arXiv subjects

Bernhard Kasberger

Publications and source records attributed to Bernhard Kasberger.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

A Market Design Proposal for Decoupling Carbon and Electricity Prices

In European day-ahead electricity markets, carbon allowance costs passed through by marginal fossil plants raise consumer expenditure and generate inframarginal rents for non-emitting generators. We propose a settlement modification: when the zonal day-ahead price exceeds a threshold, non-emitting generation is remunerated at the clearing price minus a fixed CO2 proxy deduction, while all other units continue to receive the uniform price. The mechanism thus reallocates a part of the inframarginal rents to consumers. Using hourly data we estimate static average expenditure reductions of about 8.5% in Austria and 4.7% in Germany in 2025. We discuss bidding incentives around the threshold, interactions with Contracts for Difference, implementation in coupled bidding zones, and a gas-cost variant for the 2022 energy crisis.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2025

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction

The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize different ex-post equilibria that feature truthful bidding, demand expansion, and demand reduction. The truthtelling equilibrium is fragile to small asymmetries in the bidders' caps. Moreover, if bidders are sufficiently symmetric, the CMRA is vulnerable to risk-free collusion. We propose an alternative activity rule that prevents such collusive strategies while keeping other equilibria intact. We discuss outcomes of several Danish CMRAs in light of our equilibrium predictions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2023

Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information

We study multi-unit auctions in which bidders have limited knowledge of opponent strategies and values. We characterize optimal prior-free bids; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. Optimal bids are readily computable despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information, and in certain cases admit closed-form solutions. In the pay-as-bid auction the minimax-loss bid is unique; in the uniform-price auction the minimax-loss bid is unique if the bidder is allowed to determine the quantities for which they bid, as in many practical applications. We compare minimax-loss bids and auction outcomes across auction formats, and derive testable predictions.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2022

An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics

In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids but only the expected (winning) bid and lower and upper bounds on the opponent bids. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies and prove the existence of equilibrium beliefs. Finally, we apply the model to estimate the cost distribution in highway procurement auctions and find good performance out-of-sample.

econ.TH↗