Horsten in "The expressive power of truth."