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Benson Tsz Kin Leung

Publications and source records attributed to Benson Tsz Kin Leung.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Learning in a Small/Big World

Complexity and limited ability have profound effect on how we learn and make decisions under uncertainty. Using the theory of finite automaton to model belief formation, this paper studies the characteristics of optimal learning behavior in small and big worlds, where the complexity of the environment is low and high, respectively, relative to the cognitive ability of the decision maker. Optimal behavior is well approximated by the Bayesian benchmark in very small world but is more different as the world gets bigger. In addition, in big worlds, the optimal learning behavior could exhibit a wide range of well-documented non-Bayesian learning behavior, including the use of heuristics, correlation neglect, persistent over-confidence, inattentive learning, and other behaviors of model simplification or misspecification. These results establish a clear and testable relationship among the prominence of non-Bayesian learning behavior, complexity, and cognitive ability.

econ.TH↗

Innovation Diffusion among Case-based Decision-makers

This paper analyzes a model of innovation diffusion with case-based individuals a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995,1996,1997), who decide whether to consume an incumbent or a new product based on their and their social neighbors' previous consumption experiences. I analyze how diffusion pattern changes with individual characteristics, innovation characteristics and social network. In particular, radical innovation leads to higher initial speed but lower acceleration compared to increment innovation. Social network with stronger overall social tie, lower degree of homophily or higher exposure of reviews from early adopters speed up diffusion of innovation.

econ.TH↗

Competition, Politics, & Social Media

An increasing number of politicians are relying on cheaper, easier to access technologies such as online social media platforms to communicate with their constituency. These platforms present a cheap and low-barrier channel of communication to politicians, potentially intensifying political competition by allowing many to enter political races. In this study, we demonstrate that lowering costs of communication, which allows many entrants to come into a competitive market, can strengthen an incumbent's position when the newcomers compete by providing more information to the voters. We show an asymmetric bad-news-good-news effect where early negative news hurts the challengers more than the positive news benefit them, such that in aggregate, an incumbent politician's chances of winning is higher with more entrants in the market. Our findings indicate that communication through social media and other platforms can intensify competition, how-ever incumbency advantage may be strengthened rather than weakened as an outcome of higher number of entrants into a political market.

econ.GN↗