arXiv subjects

Bernhard Tellenbach

Publications and source records attributed to Bernhard Tellenbach.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Relocate and Emulate: Re-Hosting Android's Application Layer

Dynamic analysis of Android's application layer typically relies on physical devices, limiting scalability and reproducibility. To compensate, we introduce a systematic re-hosting method that relocates the Android framework and pre-installed software from real device firmware into a fully emulated environment. Our approach integrates vendor-specific components into the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) build system using tailored extraction and injection strategies, producing vendor-flavoured emulator images that preserve system integrity and runtime compatibility. This enables dynamic execution of real-world framework and application-layer components, including proprietary binaries and pre-installed apps, across multiple SDK versions. We evaluate our method on 184 firmware samples from SDK 31-33. It achieves high build and boot success rates, with residual failures primarily occurring during core-service initialization due to baseline strategy limitations, missing dependencies, device-protection checks, or emulator constraints. However, the modular design allows injection strategies to be extended for specific firmware, supporting broader compatibility and future research on automated, adaptive re-hosting. Though we identified potential for optimization through engineering vendor-specific solutions, our research demonstrates the feasibility of vendor-flavoured emulators for scalable, reproducible dynamic analysis.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2024

E-Vote Your Conscience: Perceptions of Coercion and Vote Buying, and the Usability of Fake Credentials in Online Voting

Online voting is attractive for convenience and accessibility, but is more susceptible to voter coercion and vote buying than in-person voting. One mitigation is to give voters fake voting credentials that they can yield to a coercer. Fake credentials appear identical to real ones, but cast votes that are silently omitted from the final tally. An important unanswered question is how ordinary voters perceive such a mitigation: whether they could understand and use fake credentials, and whether the coercion risks justify the costs of mitigation. We present the first systematic study of these questions, involving 150 diverse individuals in Boston, Massachusetts. All participants "registered" and "voted" in a mock election: 120 were exposed to coercion resistance via fake credentials, the rest forming a control group. Of the 120 participants exposed to fake credentials, 96% understood their use. 53% reported that they would create fake credentials in a real-world voting scenario, given the opportunity. 10% mistakenly voted with a fake credential, however. 22% reported either personal experience with or direct knowledge of coercion or vote-buying incidents. These latter participants rated the coercion-resistant system essentially as trustworthy as in-person voting via hand-marked paper ballots. Of the 150 total participants to use the system, 87% successfully created their credentials without assistance; 83% both successfully created and properly used their credentials. Participants give a System Usability Scale score of 70.4, which is slightly above the industry's average score of 68. Our findings appear to support the importance of the coercion problem in general, and the promise of fake credentials as a possible mitigation, but user error rates remain an important usability challenge for future work.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2022

TRIP: Coercion-resistant Registration for E-Voting with Verifiability and Usability in Votegral

Online voting is convenient and flexible, but amplifies the risks of voter coercion and vote buying. One promising mitigation strategy enables voters to give a coercer fake voting credentials, which silently cast votes that do not count. Current systems along these lines make problematic assumptions about credential issuance, however, such as strong trust in a registrar and/or in voter-controlled hardware, or expecting voters to interact with multiple registrars. Votegral is the first coercion-resistant voting architecture that leverages the physical security of in-person registration to address these credential-issuance challenges, amortizing the convenience costs of in-person registration by reusing credentials across successive elections. Votegral's registration component, TRIP, gives voters a kiosk in a privacy booth with which to print real and fake credentials on paper, eliminating dependence on trusted hardware in credential issuance. The voter learns and can verify in the privacy booth which credential is real, but real and fake credentials thereafter appear indistinguishable to others. Only voters actually under coercion, a hopefully-rare case, need to trust the kiosk. To achieve verifiability, each paper credential encodes an interactive zero-knowledge proof, which is sound in real credentials but unsound in fake credentials. Voters observe the difference in the order of printing steps, but need not understand the technical details. Experimental results with our prototype suggest that Votegral is practical and sufficiently scalable for real-world elections. User-visible latency of credential issuance in TRIP is at most 19.7 seconds even on resource-constrained kiosk hardware. A companion usability study indicates that TRIP's usability is competitive with other e-voting systems, and formal proofs support TRIP's combination of coercion-resistance and verifiability.

cs.CR↗