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Bokang Zeng

Publications and source records attributed to Bokang Zeng.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

TrajMark: Ownership Attribution and Segment-Level Tamper Localization for Coding-Agent Trajectories

Watermarking the final patch produced by a coding agent provides provenance evidence for the submitted artifact, but does not authenticate the visible process that produced it. Behavioral watermarking methods primarily provide a global detection or identifier-recovery signal, so a locally edited trajectory may retain sufficient ownership evidence without revealing which protected region has become inconsistent. To address this limitation, we propose TrajMark, a training-free, symmetric-key, visible-only trajectory watermarking framework that separates robust ownership attribution from fragile local integrity verification. Our framework consists of two complementary layers: a sparse owner layer that encodes a six-bit deployment identifier by rewriting a keyed subset of naturally occurring READ actions into masked linear equations, and a localization layer that inserts linked Q12 ordinary, group, and terminal seals to commit to protected critical-action segments. This separation allows ownership evidence to accumulate robustly across trajectories, while local modifications perturb nearby keyed commitments and expose the affected protocol region. We further provide a design-level analysis of owner recoverability, integrity collision probability, structural overhead, and localization behavior. Across three coding-agent frameworks and three LLMs, TrajMark recovers the exact owner in all evaluated clean full-watermark batches. Under exhaustive eligible single-site attacks it detects 95.5%-100% of edits, and under random single-action corruption it localizes 95.8% of modified sites to an accepted protocol region rather than to the individual action. Owner marking adds no trajectory actions; the integrity layer adds explicit read-only seals, and matched Pass@1 is 26.9% versus 26.3% for unwatermarked runs.

cs.CR

IRIS: Visual-Semantic Binding for Forgery-Resistant Watermarking of Diffusion Images

Most in-generation diffusion watermarks embed patterns independent of the image that carries them, and attackers transplant the marks onto images the generator did not produce, resulting in forgery. Binding the mark to visual semantics prevents such transplantation, yet existing bindings anchor to a proxy image rather than the image they mark. Realizing visual-semantic binding inside generation faces two challenges. The mark derives from the image itself yet enters the sampling trajectory before that image exists, and may itself shift the semantics it binds. The binding also meets opposite sensitivity demands, breaking under semantic change while holding through common processing. We present IRIS, a training-free watermarking scheme that embeds an Intrinsic Ring Identifier from Semantics. IRIS reads a content code from the non-watermarked generated image, derives a one-time ring from the code and a secret key, returns to the final low-noise steps of the same trajectory and blends the ring in, after the semantics it binds are settled. To meet the opposite sensitivity demands, the code is read through a canonicalization shared between embedding and detection, holding through common distortions and mild regeneration while flipping under semantic change. Detection recomputes the ring from the query image and the key alone, and the mark therefore fails on a foreign or spliced image, with acceptance tracking semantic displacement. On three prompt datasets IRIS detects reliably and stays close to its same-seed non-watermarked counterpart, a fidelity prior in-generation marks do not reach. While forgeries transfer fixed-pattern marks and regeneration strips post-hoc marks, IRIS alone among the compared marks withstands both.

cs.CV

LAVA: Layered Audio-Visual Anti-tampering Watermarking for Robust Deepfake Detection and Localization

Proactive watermarking offers a promising approach for deepfake tamper detection and localization in short-form videos. However, existing methods often decouple audio and visual evidence and assume that watermark signals remain reliable under real-world degradations, making tamper localization vulnerable to multimodal misalignment and compression distortions. Moreover, existing semi-fragile visual watermarking methods often degrade significantly under codec compression because their embedding bands overlap with compression-sensitive frequency regions. To address these limitations, we propose Layered Audio-Visual Anti-tampering Watermarking (LAVA), a calibration-aware audio-visual watermark fusion framework for deepfake tamper detection and localization. LAVA leverages cross-modal watermark fusion and calibration-aware alignment to preserve consistent and reliable tamper evidence under compression and audio-visual asynchrony, enabling robust tamper localization. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LAVA achieves near-perfect detection performance (AP = 0.999), remains robust to compression and multimodal misalignment, and significantly improves tamper localization reliability over existing audio-visual fusion baselines.

cs.CV