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Binghui Wang

Publications and source records attributed to Binghui Wang.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources
arXiv2025

GenoArmory: A Unified Evaluation Framework for Adversarial Attacks on Genomic Foundation Models

We propose the first unified adversarial attack benchmark for Genomic Foundation Models (GFMs), named GenoArmory. Unlike existing GFM benchmarks, GenoArmory offers the first comprehensive evaluation framework to systematically assess the vulnerability of GFMs to adversarial attacks. Methodologically, we evaluate the adversarial robustness of five state-of-the-art GFMs using four widely adopted attack algorithms and three defense strategies. Importantly, our benchmark provides an accessible and comprehensive framework to analyze GFM vulnerabilities with respect to model architecture, quantization schemes, and training datasets. Additionally, we introduce GenoAdv, a new adversarial sample dataset designed to improve GFM safety. Empirically, classification models exhibit greater robustness to adversarial perturbations compared to generative models, highlighting the impact of task type on model vulnerability. Moreover, adversarial attacks frequently target biologically significant genomic regions, suggesting that these models effectively capture meaningful sequence features.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2025

Practical, Generalizable and Robust Backdoor Attacks on Text-to-Image Diffusion Models

Text-to-image diffusion models (T2I DMs) have achieved remarkable success in generating high-quality and diverse images from text prompts, yet recent studies have revealed their vulnerability to backdoor attacks. Existing attack methods suffer from critical limitations: 1) they rely on unnatural adversarial prompts that lack human readability and require massive poisoned data; 2) their effectiveness is typically restricted to specific models, lacking generalizability; and 3) they can be mitigated by recent backdoor defenses. To overcome these challenges, we propose a novel backdoor attack framework that achieves three key properties: 1) \emph{Practicality}: Our attack requires only a few stealthy backdoor samples to generate arbitrary attacker-chosen target images, as well as ensuring high-quality image generation in benign scenarios. 2) \emph{Generalizability:} The attack is applicable across multiple T2I DMs without requiring model-specific redesign. 3) \emph{Robustness:} The attack remains effective against existing backdoor defenses and adaptive defenses. Our extensive experimental results on multiple T2I DMs demonstrate that with only 10 carefully crafted backdoored samples, our attack method achieves $>$90\% attack success rate with negligible degradation in benign image generation quality. We also conduct human evaluation to validate our attack effectiveness. Furthermore, recent backdoor detection and mitigation methods, as well as adaptive defense tailored to our attack are not sufficiently effective, highlighting the pressing need for more robust defense mechanisms against the proposed attack.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2025

Rectifying Privacy and Efficacy Measurements in Machine Unlearning: A New Inference Attack Perspective

Machine unlearning focuses on efficiently removing specific data from trained models, addressing privacy and compliance concerns with reasonable costs. Although exact unlearning ensures complete data removal equivalent to retraining, it is impractical for large-scale models, leading to growing interest in inexact unlearning methods. However, the lack of formal guarantees in these methods necessitates the need for robust evaluation frameworks to assess their privacy and effectiveness. In this work, we first identify several key pitfalls of the existing unlearning evaluation frameworks, e.g., focusing on average-case evaluation or targeting random samples for evaluation, incomplete comparisons with the retraining baseline. Then, we propose RULI (Rectified Unlearning Evaluation Framework via Likelihood Inference), a novel framework to address critical gaps in the evaluation of inexact unlearning methods. RULI introduces a dual-objective attack to measure both unlearning efficacy and privacy risks at a per-sample granularity. Our findings reveal significant vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art unlearning methods, where RULI achieves higher attack success rates, exposing privacy risks underestimated by existing methods. Built on a game-based foundation and validated through empirical evaluations on both image and text data (spanning tasks from classification to generation), RULI provides a rigorous, scalable, and fine-grained methodology for evaluating unlearning techniques.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2025

Deterministic Certification of Graph Neural Networks against Graph Poisoning Attacks with Arbitrary Perturbations

Graph neural networks (GNNs) are becoming the de facto method to learn on the graph data and have achieved the state-of-the-art on node and graph classification tasks. However, recent works show GNNs are vulnerable to training-time poisoning attacks -- marginally perturbing edges, nodes, or/and node features of training graph(s) can largely degrade GNNs' testing performance. Most previous defenses against graph poisoning attacks are empirical and are soon broken by adaptive / stronger ones. A few provable defenses provide robustness guarantees, but have large gaps when applied in practice: 1) restrict the attacker on only one type of perturbation; 2) design for a particular GNN architecture or task; and 3) robustness guarantees are not 100\% accurate. In this work, we bridge all these gaps by developing PGNNCert, the first certified defense of GNNs against poisoning attacks under arbitrary (edge, node, and node feature) perturbations with deterministic robustness guarantees. Extensive evaluations on multiple node and graph classification datasets and GNNs demonstrate the effectiveness of PGNNCert to provably defend against arbitrary poisoning perturbations. PGNNCert is also shown to significantly outperform the state-of-the-art certified defenses against edge perturbation or node perturbation during GNN training.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2025

FedTilt: Towards Multi-Level Fairness-Preserving and Robust Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) is an emerging decentralized learning paradigm that can partly address the privacy concern that cannot be handled by traditional centralized and distributed learning. Further, to make FL practical, it is also necessary to consider constraints such as fairness and robustness. However, existing robust FL methods often produce unfair models, and existing fair FL methods only consider one-level (client) fairness and are not robust to persistent outliers (i.e., injected outliers into each training round) that are common in real-world FL settings. We propose \texttt{FedTilt}, a novel FL that can preserve multi-level fairness and be robust to outliers. In particular, we consider two common levels of fairness, i.e., \emph{client fairness} -- uniformity of performance across clients, and \emph{client data fairness} -- uniformity of performance across different classes of data within a client. \texttt{FedTilt} is inspired by the recently proposed tilted empirical risk minimization, which introduces tilt hyperparameters that can be flexibly tuned. Theoretically, we show how tuning tilt values can achieve the two-level fairness and mitigate the persistent outliers, and derive the convergence condition of \texttt{FedTilt} as well. Empirically, our evaluation results on a suite of realistic federated datasets in diverse settings show the effectiveness and flexibility of the \texttt{FedTilt} framework and the superiority to the state-of-the-arts.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2025

Provably Robust Explainable Graph Neural Networks against Graph Perturbation Attacks

Explaining Graph Neural Network (XGNN) has gained growing attention to facilitate the trust of using GNNs, which is the mainstream method to learn graph data. Despite their growing attention, Existing XGNNs focus on improving the explanation performance, and its robustness under attacks is largely unexplored. We noticed that an adversary can slightly perturb the graph structure such that the explanation result of XGNNs is largely changed. Such vulnerability of XGNNs could cause serious issues particularly in safety/security-critical applications. In this paper, we take the first step to study the robustness of XGNN against graph perturbation attacks, and propose XGNNCert, the first provably robust XGNN. Particularly, our XGNNCert can provably ensure the explanation result for a graph under the worst-case graph perturbation attack is close to that without the attack, while not affecting the GNN prediction, when the number of perturbed edges is bounded. Evaluation results on multiple graph datasets and GNN explainers show the effectiveness of XGNNCert.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2025

AGNNCert: Defending Graph Neural Networks against Arbitrary Perturbations with Deterministic Certification

Graph neural networks (GNNs) achieve the state-of-the-art on graph-relevant tasks such as node and graph classification. However, recent works show GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations include the perturbation on edges, nodes, and node features, the three components forming a graph. Empirical defenses against such attacks are soon broken by adaptive ones. While certified defenses offer robustness guarantees, they face several limitations: 1) almost all restrict the adversary's capability to only one type of perturbation, which is impractical; 2) all are designed for a particular GNN task, which limits their applicability; and 3) the robustness guarantees of all methods except one are not 100% accurate. We address all these limitations by developing AGNNCert, the first certified defense for GNNs against arbitrary (edge, node, and node feature) perturbations with deterministic robustness guarantees, and applicable to the two most common node and graph classification tasks. AGNNCert also encompass existing certified defenses as special cases. Extensive evaluations on multiple benchmark node/graph classification datasets and two real-world graph datasets, and multiple GNNs validate the effectiveness of AGNNCert to provably defend against arbitrary perturbations. AGNNCert also shows its superiority over the state-of-the-art certified defenses against the individual edge perturbation and node perturbation.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

Practicable Black-box Evasion Attacks on Link Prediction in Dynamic Graphs -- A Graph Sequential Embedding Method

Link prediction in dynamic graphs (LPDG) has been widely applied to real-world applications such as website recommendation, traffic flow prediction, organizational studies, etc. These models are usually kept local and secure, with only the interactive interface restrictively available to the public. Thus, the problem of the black-box evasion attack on the LPDG model, where model interactions and data perturbations are restricted, seems to be essential and meaningful in practice. In this paper, we propose the first practicable black-box evasion attack method that achieves effective attacks against the target LPDG model, within a limited amount of interactions and perturbations. To perform effective attacks under limited perturbations, we develop a graph sequential embedding model to find the desired state embedding of the dynamic graph sequences, under a deep reinforcement learning framework. To overcome the scarcity of interactions, we design a multi-environment training pipeline and train our agent for multiple instances, by sharing an aggregate interaction buffer. Finally, we evaluate our attack against three advanced LPDG models on three real-world graph datasets of different scales and compare its performance with related methods under the interaction and perturbation constraints. Experimental results show that our attack is both effective and practicable.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

Learning Robust and Privacy-Preserving Representations via Information Theory

Machine learning models are vulnerable to both security attacks (e.g., adversarial examples) and privacy attacks (e.g., private attribute inference). We take the first step to mitigate both the security and privacy attacks, and maintain task utility as well. Particularly, we propose an information-theoretic framework to achieve the goals through the lens of representation learning, i.e., learning representations that are robust to both adversarial examples and attribute inference adversaries. We also derive novel theoretical results under our framework, e.g., the inherent trade-off between adversarial robustness/utility and attribute privacy, and guaranteed attribute privacy leakage against attribute inference adversaries.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2024

FedGMark: Certifiably Robust Watermarking for Federated Graph Learning

Federated graph learning (FedGL) is an emerging learning paradigm to collaboratively train graph data from various clients. However, during the development and deployment of FedGL models, they are susceptible to illegal copying and model theft. Backdoor-based watermarking is a well-known method for mitigating these attacks, as it offers ownership verification to the model owner. We take the first step to protect the ownership of FedGL models via backdoor-based watermarking. Existing techniques have challenges in achieving the goal: 1) they either cannot be directly applied or yield unsatisfactory performance; 2) they are vulnerable to watermark removal attacks; and 3) they lack of formal guarantees. To address all the challenges, we propose FedGMark, the first certified robust backdoor-based watermarking for FedGL. FedGMark leverages the unique graph structure and client information in FedGL to learn customized and diverse watermarks. It also designs a novel GL architecture that facilitates defending against both the empirical and theoretically worst-case watermark removal attacks. Extensive experiments validate the promising empirical and provable watermarking performance of FedGMark. Source code is available at: https://github.com/Yuxin104/FedGMark.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

Leveraging Local Structure for Improving Model Explanations: An Information Propagation Approach

Numerous explanation methods have been recently developed to interpret the decisions made by deep neural network (DNN) models. For image classifiers, these methods typically provide an attribution score to each pixel in the image to quantify its contribution to the prediction. However, most of these explanation methods appropriate attribution scores to pixels independently, even though both humans and DNNs make decisions by analyzing a set of closely related pixels simultaneously. Hence, the attribution score of a pixel should be evaluated jointly by considering itself and its structurally-similar pixels. We propose a method called IProp, which models each pixel's individual attribution score as a source of explanatory information and explains the image prediction through the dynamic propagation of information across all pixels. To formulate the information propagation, IProp adopts the Markov Reward Process, which guarantees convergence, and the final status indicates the desired pixels' attribution scores. Furthermore, IProp is compatible with any existing attribution-based explanation method. Extensive experiments on various explanation methods and DNN models verify that IProp significantly improves them on a variety of interpretability metrics.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2024

Certifiable Black-Box Attacks with Randomized Adversarial Examples: Breaking Defenses with Provable Confidence

Black-box adversarial attacks have demonstrated strong potential to compromise machine learning models by iteratively querying the target model or leveraging transferability from a local surrogate model. Recently, such attacks can be effectively mitigated by state-of-the-art (SOTA) defenses, e.g., detection via the pattern of sequential queries, or injecting noise into the model. To our best knowledge, we take the first step to study a new paradigm of black-box attacks with provable guarantees -- certifiable black-box attacks that can guarantee the attack success probability (ASP) of adversarial examples before querying over the target model. This new black-box attack unveils significant vulnerabilities of machine learning models, compared to traditional empirical black-box attacks, e.g., breaking strong SOTA defenses with provable confidence, constructing a space of (infinite) adversarial examples with high ASP, and the ASP of the generated adversarial examples is theoretically guaranteed without verification/queries over the target model. Specifically, we establish a novel theoretical foundation for ensuring the ASP of the black-box attack with randomized adversarial examples (AEs). Then, we propose several novel techniques to craft the randomized AEs while reducing the perturbation size for better imperceptibility. Finally, we have comprehensively evaluated the certifiable black-box attacks on the CIFAR10/100, ImageNet, and LibriSpeech datasets, while benchmarking with 16 SOTA black-box attacks, against various SOTA defenses in the domains of computer vision and speech recognition. Both theoretical and experimental results have validated the significance of the proposed attack. The code and all the benchmarks are available at \url{https://github.com/datasec-lab/CertifiedAttack}.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2024

Understanding Data Reconstruction Leakage in Federated Learning from a Theoretical Perspective

Federated learning (FL) is an emerging collaborative learning paradigm that aims to protect data privacy. Unfortunately, recent works show FL algorithms are vulnerable to the serious data reconstruction attacks. However, existing works lack a theoretical foundation on to what extent the devices' data can be reconstructed and the effectiveness of these attacks cannot be compared fairly due to their unstable performance. To address this deficiency, we propose a theoretical framework to understand data reconstruction attacks to FL. Our framework involves bounding the data reconstruction error and an attack's error bound reflects its inherent attack effectiveness. Under the framework, we can theoretically compare the effectiveness of existing attacks. For instance, our results on multiple datasets validate that the iDLG attack inherently outperforms the DLG attack.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

PoisonedRAG: Knowledge Corruption Attacks to Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success due to their exceptional generative capabilities. Despite their success, they also have inherent limitations such as a lack of up-to-date knowledge and hallucination. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a state-of-the-art technique to mitigate these limitations. The key idea of RAG is to ground the answer generation of an LLM on external knowledge retrieved from a knowledge database. Existing studies mainly focus on improving the accuracy or efficiency of RAG, leaving its security largely unexplored. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. We find that the knowledge database in a RAG system introduces a new and practical attack surface. Based on this attack surface, we propose PoisonedRAG, the first knowledge corruption attack to RAG, where an attacker could inject a few malicious texts into the knowledge database of a RAG system to induce an LLM to generate an attacker-chosen target answer for an attacker-chosen target question. We formulate knowledge corruption attacks as an optimization problem, whose solution is a set of malicious texts. Depending on the background knowledge (e.g., black-box and white-box settings) of an attacker on a RAG system, we propose two solutions to solve the optimization problem, respectively. Our results show PoisonedRAG could achieve a 90% attack success rate when injecting five malicious texts for each target question into a knowledge database with millions of texts. We also evaluate several defenses and our results show they are insufficient to defend against PoisonedRAG, highlighting the need for new defenses.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

Efficient Byzantine-Robust and Provably Privacy-Preserving Federated Learning

Federated learning (FL) is an emerging distributed learning paradigm without sharing participating clients' private data. However, existing works show that FL is vulnerable to both Byzantine (security) attacks and data reconstruction (privacy) attacks. Almost all the existing FL defenses only address one of the two attacks. A few defenses address the two attacks, but they are not efficient and effective enough. We propose BPFL, an efficient Byzantine-robust and provably privacy-preserving FL method that addresses all the issues. Specifically, we draw on state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust FL methods and use similarity metrics to measure the robustness of each participating client in FL. The validity of clients are formulated as circuit constraints on similarity metrics and verified via a zero-knowledge proof. Moreover, the client models are masked by a shared random vector, which is generated based on homomorphic encryption. In doing so, the server receives the masked client models rather than the true ones, which are proven to be private. BPFL is also efficient due to the usage of non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. Experimental results on various datasets show that our BPFL is efficient, Byzantine-robust, and privacy-preserving.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

A Learning-Based Attack Framework to Break SOTA Poisoning Defenses in Federated Learning

Federated Learning (FL) is a novel client-server distributed learning framework that can protect data privacy. However, recent works show that FL is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Many defenses with robust aggregators (AGRs) are proposed to mitigate the issue, but they are all broken by advanced attacks. Very recently, some renewed robust AGRs are designed, typically with novel clipping or/and filtering strate-gies, and they show promising defense performance against the advanced poisoning attacks. In this paper, we show that these novel robust AGRs are also vulnerable to carefully designed poisoning attacks. Specifically, we observe that breaking these robust AGRs reduces to bypassing the clipping or/and filtering of malicious clients, and propose an optimization-based attack framework to leverage this observation. Under the framework, we then design the customized attack against each robust AGR. Extensive experiments on multiple datasets and threat models verify our proposed optimization-based attack can break the SOTA AGRs. We hence call for novel defenses against poisoning attacks to FL. Code is available at: https://github.com/Yuxin104/ BreakSTOAPoisoningDefenses.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2024

Universally Harmonizing Differential Privacy Mechanisms for Federated Learning: Boosting Accuracy and Convergence

Differentially private federated learning (DP-FL) is a promising technique for collaborative model training while ensuring provable privacy for clients. However, optimizing the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy remains a critical challenge. To our best knowledge, we propose the first DP-FL framework (namely UDP-FL), which universally harmonizes any randomization mechanism (e.g., an optimal one) with the Gaussian Moments Accountant (viz. DP-SGD) to significantly boost accuracy and convergence. Specifically, UDP-FL demonstrates enhanced model performance by mitigating the reliance on Gaussian noise. The key mediator variable in this transformation is the Rényi Differential Privacy notion, which is carefully used to harmonize privacy budgets. We also propose an innovative method to theoretically analyze the convergence for DP-FL (including our UDP-FL ) based on mode connectivity analysis. Moreover, we evaluate our UDP-FL through extensive experiments benchmarked against state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods, demonstrating superior performance on both privacy guarantees and model performance. Notably, UDP-FL exhibits substantial resilience against different inference attacks, indicating a significant advance in safeguarding sensitive data in federated learning environments.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2024

Distributed Backdoor Attacks on Federated Graph Learning and Certified Defenses

Federated graph learning (FedGL) is an emerging federated learning (FL) framework that extends FL to learn graph data from diverse sources. FL for non-graph data has shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which inject a shared backdoor trigger into the training data such that the trained backdoored FL model can predict the testing data containing the trigger as the attacker desires. However, FedGL against backdoor attacks is largely unexplored, and no effective defense exists. In this paper, we aim to address such significant deficiency. First, we propose an effective, stealthy, and persistent backdoor attack on FedGL. Our attack uses a subgraph as the trigger and designs an adaptive trigger generator that can derive the effective trigger location and shape for each graph. Our attack shows that empirical defenses are hard to detect/remove our generated triggers. To mitigate it, we further develop a certified defense for any backdoored FedGL model against the trigger with any shape at any location. Our defense involves carefully dividing a testing graph into multiple subgraphs and designing a majority vote-based ensemble classifier on these subgraphs. We then derive the deterministic certified robustness based on the ensemble classifier and prove its tightness. We extensively evaluate our attack and defense on six graph datasets. Our attack results show our attack can obtain > 90% backdoor accuracy in almost all datasets. Our defense results show, in certain cases, the certified accuracy for clean testing graphs against an arbitrary trigger with size 20 can be close to the normal accuracy under no attack, while there is a moderate gap in other cases. Moreover, the certified backdoor accuracy is always 0 for backdoored testing graphs generated by our attack, implying our defense can fully mitigate the attack. Source code is available at: https://github.com/Yuxin104/Opt-GDBA.

cs.CR↗