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Ben Dong

Publications and source records attributed to Ben Dong.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

The Claws in Plain Sight: Unauthorized Context Disclosure through LLM Agent Tool Calls

LLM agents routinely construct tool-call arguments from user profiles, conversation history, retrieved documents, and prior tool results. However, legitimate access to contextual information does not imply authorization to transmit that information for every purpose or destination. We present Claw in Plain Sight, an authority- pressure attack in which task-adjacent content frames protected attributes as operationally or procedurally required, causing a model to include them in otherwise valid generated arguments. We evaluate Claw in Plain Sight using a controlled synthetic benchmark that crosses six pressure levels with four privacy-policy levels across five DeepSeek and Claude model configurations, producing 120 calls. Across the complete pressure-policy matrix, session-level disclosure rates range from 20.8% to 75.0% among the tested models. Stronger privacy instructions reduce aggregate disclosure but do not eliminate it consistently across models, showing that prompt-level policies do not provide a portable enforcement boundary. Our experiments use only synthetic profiles and capture proposed arguments locally; they measure policy-violating generation at the context-to-argument boundary, not completed network exfiltration or leakage from deployed users. These findings motivate purpose- and destination-aware inspection of generated tool arguments before execution.

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Clawdrain: Exploiting Tool-Calling Chains for Stealthy Token Exhaustion in OpenClaw Agents

Modern generative agents such as OpenClaw - an open-source, self-hosted personal assistant with a community skill ecosystem, are gaining attention and are used pervasively. However, the openness and rapid growth of these ecosystems often outpace systematic security evaluation. In this paper, we design, implement, and evaluate Clawdrain, a Trojanized skill that induces a multi-turn "Segmented Verification Protocol" via injected SKILL.md instructions and a companion script that returns PROGRESS/REPAIR/TERMINAL signals. We deploy Clawdrain in a production-like OpenClaw instance with real API billing and a production model (Gemini 2.5 Pro), and we measure 6-7x token amplification over a benign baseline, with a costly, failure configuration reaching approximately 9x. We observe a deployment-only phenomenon: the agent autonomously composes general-purpose tools (e.g., shell/Python) to route around brittle protocol steps, reducing amplification and altering attack dynamics. Finally, we identify production vectors enabled by OpenClaw's architecture, including SKILL.md prompt bloat, persistent tool-output pollution, cron/heartbeat frequency amplification, and behavioral instruction injection. Overall, we demonstrate that token-drain attacks remain feasible in real deployments, but their magnitude and observability are shaped by tool composition, recovery behavior, and interface design.

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CLOAQ: Combined Logic and Angle Obfuscation for Quantum Circuits

In the realm of quantum computing, quantum circuits serve as essential depictions of quantum algorithms, which are then compiled into executable operations for quantum computations. Quantum compilers are responsible for converting these algorithmic quantum circuits into versions compatible with specific quantum hardware, thus connecting quantum software with hardware. Nevertheless, untrusted quantum compilers present notable threats. They have the potential to result in the theft of quantum circuit designs and jeopardize sensitive intellectual property (IP). In this work, we propose CLOAQ, a quantum circuit obfuscation (QCO) approach that hides the logic and the phase angles of selected gates within the obfuscated quantum circuit. To evaluate the effectiveness of CLOAQ, we sample the input state uniformly from the Hilbert space of all qubits, which is more accurate than prior work that use all-|0> inputs. Our results show that CLOAQ benefits from the synergy between logic and phase protections. Compared with prior QCO approaches using only one perspective, the combined method is more resilient to attacks and causes greater functional disruption when the unlocking key is incorrect.

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OptHQC: Optimize HQC for High-Performance Post-Quantum Cryptography

As post-quantum cryptography (PQC) becomes increasingly critical for securing future communication systems, the performance overhead introduced by quantum-resistant algorithms presents a major computing challenge. HQC (Hamming Quasi-Cyclic) is a newly standardized code-based PQC scheme designed to replace classical key exchange methods. In this paper, we propose OptHQC, an optimized implementation of the HQC scheme to deliver high-performance cryptographic operations. Our approach provides a comprehensive analysis of each computational blocks in HQC and introduces optimizations across all three stages: key generation, encryption, and decryption. We first exploit data-level sparsity in vector multiplication to accelerate polynomial operations during vector generation. We then leverage instruction-level acceleration (e.g., AVX2) in hash computation to further improve performance. Last, we transform multiplication into lookup table indexing and optimize memory access patterns in syndrome computation and error vector recovery, which are the most computationally intensive operations in HQC. Overall, OptHQC achieves an average 55% speedup over the reference HQC implementation on CPU.

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Exploiting Timing Side-Channels in Quantum Circuits Simulation Via ML-Based Methods

As quantum computing advances, quantum circuit simulators serve as critical tools to bridge the current gap caused by limited quantum hardware availability. These simulators are typically deployed on cloud platforms, where users submit proprietary circuit designs for simulation. In this work, we demonstrate a novel timing side-channel attack targeting cloud-based quantum simulators. A co-located malicious process can observe fine-grained execution timing patterns to extract sensitive information about concurrently running quantum circuits. We systematically analyze simulator behavior using the QASMBench benchmark suite, profiling timing and memory characteristics across various circuit executions. Our experimental results show that timing profiles exhibit circuit-dependent patterns that can be effectively classified using pattern recognition techniques, enabling the adversary to infer circuit identities and compromise user confidentiality. We were able to achieve 88% to 99.9% identification rate of quantum circuits based on different datasets. This work highlights previously unexplored security risks in quantum simulation environments and calls for stronger isolation mechanisms to protect user workloads

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TetrisLock: Quantum Circuit Split Compilation with Interlocking Patterns

In quantum computing, quantum circuits are fundamental representations of quantum algorithms, which are compiled into executable functions for quantum solutions. Quantum compilers transform algorithmic quantum circuits into one compatible with target quantum computers, bridging quantum software and hardware. However, untrusted quantum compilers pose significant risks. They can lead to the theft of quantum circuit designs and compromise sensitive intellectual property (IP). In this paper, we propose TetrisLock, a split compilation method for quantum circuit obfuscation that uses an interlocking splitting pattern to effectively protect IP with minimal resource overhead. Our approach divides the quantum circuit into two interdependent segments, ensuring that reconstructing the original circuit functionality is possible only by combining both segments and eliminating redundancies. This method makes reverse engineering by an untrusted compiler unrealizable, as the original circuit is never fully shared with any single entity. Also, our approach eliminates the need for a trusted compiler to process the inserted random circuit, thereby relaxing the security requirements. Additionally, it defends against colluding attackers with mismatched numbers of qubits, while maintaining low overhead by preserving the original depth of the quantum circuit. We demonstrate our method by using established RevLib benchmarks, showing that it achieves a minimal impact on functional accuracy (less than 1%) while significantly reducing the likelihood of IP inference.

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Evaluating the Performance of the DeepSeek Model in Confidential Computing Environment

The increasing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) in cloud environments raises critical security concerns, particularly regarding model confidentiality and data privacy. Confidential computing, enabled by Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), offers a promising solution to mitigate these risks. However, existing TEE implementations, primarily CPU-based, struggle to efficiently support the resource-intensive nature of LLM inference and training. In this work, we present the first evaluation of the DeepSeek model within a TEE-enabled confidential computing environment, specifically utilizing Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX). Our study benchmarks DeepSeek's performance across CPU-only, CPU-GPU hybrid, and TEE-based implementations. For smaller parameter sets, such as DeepSeek-R1-1.5B, the TDX implementation outperforms the CPU version in executing computations within a secure environment. It highlights the potential for efficiently deploying LLM models on resource-constrained systems while ensuring security. The overall GPU-to-CPU performance ratio averages 12 across different model sizes, with smaller models exhibiting a lower ratio. Additionally, we provide foundational insights and guidance on optimizing CPU-GPU confidential computing solutions for scalable and secure AI deployments. Our findings contribute to the advancement of privacy-preserving AI, paving the way for efficient and secure LLM inference in confidential computing environments.

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Evaluating Post-Quantum Cryptography on Embedded Systems: A Performance Analysis

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has finalized the selection of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms for use in the era of quantum computing. Despite their integration into TLS protocol for key establishment and signature generation, there is limited study on profiling these newly standardized algorithms in resource-constrained communication systems. In this work, we integrate PQC into both TLS servers and clients built upon embedded systems. Additionally, we compare the performance overhead of PQC pairs to currently used non-PQC schemes.

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Mining Permission Request Patterns from Android and Facebook Applications (extended author version)

Android and Facebook provide third-party applications with access to users' private data and the ability to perform potentially sensitive operations (e.g., post to a user's wall or place phone calls). As a security measure, these platforms restrict applications' privileges with permission systems: users must approve the permissions requested by applications before the applications can make privacy- or security-relevant API calls. However, recent studies have shown that users often do not understand permission requests and lack a notion of typicality of requests. As a first step towards simplifying permission systems, we cluster a corpus of 188,389 Android applications and 27,029 Facebook applications to find patterns in permission requests. Using a method for Boolean matrix factorization for finding overlapping clusters, we find that Facebook permission requests follow a clear structure that exhibits high stability when fitted with only five clusters, whereas Android applications demonstrate more complex permission requests. We also find that low-reputation applications often deviate from the permission request patterns that we identified for high-reputation applications suggesting that permission request patterns are indicative for user satisfaction or application quality.

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