arXiv subjects

Benjamin Birnbaum

Publications and source records attributed to Benjamin Birnbaum.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2020

Model-assisted cohort selection with bias analysis for generating large-scale cohorts from the EHR for oncology research

Objective Electronic health records (EHRs) are a promising source of data for health outcomes research in oncology. A challenge in using EHR data is that selecting cohorts of patients often requires information in unstructured parts of the record. Machine learning has been used to address this, but even high-performing algorithms may select patients in a non-random manner and bias the resulting cohort. To improve the efficiency of cohort selection while measuring potential bias, we introduce a technique called Model-Assisted Cohort Selection (MACS) with Bias Analysis and apply it to the selection of metastatic breast cancer (mBC) patients. Materials and Methods We trained a model on 17,263 patients using term-frequency inverse-document-frequency (TF-IDF) and logistic regression. We used a test set of 17,292 patients to measure algorithm performance and perform Bias Analysis. We compared the cohort generated by MACS to the cohort that would have been generated without MACS as reference standard, first by comparing distributions of an extensive set of clinical and demographic variables and then by comparing the results of two analyses addressing existing example research questions. Results Our algorithm had an area under the curve (AUC) of 0.976, a sensitivity of 96.0%, and an abstraction efficiency gain of 77.9%. During Bias Analysis, we found no large differences in baseline characteristics and no differences in the example analyses. Conclusion MACS with bias analysis can significantly improve the efficiency of cohort selection on EHR data while instilling confidence that outcomes research performed on the resulting cohort will not be biased.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2018

TIFTI: A Framework for Extracting Drug Intervals from Longitudinal Clinic Notes

Oral drugs are becoming increasingly common in oncology care. In contrast to intravenous chemotherapy, which is administered in the clinic and carefully tracked via structure electronic health records (EHRs), oral drug treatment is self-administered and therefore not tracked as well. Often, the details of oral cancer treatment occur only in unstructured clinic notes. Extracting this information is critical to understanding a patient's treatment history. Yet, this a challenging task because treatment intervals must be inferred longitudinally from both explicit mentions in the text as well as from document timestamps. In this work, we present TIFTI (Temporally Integrated Framework for Treatment Intervals), a robust framework for extracting oral drug treatment intervals from a patient's unstructured notes. TIFTI leverages distinct sources of temporal information by breaking the problem down into two separate subtasks: document-level sequence labeling and date extraction. On a labeled dataset of metastatic renal-cell carcinoma (RCC) patients, it exactly matched the labeled start date in 46% of the examples (86% of the examples within 30 days), and it exactly matched the labeled end date in 52% of the examples (78% of the examples within 30 days). Without retraining, the model achieved a similar level of performance on a labeled dataset of advanced non-small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC) patients.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2009

On Revenue Maximization in Second-Price Ad Auctions

Most recent papers addressing the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction, which does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different than that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem. First, unlike the first-price variant, for which small constant-factor approximations are known, it is NP-hard to approximate the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem to any non-trivial factor. Second, this discrepancy extends even to the 0-1 special case that we call the Second-Price Matching problem (2PM). In particular, offline 2PM is APX-hard, and for online 2PM there is no deterministic algorithm achieving a non-trivial competitive ratio and no randomized algorithm achieving a competitive ratio better than 2. This stands in contrast to the results for the analogous special case in the first-price model, the standard bipartite matching problem, which is solvable in polynomial time and which has deterministic and randomized online algorithms achieving better competitive ratios. On the positive side, we provide a 2-approximation for offline 2PM and a 5.083-competitive randomized algorithm for online 2PM. The latter result makes use of a new generalization of a classic result on the performance of the "Ranking" algorithm for online bipartite matching.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2009

Convergence of Local Dynamics to Balanced Outcomes in Exchange Networks

Bargaining games on exchange networks have been studied by both economists and sociologists. A Balanced Outcome for such a game is an equilibrium concept that combines notions of stability and fairness. In a recent paper, Kleinberg and Tardos introduced balanced outcomes to the computer science community and provided a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the set of such outcomes. Their work left open a pertinent question: are there natural, local dynamics that converge quickly to a balanced outcome? In this paper, we provide a partial answer to this question by showing that simple edge-balancing dynamics converge to a balanced outcome whenever one exists.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2008

Thinking Twice about Second-Price Ad Auctions

Recent work has addressed the algorithmic problem of allocating advertisement space for keywords in sponsored search auctions so as to maximize revenue, most of which assume that pricing is done via a first-price auction. This does not realistically model the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used in practice, in which bidders pay the next-highest bid for keywords that they are allocated. Towards the goal of more realistically modeling these auctions, we introduce the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem, in which bidders' payments are determined by the GSP mechanism. We show that the complexity of the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem is quite different than that of the more studied First-Price Ad Auctions problem. First, unlike the first-price variant, for which small constant-factor approximations are known, it is NP-hard to approximate the Second-Price Ad Auctions problem to any non-trivial factor, even when the bids are small compared to the budgets. Second, this discrepancy extends even to the 0-1 special case that we call the Second-Price Matching problem (2PM). Offline 2PM is APX-hard, and for online 2PM there is no deterministic algorithm achieving a non-trivial competitive ratio and no randomized algorithm achieving a competitive ratio better than 2. This contrasts with the results for the analogous special case in the first-price model, the standard bipartite matching problem, which is solvable in polynomial time and which has deterministic and randomized online algorithms achieving better competitive ratios. On the positive side, we provide a 2-approximation for offline 2PM and a 5.083-competitive randomized algorithm for online 2PM. The latter result makes use of a new generalization of a result on the performance of the "Ranking" algorithm for online bipartite matching.

cs.DS↗