SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Ben Smyth

Publications and source records attributed to Ben Smyth.

7 recordsLinked to original sources

Secrecy and Verifiability: An Introduction to Electronic Voting

Democracies are built upon secure and reliable voting systems. Electronic voting systems seek to replace ballot papers and boxes with computer hardware and software. Proposed electronic election schemes have been subjected to scrutiny, with researchers spotting inherent faults and weaknesses. Inspired by physical voting systems, we argue that any electronic voting system needs two essential properties: ballot secrecy and verifiability. These properties seemingly work against each other. An election scheme that is a complete black box offers ballot secrecy, but verification of the outcome is impossible. This challenge can be tackled using standard tools from modern cryptography, reaching a balance that delivers both properties. This tutorial makes these ideas accessible to readers outside electronic voting. We introduce fundamental concepts such as asymmetric and homomorphic encryption, which we use to describe a general electronic election scheme while keeping mathematical formalism minimal. We outline game-based cryptography, a standard approach in modern cryptography, and introduce notation for formulating elections as games. We then give precise definitions of ballot secrecy and verifiability in the framework of game-based cryptography. A principal aim is introducing modern research approaches to electronic voting.

cs.CR

Perils of current DAO governance

DAO Governance is currently broken. We survey the state of the art and find worrying conclusions. Vote buying, vote selling and coercion are easy. The wealthy rule, decentralisation is a myth. Hostile take-overs are incentivised. Ballot secrecy is non-existent or short lived, despite being a human right. Verifiablity is achieved at the expense of privacy. These privacy concerns are highlighted with case study analyses of Vocdoni's governance protocol. This work presents two contributions: firstly a review of current DAO governance protocols, and secondly, an illustration of their vulnerabilities, showcasing the privacy and security threats these entail.

cs.CY

Is your vote truly secret? Ballot Secrecy iff Ballot Independence: Proving necessary conditions and analysing case studies

We formalise definitions of ballot secrecy and ballot independence by Smyth, JCS'21 as indistinguishability games in the computational model of security. These definitions improve upon Smyth, draft '21 to consider a wider class of voting systems. Both Smyth, JCS'21 and Smyth, draft '21 improve on earlier works by considering a more realistic adversary model wherein they have access to the ballot collection. We prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence. We say ballot independence holds if a system has non-malleable ballots. We construct games for ballot secrecy and non-malleability and show that voting schemes with malleable ballots do not preserve ballot secrecy. We demonstrate that Helios does not satisfy our definition of ballot secrecy. Furthermore, the Python framework we constructed for our case study shows that if an attack exists against non-malleability, this attack can be used to break ballot secrecy.

cs.CR

TLS 1.3 for engineers: An exploration of the TLS 1.3 specification and OpenJDK's Java implementation

The Internet delivered in excess of forty terabytes per second in 2017 (Cisco, 2018), and over half of today's Internet traffic is encrypted (Sandvine, 2018); enabling trade worth trillions of dollars (Statista, 2017). Yet, the underlying encryption technology is only understood by a select few. This manuscript broadens understanding by exploring TLS, an encryption technology used to protect application layer communication (including HTTP, FTP and SMTP traffic), and by examining Oracle's Java implementation. We focus on the most recent TLS release, namely, version 1.3, which is defined by RFC 8446.

cs.CR

An Overview of GSMA's M2M Remote Provisioning Specification

M2M devices are ubiquitous, and there is a growing tendency to connect such devices to mobile networks. Network operators are investigating new solutions to lower their costs and to address usability issues. Embedded SIM cards with remote provisioning capability are one of the most promising solutions. GSMA, the leading consortium on mobile network standards, has proposed a specification for such an embedded SIM card, called eUICC. The specification describes eUICC architecture and a remote provisioning mechanism. Embodiments of this specification have the potential to disrupt the telecommunications market: eUICCs will be shipped to device manufacturers and then remotely provisioned with a subscription, whereas (currently) SIMs must be provisioned prior to shipping. In this article, we present a comprehensive overview of GSMA's specification and its motivation. In particular, we describe the technology and the protocols involved in remote provisioning.

cs.NI

Exploiting re-voting in the Helios election system

Election systems must ensure that representatives are chosen by voters. Moreover, each voter should have equal influence. Traditionally, this has been achieved by permitting voters to cast at most one ballot. More recently, this has been achieved by tallying the last ballot cast by each voter. We show this is not achieved by the Helios election system, because an adversary can cause a ballot other than a voter's last to be tallied. Moreover, we show how the adversary can choose the contents of such a ballot, thus the adversary can unduly influence the selection of representatives.

cs.CR

A short introduction to secrecy and verifiability for elections

We explore the fundamental properties that are necessary to ensure that election schemes behave as expected. The exploration reveals how our understanding of those expectations has evolved, culminating in the emergence of formal definitions of properties necessary to fulfil expectations. We provide insights into definitions of secrecy and verifiability, allowing us to learn and appreciate the underlying intuition and technical details of these notions. Equipped with definitions, we can build election schemes that can be proven to behave as expected. And, as an illustrative example, we review a variant of the Helios election system that was built and proven secure, in this way. Furthermore, the definitions can be used to analyse existing election schemes, and vulnerabilities have been uncovered. Indeed, we describe a series of vulnerabilities that were discovered during the analysis of the original Helios system, which advanced our understanding of system behaviour and prompted the design of the aforementioned variant. Thus, this article contributes to the science of security by sharing valuable insights into elections, and demonstrating the value that formal definitions and analysis have in building schemes guaranteed to behave as expected.

cs.CR