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Benjamin Kang

Publications and source records attributed to Benjamin Kang.

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Function estimation in the empirical Bayes setting

We study function estimation in the empirical Bayes setting for Poisson and normal means. Specifically, given observations $X_i\sim f(\cdot; \theta_i)$ with latent parameters $\theta_i\sim \pi$, the goal is to estimate $\mathbb{E}_{\pi}[\ell(\theta)|X = x]$. This task lies between classical deconvolution (recovering the full prior $\pi$), and standard empirical Bayes mean estimation. While the minimax risk for estimating $\pi$ in the Wasserstein distance is known to decay only logarithmically, we show that estimating the corresponding posterior smooth functionals admits dramatically faster rates. In particular, for polynomial functions of degree $k$ in the Poisson model, we establish a tight total regret bound of $\Theta((\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})^{k+1})$ and $\Theta((\log n)^{2k+1})$ for bounded and subexponential priors, respectively, attainable by estimators mimicking those that achieve optimal regret for the mean estimation problem (Robbins, minimum distance, ERM). In the normal means model, we establish tight total regret bound of $\Theta((\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})^{k+1})$ for bounded priors, and bounds that match up to a polylogarithmic factor for subgaussian priors. Our analysis identifies the approximation-theoretic origin of this improvement: smooth functions can be well-approximated by low-degree polynomials, whereas Lipschitz functions have only $O(\frac{1}{k})$ degree-$k$ polynomial approximation error. The results reveal a sharp hierarchy in the difficulty of empirical Bayes problems: ranging from slow, logarithmic deconvolution to near-parametric convergence for smooth posterior functionals, and establish new connections between nonparametric empirical Bayes theory, polynomial approximation, and statistical inverse problems.

math.ST

All-Pay Auctions as Models for Trade Wars and Military Annexation

We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (military/tariff) power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. In particular, we derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. This work is relevant for the ongoing US-China trade war, and the recent Russian capture of Crimea, as well as historical and future conflicts.

econ.TH

All-Pay Auctions with Different Forfeits

In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.

econ.TH