Continuous-Variables Quantum Key Distribution over Standard Telecom Fiber
This paper has been withdrawn
quant-ph↗
arXiv subjects
Bing Qi
Publications and source records attributed to Bing Qi.
Phase-Remapping Attack in Practical Quantum Key Distribution Systems
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used to generate secret keys between two distant parties. Even though QKD has been proven unconditionally secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computation power, practical implementations of QKD may contain loopholes that may lead to the generated secret keys being compromised. In this paper, we propose a phase-remapping attack targeting two practical bidirectional QKD systems (the "plug & play" system and the Sagnac system). We showed that if the users of the systems are unaware of our attack, the final key shared between them can be compromised in some situations. Specifically, we showed that, in the case of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol with ideal single-photon sources, when the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is between 14.6% and 20%, our attack renders the final key insecure, whereas the same range of QBER values has been proved secure if the two users are unaware of our attack; also, we demonstrated three situations with realistic devices where positive key rates are obtained without the consideration of Trojan horse attacks but in fact no key can be distilled. We remark that our attack is feasible with only current technology. Therefore, it is very important to be aware of our attack in order to ensure absolute security. In finding our attack, we minimize the QBER over individual measurements described by a general POVM, which has some similarity with the standard quantum state discrimination problem.
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Quantum key distribution with "dual detectors"
To improve the performance of a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, high speed, low dark count single photon detectors (or low noise homodyne detectors) are required. However, in practice, a fast detector is usually noisy. Here, we propose a "dual detectors" method to improve the performance of a practical QKD system with realistic detectors: the legitimate receiver randomly uses either a fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to bound eavesdropper's information, while the measurement results from the fast detector are used to generate secure key. We apply this idea to various QKD protocols. Simulation results demonstrate significant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated coherent states (GMCS) protocol; while for decoy-state BB84 protocol with weak coherent source, the improvement is moderate. We also discuss various practical issues in implementing the "dual detectors" scheme.
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Experimental quantum key distribution with active phase randomization
Phase randomization is an important assumption made in many security proofs of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Here, we present the first experimental demonstration of QKD with reliable active phase randomization. One key contribution is a polarization-insensitive phase modulator, which we added to a commercial phase-coding QKD system to randomize the global phase of each bit. We also proposed a simple but useful method to verify experimentally that the phase is indeed randomized. Our result shows very low QBER (<1%). We expect this active phase randomization process to be a standard part in future QKD set-ups due to its significance and feasibility.
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Simulation and Implementation of Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution over 60km Telecom Fiber
Decoy state quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proposed as a novel approach to improve dramatically both the security and the performance of practical QKD set-ups. Recently, many theoretical efforts have been made on this topic and have theoretically predicted the high performance of decoy method. However, the gap between theory and experiment remains open. In this paper, we report the first experiments on decoy state QKD, thus bridging the gap. Two protocols of decoy state QKD are implemented: one-decoy protocol over 15km of standard telecom fiber, and weak+vacuum protocol over 60km of standard telecom fiber. We implemented the decoy state method on a modified commercial QKD system. The modification we made is simply adding commercial acousto-optic modulator (AOM) on the QKD system. The AOM is used to modulate the intensity of each signal individually, thus implementing the decoy state method. As an important part of implementation, numerical simulation of our set-up is also performed. The simulation shows that standard security proofs give a zero key generation rate at the distance we perform decoy state QKD (both 15km and 60km). Therefore decoy state QKD is necessary for long distance secure communication. Our implementation shows explicitly the power and feasibility of decoy method, and brings it to our real-life.
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High-resolution, large dynamic range fiber length measurement based on frequency-shifted asymmetrical Sagnac interferometer
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a single-mode fiber length and dispersion measurement system based on a novel frequency-shifted asymmetric Sagnac interferometer incorporating an acousto-optic modulator (AOM). By sweeping the driving frequency of the AOM, which is asymmetrically placed in the Sagnac loop, the optical length of the fiber can be determined by measuring the corresponding variation in the phase delay between the two counter-propagating light beams. Combined with a high-resolution data processing algorithm, this system yields a dynamic range from a few centimeters to 60km (limited only by our availability of long fibers) with a resolution about 1ppm for long fibers.
physics.optics↗
Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems
Recently, a new type of attack, which exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors (SPD) in a quantum key distribution (QKD) system, has been proposed. In this paper, we propose another "time-shift" attack that exploits the same imperfection. In our attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of either the signal pulse or the synchronization pulse or both between Alice and Bob. In particular, in a QKD system where Bob employs time-multiplexing technique to detect both bit "0" and bit "1" with the same SPD, Eve, in principle, could acquire full information on the final key without introducing any error. Finally, we discuss some counter measures against our and earlier attacks.
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Quantum key distribution based on a Sagnac loop interferometer and polarization-insensitive phase modulators
We present a design for a quantum key distribution(QKD) system in a Sagnac loop configuration, employing a novel phase modulation scheme based on frequency shift, and demonstrate stable BB84 QKD operation with high interference visibility and low quantum bit error rate (QBER). The phase modulation is achieved by sending two light pulses with a fixed time delay (or a fixed optical path delay) through a frequency shift element and by modulating the amount of frequency shift. The relative phase between two light pulses upon leaving the frequency-shift element is determined by both the time delay (or the optical path delay) and the frequency shift, and can therefore be controlled by varying the amount of frequency shift. To demonstrate its operation, we used an acousto-optic modulator (AOM) as the frequency-shift element, and vary the driving frequency of the AOM to encode phase information.The interference visibility for a 40km and a 10km fiber loop is 96% and 99%, respectively, at single photon level. We ran BB84 protocol in a 40-km Sagnac loop setup continuously for one hour and the measured QBER remained within the 2%~5% range. A further advantage of our scheme is that both phase and amplitude modulation can be achieved simultaneously by frequency and amplitude modulation of the AOM's driving signal, allowing our QKD system the capability of implementing other protocols, such as the decoy-state QKD and the continuous- variable QKD. We also briefly discuss a new type of Eavesdropping strategy ("phaseremapping" attack) in bidirectional QKD system.
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Single photon continuous variable quantum key distribution based on energy-time uncertainty relation
In previous quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, information is encoded on either the discrete-variable of single-photon signal or continuous-variables of multi-photon signal. Here, we propose a new QKD protocol by encoding information on continuous-variables of a single photon. In this protocol, Alice randomly encodes her information on either the central frequency of a narrow-band single photon pulse or the time-delay of a broadband single photon pulse, while Bob randomly chooses to do either frequency measurement or time measurement. The security of this protocol rests on the energy-time uncertainty relation, which prevents Eve from simultaneously determining both frequency and time information with arbitrarily high resolution. In practice, this scheme may be more robust against various channel noises, such as polarization and phase fluctuations.
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Experimental Quantum Key Distribution with Decoy States
To increase dramatically the distance and the secure key generation rate of quantum key distribution (QKD), the idea of quantum decoys--signals of different intensities--has recently been proposed. Here, we present the first experimental implementation of decoy state QKD. By making simple modifications to a commercial quantum key distribution system, we show that a secure key generation rate of 165bit/s, which is 1/4 of the theoretical limit, can be obtained over 15km of a Telecom fiber. We also show that with the same experimental parameters, not even a single bit of secure key can be extracted with a non-decoy-state protocol. Compared to building single photon sources, decoy state QKD is a much simpler method for increasing the distance and key generation rate of unconditionally secure QKD.
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