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Ben Collier

Publications and source records attributed to Ben Collier.

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Stand-Alone Complex or Vibercrime? Exploring the adoption and innovation of GenAI tools, coding assistants, and agents within cybercrime ecosystems

Existential risk scenarios relating to Generative Artificial Intelligence often involve advanced systems or agentic models breaking loose and using hacking tools to gain control over critical infrastructure. In this paper, we argue that the real threats posed by generative AI for cybercrime are rather different. We apply innovation theory and evolutionary economics - treating cybercrime as an ecosystem of small- and medium-scale tech start-ups, coining two novel terms that bound the upper and lower cases for disruption. At the high end, we propose the Stand-Alone Complex, in which cybercrime-gang-in-a-box solutions enable individual actors to largely automate existing cybercrime-as-a-service arrangements. At the low end, we suggest the phenomenon of Vibercrime, in which 'vibe coding' lowers the barrier to entry, but do not fundamentally reshape the economic structures of cybercrime. We analyse early empirical data from the cybercrime underground, and find the reality is prosaic - AI has some early adoption in existing large-scale, low-profit passive income schemes and trivial forms of fraud but there is little evidence so far on widespread disruption in cybercrime. This replaces existing means of code pasting, error checking, and cheatsheet consultation, for generic aspects of software development involved in cybercrime - and largely for already skilled actors, with low-skill actors finding little utility in vibe coding tools compared to pre-made scripts. The role of jailbroken LLMs (Dark AI) as instructors is also overstated, given the prominence of subculture and social learning in initiation - new users value the social connections and community identity involved in learning hacking and cybercrime skills as much as the knowledge itself. Our initial results, therefore, suggest that even bemoaning the rise of the Vibercriminal may be overstating the level of disruption to date.

cs.CY

Assessing the Aftermath: the Effects of a Global Takedown against DDoS-for-hire Services

Law enforcement and private-sector partners have in recent years conducted various interventions to disrupt the DDoS-for-hire market. Drawing on multiple quantitative datasets, including web traffic and ground-truth visits to seized websites, millions of DDoS attack records from academic, industry, and self-reported statistics, along with chats on underground forums and Telegram channels, we assess the effects of an ongoing global intervention against DDoS-for-hire services since December 2022. This is the most extensive booter takedown to date conducted, combining targeting infrastructure with digital influence tactics in a concerted effort by law enforcement across several countries with two waves of website takedowns and the use of deceptive domains. We found over half of the seized sites in the first wave returned within a median of one day, while all booters seized in the second wave returned within a median of two days. Re-emerged booter domains, despite closely resembling old ones, struggled to attract visitors (80-90% traffic reduction). While the first wave cut the global DDoS attack volume by 20-40% with a statistically significant effect specifically on UDP-based DDoS attacks (commonly attributed to booters), the impact of the second wave appeared minimal. Underground discussions indicated a cumulative impact, leading to changes in user perceptions of safety and causing some operators to leave the market. Despite the extensive intervention efforts, all DDoS datasets consistently suggest that the illicit market is fairly resilient, with an overall short-lived effect on the global DDoS attack volume lasting for at most only around six weeks.

cs.CR

Getting Bored of Cyberwar: Exploring the Role of Low-level Cybercrime Actors in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

There has been substantial commentary on the role of cyberattacks carried out by low-level cybercrime actors in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We analyse 358k website defacement attacks, 1.7M UDP amplification DDoS attacks, 1764 posts made by 372 users on Hack Forums mentioning the two countries, and 441 Telegram announcements (with 58k replies) of a volunteer hacking group for two months before and four months after the invasion. We find the conflict briefly but notably caught the attention of low-level cybercrime actors, with significant increases in online discussion and both types of attacks targeting Russia and Ukraine. However, there was little evidence of high-profile actions; the role of these players in the ongoing hybrid warfare is minor, and they should be separated from persistent and motivated 'hacktivists' in state-sponsored operations. Their involvement in the conflict appears to have been short-lived and fleeting, with a clear loss of interest in discussing the situation and carrying out both website defacement and DDoS attacks against either Russia or Ukraine after just a few weeks.

cs.CR