arXiv subjects

Ben Wincelberg

Publications and source records attributed to Ben Wincelberg.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Measuring Economic Preferences in the Presence of Noise: The Connections Between Choices and Valuations

Past research highlights failures of "procedural invariance" when measuring economic preferences using choices versus valuations. We reassess these failures by examining theoretical connections between choices and valuations when preferences are stable but measurements are noisy and individuals are heterogeneous. Even under strong assumptions governing noise and heterogeneity, stability does not generally imply identical measurements. We develop new tests of stable preferences in conjunction with various ancillary assumptions about heterogeneity and noise. We implement these tests using existing data to understand if, in the domain of risk preferences, choices and valuations truly differ and to provide quantitative assessments of any deviations. Limiting to the types of data used in the prior literature, we rarely reject the null of stable preferences. With richer data linking individual choices and valuations and structural assumptions, we find evidence of instability which differs qualitatively from the received wisdom that choices implicate greater risk aversion than valuations.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games

We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are responsive to payoffs induced by the play of others and, whenever several games are played simultaneously, players may consider each separately.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Risk Aversion Reversals

Standard stochastic choice models used to estimate risk aversion can lead to risk-aversion reversals, where a more risk-averse individual chooses a riskier lottery more frequently than a less risk-averse individual. We study when reversals are implied by the preference specification rather than the noise specification. We say that two utilities imply reversals in a given noise framework if reversals arise for every specification of noise for each individual. For weak utility, a flexible class that includes logit and probit and allows for menu-dependent noise, two utilities imply reversals if and only if their curvature ratio is unbounded. This condition holds for CARA, CRRA, and their generalizations, for which reversals arise for empirically relevant coefficients and lotteries, raising concerns about resulting estimates and out-of-sample predictions. Finally, we show that equicautious HARA, sum-ex, and sum-power utilities do not imply reversals and that, moreover, these families remain well-behaved for multinomial choice.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

A Separability Foundation for Random Coefficients Logit

We study stochastic choice across decision problems, each represented as a menu of action labels paired with observable outcome vectors. We propose a consistency condition for behavior in decision problems composed of two separable components: choice probabilities must agree with those obtained when each component is considered in isolation. Together with monotonicity and continuity, this separability requirement characterizes the family of random coefficients logit rules.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness

We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) when the intermediary cannot punish deviators, and via the set of individually rational correlated profiles (IRCP) when it can. We characterize games in which the IRCP or the CCE is unique, uncovering a structural link between these solution concepts. Our analysis also provides new conditions for the uniqueness of classical correlated and Nash equilibria that do not rely on the existence of dominant strategies. The resulting equilibria are robust to players' information about the environment, payoff perturbations, pre-play communication, equilibrium selection, and learning dynamics. We apply these results to collusion-proof mechanism design.

econ.TH↗