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Ben Golan

Publications and source records attributed to Ben Golan.

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The FACTS Leaderboard: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Large Language Model Factuality

We introduce The FACTS Leaderboard, an online leaderboard suite and associated set of benchmarks that comprehensively evaluates the ability of language models to generate factually accurate text across diverse scenarios. The suite provides a holistic measure of factuality by aggregating the performance of models on four distinct sub-leaderboards: (1) FACTS Multimodal, which measures the factuality of responses to image-based questions; (2) FACTS Parametric, which assesses models' world knowledge by answering closed-book factoid questions from internal parameters; (3) FACTS Search, which evaluates factuality in information-seeking scenarios, where the model must use a search API; and (4) FACTS Grounding (v2), which evaluates whether long-form responses are grounded in provided documents, featuring significantly improved judge models. Each sub-leaderboard employs automated judge models to score model responses, and the final suite score is an average of the four components, designed to provide a robust and balanced assessment of a model's overall factuality. The FACTS Leaderboard Suite will be actively maintained, containing both public and private splits to allow for external participation while guarding its integrity. It can be found at https://www.kaggle.com/benchmarks/google/facts .

cs.CL

Beyond Proportional Individual Guarantees for Binary Perpetual Voting

Perpetual voting studies fair collective decision-making in settings where many decisions are to be made, and is a natural framework for settings such as parliaments and the running of blockchain Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). We focus our attention on the binary case (YES/NO decisions) and \textit{individual} guarantees for each of the participating agents. We introduce a novel notion, inspired by the popular maxi-min-share (MMS) for fair allocation. The agent expects to get as many decisions as if they were to optimally partition the decisions among the agents, with an adversary deciding which of the agents decides on what bundle. We show an online algorithm that guarantees the MMS notion for $n=3$ agents, an offline algorithm for $n=4$ agents, and show that no online algorithm can guarantee the $MMS^{adapt}$ for $n\geq 7$ agents. We also show that the Maximum Nash Welfare (MNW) outcome can only guarantee $O(\frac{1}{n})$ of the MMS notion in the worst case.

cs.GT