arXiv subjects

Bobak Pakzad-Hurson

Publications and source records attributed to Bobak Pakzad-Hurson.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Competition, Persuasion, and Search

How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of sampled goods by repeatedly purchasing signals from profit-maximizing information brokers. Brokers design and price signals but can commit only to spot contracts. We characterize the equilibrium payoff set as a function of the market structure -- the number of competing brokers. When search costs are low, market structure affects neither surplus generation nor its division. When costs are high, however, competition benefits the agent but reduces total surplus relative to monopoly. Methodologically, we extend repeated-games theory to stopping problems such as sequential search.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Equal Pay for Similar Work

Equal pay laws increasingly require that workers doing "similar" work are paid equal wages within firm. We study such "equal pay for similar work" (EPSW) policies theoretically and test our model's predictions empirically using evidence from a 2009 Chilean EPSW. When EPSW only binds across protected class (e.g., no woman can be paid less than any similar man, and vice versa), firms segregate their workforce by gender. When there are more men than women in a labor market, EPSW increases the gender wage gap. By contrast, EPSW that is not based on protected class can decrease the gender wage gap.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Bertrand Menu Competition

We study a variation of the price competition model a la Bertrand, in which firms must offer menus of contracts that obey monotonicity constraints, e.g., wages that rise with worker productivity to comport with equal pay legislation. While such constraints limit firms' ability to undercut their competitors, we show that Bertrand's classic result still holds: competition drives firm profits to zero and leads to efficient allocations without rationing. Our findings suggest that Bertrand's logic extends to a broader variety of markets, including labor and product markets that are subject to real-world constraints on pricing across workers and products.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Persuaded Search

We consider sequential search by an agent who cannot observe the quality of goods but can acquire information by buying signals from a profit-maximizing principal with limited commitment power. The principal can charge higher prices for more informative signals in any period, but high prices in the future discourage continued search by the agent, thereby reducing the principal's future profits. A unique stationary equilibrium outcome exists, and we show that the principal $(i)$ induces the socially efficient stopping rule, $(ii)$ extracts the full surplus, and $(iii)$ persuades the agent against settling for marginal goods, extending the duration of surplus extraction. However, introducing an additional, free source of information can lead to inefficiency in equilibrium.

econ.TH↗