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Benjamin Livshits

Publications and source records attributed to Benjamin Livshits.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

TierDrop: Harnessing Airdrop Farmers for User Growth

Blockchain platforms attempt to expand their user base by awarding tokens to users, a practice known as issuing airdrops. Empirical data and related work implies that previous airdrops fall short of their stated aim of attracting long-term users, partially due to adversarial farmers who game airdrop mechanisms and receive an outsize share of rewards. In this work, we argue that given the futility of fighting farmers, the airdrop business model should be reconsidered: farmers should be harnessed to generate activity that attracts real users, i.e., strengthens network effects. To understand the impact of farmers on airdrops, we analyze their performance in a market inhabited by two competing platforms and two tiers of users: real users and farmers. We show that counterintuitively, farmers sometimes represent a necessary evil-it can be revenue-optimal for airdrop issuers to give some tokens to farmers, even in the hypothetical case where platforms could costlessly detect and banish all farmers. Although we focus on airdrops, our results generally apply to activity-based incentive schemes.

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Quantifying Arbitrage in Automated Market Makers: An Empirical Study of Ethereum ZK Rollups

Arbitrage can arise from the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same asset in different markets in order to profit from a difference in its price. This work systematically reviews arbitrage opportunities between Automated Market Makers (AMMs) on Ethereum ZK rollups, and Centralised Exchanges (CEXs). First, we propose a theoretical framework to measure such arbitrage opportunities and derive a formula for the related Maximal Arbitrage Value (MAV) that accounts for both price divergences and liquidity available in the trading venues. Then, we empirically measure the historical MAV available between SyncSwap, an AMM on zkSync Era, and Binance, and investigate how quickly misalignments in price are corrected against explicit and implicit market costs. Overall, the cumulative MAV from July to September 2023 on the USDC-ETH SyncSwap pool amounts to $104.96k (0.24% of trading volume).

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The Writing is on the Wall: Analyzing the Boom of Inscriptions and its Impact on Rollup Performance and Cost Efficiency

Late 2023 witnessed significant user activity on EVM chains, resulting in a surge in transaction activity and putting many rollups into the first live test. While some rollups performed well, some others experienced downtime during this period, affecting transaction finality time and gas fees. To address the lack of empirical research on rollups, we perform the first study during a heightened activity during the late 2023 transaction boom, as attributed to inscriptions - a novel technique that enables NFT and ERC-20 token creation on Bitcoin and other blockchains. We observe that minting inscription-based meme tokens on zkSync Era allows for trading at a fraction of the costs, compared to the Bitcoin or Ethereum networks. We also found that the increased transaction activity, over 99% attributed to the minting of new inscription tokens, positively affected other users of zkSync Era, resulting in lowered gas fees. Unlike L1 blockchains, ZK rollups may experience lower gas fees with increased transaction volume. Lastly, the introduction of blobs - a form of temporary data storage - decreased the gas costs of Ethereum rollups, but also raised a number of questions about the security of inscription-based tokens.

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SoK: Decentralized Sequencers for Rollups

Rollups have emerged as a promising solution to enhance blockchain scalability, offering increased throughput, reduced latency, and lower transaction fees. However, they currently rely on a centralized sequencer to determine transaction ordering, compromising the decentralization principle of blockchain systems. Recognizing this, there is a clear need for decentralized sequencers in rollups. However, designing such a system is intricate. This paper presents a comprehensive exploration of decentralized sequencers in rollups, formulating their ideal properties, dissecting their core components, and synthesizing community insights. Our findings emphasize the imperative for an adept sequencer design, harmonizing with the overarching goals of the blockchain ecosystem, and setting a trajectory for subsequent research endeavors.

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The Blockchain Imitation Game

The use of blockchains for automated and adversarial trading has become commonplace. However, due to the transparent nature of blockchains, an adversary is able to observe any pending, not-yet-mined transactions, along with their execution logic. This transparency further enables a new type of adversary, which copies and front-runs profitable pending transactions in real-time, yielding significant financial gains. Shedding light on such "copy-paste" malpractice, this paper introduces the Blockchain Imitation Game and proposes a generalized imitation attack methodology called Ape. Leveraging dynamic program analysis techniques, Ape supports the automatic synthesis of adversarial smart contracts. Over a timeframe of one year (1st of August, 2021 to 31st of July, 2022), Ape could have yielded 148.96M USD in profit on Ethereum, and 42.70M USD on BNB Smart Chain (BSC). Not only as a malicious attack, we further show the potential of transaction and contract imitation as a defensive strategy. Within one year, we find that Ape could have successfully imitated 13 and 22 known Decentralized Finance (DeFi) attacks on Ethereum and BSC, respectively. Our findings suggest that blockchain validators can imitate attacks in real-time to prevent intrusions in DeFi.

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Pool-Party: Exploiting Browser Resource Pools as Side-Channels for Web Tracking

We identify class of covert channels in browsers that are not mitigated by current defenses, which we call "pool-party" attacks. Pool-party attacks allow sites to create covert channels by manipulating limited-but-unpartitioned resource pools. These class of attacks have been known, but in this work we show that they are both more prevalent, more practical for exploitation, and allow exploitation in more ways, than previously identified. These covert channels have sufficient bandwidth to pass cookies and identifiers across site boundaries under practical and real-world conditions. We identify pool-party attacks in all popular browsers, and show they are practical cross-site tracking techniques (i.e., attacks take 0.6s in Chrome and Edge, and 7s in Firefox and Tor Browser). In this paper we make the following contributions: first, we describe pool-party covert channel attacks that exploit limits in application-layer resource pools in browsers. Second, we demonstrate that pool-party attacks are practical, and can be used to track users in all popular browsers; we also share open source implementations of the attack and evaluate them through a representative web crawl. Third, we show that in Gecko based-browsers (including the Tor Browser) pool-party attacks can also be used for cross-profile tracking (e.g., linking user behavior across normal and private browsing sessions). Finally, we discuss possible mitigation strategies and defenses

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Security, Privacy, and Decentralization in Web3

Much of the recent excitement around decentralized finance (DeFi) comes from hopes that DeFi can be a secure, private, less centralized alternative to traditional finance systems. However, people moving to DeFi sites in hopes of improving their security and privacy may end up with less of both as recent attacks have demonstrated. In this work, we improve the understanding of DeFi by conducting the first Web measurements of the security, privacy, and decentralization properties of popular DeFi front ends. We find that DeFi applications -- or dapps -- suffer from the same security and privacy risks that frequent other parts of the Web but those risks are greatly exacerbated considering the money that is involved in DeFi. Our results show that a common tracker can observe user behavior on over 56% of websites we analyzed and many trackers on DeFi sites can trivially link a user's Ethereum address with PII (e.g., user name or demographic information), or phish users by initiating fake Ethereum transactions. Lastly, we establish that despite claims to the opposite, because of companies like Amazon and Cloudflare operating significant Web infrastructure, DeFi as a whole is considerably less decentralized than previously believed.

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STAR: Secret Sharing for Private Threshold Aggregation Reporting

Threshold aggregation reporting systems promise a practical, privacy-preserving solution for developers to learn how their applications are used "\emph{in-the-wild}". Unfortunately, proposed systems to date prove impractical for wide scale adoption, suffering from a combination of requiring: \emph{i)} prohibitive trust assumptions; \emph{ii)} high computation costs; or \emph{iii)} massive user bases. As a result, adoption of truly-private approaches has been limited to only a small number of enormous (and enormously costly) projects. In this work, we improve the state of private data collection by proposing $\mathsf{STAR}$, a highly efficient, easily deployable system for providing cryptographically-enforced $κ$-anonymity protections on user data collection. The $\mathsf{STAR}$ protocol is easy to implement and cheap to run, all while providing privacy properties similar to, or exceeding the current state-of-the-art. Measurements of our open-source implementation of $\mathsf{STAR}$ find that it is $1773\times$ quicker, requires $62.4\times$ less communication, and is $24\times$ cheaper to run than the existing state-of-the-art.

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Blocked or Broken? Automatically Detecting When Privacy Interventions Break Websites

A core problem in the development and maintenance of crowd-sourced filter lists is that their maintainers cannot confidently predict whether (and where) a new filter list rule will break websites. This is a result of enormity of the Web, which prevents filter list authors from broadly understanding the impact of a new blocking rule before they ship it to millions of users. The inability of filter list authors to evaluate the Web compatibility impact of a new rule before shipping it severely reduces the benefits of filter-list-based content blocking: filter lists are both overly-conservative (i.e. rules are tailored narrowly to reduce the risk of breaking things) and error-prone (i.e. blocking tools still break large numbers of sites). To scale to the size and scope of the Web, filter list authors need an automated system to detect when a new filter rule breaks websites, before that breakage has a chance to make it to end users. In this work, we design and implement the first automated system for predicting when a filter list rule breaks a website. We build a classifier, trained on a dataset generated by a combination of compatibility data from the EasyList project and novel browser instrumentation, and find it is accurate to practical levels (AUC 0.88). Our open source system requires no human interaction when assessing the compatibility risk of a proposed privacy intervention. We also present the 40 page behaviors that most predict breakage in observed websites.

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Liquidations: DeFi on a Knife-edge

The trustless nature of permissionless blockchains renders overcollateralization a key safety component relied upon by decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. Nonetheless, factors such as price volatility may undermine this mechanism. In order to protect protocols from suffering losses, undercollateralized positions can be liquidated. In this paper, we present the first in-depth empirical analysis of liquidations on protocols for loanable funds (PLFs). We examine Compound, one of the most widely used PLFs, for a period starting from its conception to September 2020. We analyze participants' behavior and risk-appetite in particular, to elucidate recent developments in the dynamics of the protocol. Furthermore, we assess how this has changed with a modification in Compound's incentive structure and show that variations of only 3% in an asset's dollar price can result in over 10m USD becoming liquidable. To further understand the implications of this, we investigate the efficiency of liquidators. We find that liquidators' efficiency has improved significantly over time, with currently over 70% of liquidable positions being immediately liquidated. Lastly, we provide a discussion on how a false sense of security fostered by a misconception of the stability of non-custodial stablecoins, increases the overall liquidation risk faced by Compound participants.

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Towards Private On-Chain Algorithmic Trading

While quantitative automation related to trading crypto-assets such as ERC-20 tokens has become relatively commonplace, with services such as 3Commas and Shrimpy offering user-friendly web-driven services for even the average crypto trader, we have not yet seen the emergence of on-chain trading as a phenomenon. We hypothesize that just like decentralized exchanges (DEXes) that by now are by some measures more popular than traditional exchanges, process in the space of decentralized finance (DeFi) may enable attractive online trading automation options. In this paper we present ChainBot, an approach for creating algorithmic trading bots with the help of blockchain technology. We show how to partition the computation into on- and off-chain components in a way that provides a measure of end-to-end integrity, while preserving the algorithmic "secret sauce". Our system is enabled with a careful use of algorithm partitioning, zero-knowledge proofs and smart contracts. We also show that with layer-2 (L2) technologies, trades can be kept private, which means that algorithmic parameters are difficult to recover by a chain observer. Our approach offers more transparent access to liquidity and better censorship-resistance compared to traditional off-chain trading approaches. We develop a sample ChainBot and train it on historical data, resulting in returns that are up to 2.4x the buy-and-hold strategy, which we use as our baseline. Our measurements show that across 1000 runs, the end-to-end average execution time for our system is 48.4 seconds. We demonstrate that the frequency of trading does not significantly affect the rate of return and Sharpe ratio, which indicates that we do not have to trade at every block, thereby significantly saving in terms of gas fees. In our implementation, a user who invests \$1,000 would earn \$105, and spend \$3 on gas; assuming a user pool of 1,000 subscribers.

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PrivateFetch: Scalable Catalog Delivery in Privacy-Preserving Advertising

In order to preserve the possibility of an Internet that is free at the point of use, attention is turning to new solutions that would allow targeted advertisement delivery based on behavioral information such as user preferences, without compromising user privacy. Recently, explorations in devising such systems either take approaches that rely on semantic guarantees like $k$-anonymity -- which can be easily subverted when combining with alternative information, and do not take into account the possibility that even knowledge of such clusters is privacy-invasive in themselves. Other approaches provide full privacy by moving all data and processing logic to clients -- but which is prohibitively expensive for both clients and servers. In this work, we devise a new framework called PrivateFetch for building practical ad-delivery pipelines that rely on cryptographic hardness and best-case privacy, rather than syntactic privacy guarantees or reliance on real-world anonymization tools. PrivateFetch utilizes local computation of preferences followed by high-performance single-server private information retrieval (PIR) to ensure that clients can pre-fetch ad content from servers, without revealing any of their inherent characteristics to the content provider. When considering an database of $>1,000,000$ ads, we show that we can deliver $30$ ads to a client in 40 seconds, with total communication costs of 192KB. We also demonstrate the feasibility of PrivateFetch by showing that the monetary cost of running it is less than 1% of average ad revenue. As such, our system is capable of pre-fetching ads for clients based on behavioral and contextual user information, before displaying them during a typical browsing session. In addition, while we test PrivateFetch as a private ad-delivery, the generality of our approach means that it could also be used for other content types.

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ZKSENSE: A Friction-less Privacy-Preserving Human Attestation Mechanism for Mobile Devices

Recent studies show that 20.4% of the internet traffic originates from automated agents. To identify and block such ill-intentioned traffic, mechanisms that verify the humanness of the user are widely deployed, with CAPTCHAs being the most popular. Traditional CAPTCHAs require extra user effort (e.g., solving mathematical puzzles), which can severely downgrade the end-user's experience, especially on mobile, and provide sporadic humanness verification of questionable accuracy. More recent solutions like Google's reCAPTCHA v3, leverage user data, thus raising significant privacy concerns. To address these issues, we present zkSENSE: the first zero-knowledge proof-based humanness attestation system for mobile devices. zkSENSE moves the human attestation to the edge: onto the user's very own device, where humanness of the user is assessed in a privacy-preserving and seamless manner. zkSENSE achieves this by classifying motion sensor outputs of the mobile device, based on a model trained by using both publicly available sensor data and data collected from a small group of volunteers. To ensure the integrity of the process, the classification result is enclosed in a zero-knowledge proof of humanness that can be safely shared with a remote server. We implement zkSENSE as an Android service to demonstrate its effectiveness and practicality. In our evaluation, we show that zkSENSE successfully verifies the humanness of a user across a variety of attacking scenarios and demonstrates 92% accuracy. On a two years old Samsung S9, zkSENSE's attestation takes around 3 seconds (when visual CAPTCHAs need 9.8 seconds) and consumes a negligible amount of battery.

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Stronger Privacy for Federated Collaborative Filtering with Implicit Feedback

Recommender systems are commonly trained on centrally collected user interaction data like views or clicks. This practice however raises serious privacy concerns regarding the recommender's collection and handling of potentially sensitive data. Several privacy-aware recommender systems have been proposed in recent literature, but comparatively little attention has been given to systems at the intersection of implicit feedback and privacy. To address this shortcoming, we propose a practical federated recommender system for implicit data under user-level local differential privacy (LDP). The privacy-utility trade-off is controlled by parameters $ε$ and $k$, regulating the per-update privacy budget and the number of $ε$-LDP gradient updates sent by each user respectively. To further protect the user's privacy, we introduce a proxy network to reduce the fingerprinting surface by anonymizing and shuffling the reports before forwarding them to the recommender. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework on the MovieLens dataset, achieving up to Hit Ratio with K=10 (HR@10) 0.68 on 50k users with 5k items. Even on the full dataset, we show that it is possible to achieve reasonable utility with HR@10>0.5 without compromising user privacy.

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THEMIS: A Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Ad Platform with Reporting Integrity

Online advertising fuels the (seemingly) free internet. However, although users can access most of the web services free of charge, they pay a heavy coston their privacy. They are forced to trust third parties and intermediaries, who not only collect behavioral data but also absorb great amounts of ad revenues. Consequently, more and more users opt out from advertising by resorting to ad blockers, thus costing publishers millions of dollars in lost ad revenues. Albeit there are various privacy-preserving advertising proposals (e.g.,Adnostic, Privad, Brave Ads) from both academia and industry, they all rely on centralized management that users have to blindly trust without being able to audit, while they also fail to guarantee the integrity of the per-formance analytics they provide to advertisers. In this paper, we design and deploy THEMIS, a novel, decentralized and privacy-by-design ad platform that requires zero trust by users. THEMIS (i) provides auditability to its participants, (ii) rewards users for viewing ads, and (iii) allows advertisers to verify the performance and billing reports of their ad campaigns. By leveraging smart contracts and zero-knowledge schemes, we implement a prototype of THEMIS and early performance evaluation results show that it can scale linearly on a multi sidechain setup while it supports more than 51M users on a single-sidechain.

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Attacking the DeFi Ecosystem with Flash Loans for Fun and Profit

Credit allows a lender to loan out surplus capital to a borrower. In the traditional economy, credit bears the risk that the borrower may default on its debt, the lender hence requires upfront collateral from the borrower, plus interest fee payments. Due to the atomicity of blockchain transactions, lenders can offer flash loans, i.e., loans that are only valid within one transaction and must be repaid by the end of that transaction. This concept has lead to a number of interesting attack possibilities, some of which were exploited in February 2020. This paper is the first to explore the implication of transaction atomicity and flash loans for the nascent decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. We show quantitatively how transaction atomicity increases the arbitrage revenue. We moreover analyze two existing attacks with ROIs beyond 500k%. We formulate finding the attack parameters as an optimization problem over the state of the underlying Ethereum blockchain and the state of the DeFi ecosystem. We show how malicious adversaries can efficiently maximize an attack profit and hence damage the DeFi ecosystem further. Specifically, we present how two previously executed attacks can be "boosted" to result in a profit of 829.5k USD and 1.1M USD, respectively, which is a boost of 2.37x and 1.73x, respectively.

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On the Just-In-Time Discovery of Profit-Generating Transactions in DeFi Protocols

In this paper, we investigate two methods that allow us to automatically create profitable DeFi trades, one well-suited to arbitrage and the other applicable to more complicated settings. We first adopt the Bellman-Ford-Moore algorithm with DEFIPOSER-ARB and then create logical DeFi protocol models for a theorem prover in DEFIPOSER-SMT. While DEFIPOSER-ARB focuses on DeFi transactions that form a cycle and performs very well for arbitrage, DEFIPOSER-SMT can detect more complicated profitable transactions. We estimate that DEFIPOSER-ARB and DEFIPOSER-SMT can generate an average weekly revenue of 191.48ETH (76,592USD) and 72.44ETH (28,976USD) respectively, with the highest transaction revenue being 81.31ETH(32,524USD) and22.40ETH (8,960USD) respectively. We further show that DEFIPOSER-SMT finds the known economic bZx attack from February 2020, which yields 0.48M USD. Our forensic investigations show that this opportunity existed for 69 days and could have yielded more revenue if exploited one day earlier. Our evaluation spans 150 days, given 96 DeFi protocol actions, and 25 assets. Looking beyond the financial gains mentioned above, forks deteriorate the blockchain consensus security, as they increase the risks of double-spending and selfish mining. We explore the implications of DEFIPOSER-ARB and DEFIPOSER-SMT on blockchain consensus. Specifically, we show that the trades identified by our tools exceed the Ethereum block reward by up to 874x. Given optimal adversarial strategies provided by a Markov Decision Process (MDP), we quantify the value threshold at which a profitable transaction qualifies as Miner ExtractableValue (MEV) and would incentivize MEV-aware miners to fork the blockchain. For instance, we find that on Ethereum, a miner with a hash rate of 10% would fork the blockchain if an MEV opportunity exceeds 4x the block reward.

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Browselite: A Private Data Saving Solution for the Web

The median webpage has increased in size by more than 80% in the last 4 years. This extra complexity allows for a rich browsing experience, but it hurts the majority of mobile users which still pay for their traffic. This has motivated several data-saving solutions, which aim at reducing the complexity of webpages by transforming their content. Despite each method being unique, they either reduce user privacy by further centralizing web traffic through data-saving middleboxes or introduce web compatibility (Webcompat) issues by removing content that breaks pages in unpredictable ways. In this paper, we argue that data-saving is still possible without impacting either users privacy or Webcompat. Our main observation is that Web images make up a large portion of Web traffic and have negligible impact on Webcompat. To this end we make two main contributions. First, we quantify the potential savings that image manipulation, such as dimension resizing, quality compression, and transcoding, enables at large scale: 300 landing and 880 internal pages. Next, we design and build Browselite, an entirely client-side tool that achieves such data savings through opportunistically instrumenting existing server-side tooling to perform image compression, while simultaneously reducing the total amount of image data fetched. The effect of Browselite on the user experience is quantified using standard page load metrics and a real user study of over 200 users across 50 optimized web pages. Browselite allows for similar savings to middlebox approaches, while offering additional security, privacy, and Webcompat guarantees.

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