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Bhavook Bhardwaj

Publications and source records attributed to Bhavook Bhardwaj.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Decisions over Sequences: Computability and Choice

We develop a framework to study situations where decision makers face alternatives sequentially. Within this framework, we focus on endogenous stopping behavior using two broad classes of decision rules: \textit{stopping rules} and \textit{bounded stopping rules}. We establish the equivalence of these two classes and examine two of its implications. First, focusing on the procedural aspects of decision making, we define \textit{computable} rules using the model of a Turing machine. Our equivalence result enables us to show that computable rules are implementable by finite automata. Second, we extend the setup of abstract choice theory beyond choice from sets and finite lists, to that from \textit{infinite sequences} of alternatives. The equivalence result allows us to derive \textit{testable implications} of choice behavior. We develop a revealed-preference ``toolkit'' and use it to characterize a threshold-based and a satisficing choice procedure.

econ.TH

Choice by Rejection

We propose a boundedly rational model of choice where agents eliminate dominated alternatives using a transitive rationale before making a choice using a complete rationale. This model is related to the seminal two-stage model of Manzini and Mariotti (2007), the Rational Shortlist Method (RSM). We analyze the model through reversals in choice and provide its behavioral characterization. The procedure satisfies a weaker version of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) allowing for at most two reversals in choice in terms of set inclusion for any pair of alternatives. We show that the underlying rationales can be identified from the observable reversals in the choice. We also characterize a variant of this model in which both the rationales are transitive

econ.TH

Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences

We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocations can yield large welfare losses. Using a simplifying assumption, we characterize all Pareto optimal allocations, which have a simple structure: are peak-preserving and non-wasteful. Finally, we provide simple alternative mechanisms that Pareto dominate that of Wang-Wu, and which achieve envy-freeness or Pareto optimality.

cs.GT