arXiv subjects

Boli Xu

Publications and source records attributed to Boli Xu.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Does p-Hacking Mitigate or Exacerbate the Effects of Publication Bias?

This paper studies the effects of p-hacking on the bias of published estimates when papers with statistically significant results are selectively published. We show that fast p-hacking---actions that lead to large changes in p-values---always exacerbates the bias from selective publication. On the other hand, slow p-hacking---actions that lead to small changes in p-values---exacerbates bias when selection is weak, but mitigates it when selection is strong. In a model featuring both types of p-hacking, we show that a normality assumption identifies the true distribution of effects as well as the counterfactual mean that would obtain under selective publication without p-hacking. Applying the model to meta-analyses on the effects of behavioral nudges and development aid, we find suggestive evidence that both mitigation and exacerbation can arise in practice.

econ.EM↗

arXiv2026

Going Public: Communication in Collective Decisions

A principal and $n\ge 2$ agents can launch a project if the principal proposes it and at least $k$ agents accept. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an ex ante unknown state. The principal can conduct a test to learn about the state and then communicate her findings to the agents via cheap talk. This paper focuses on comparing two communication regimes: public and private messaging. We show that public messaging is weakly dominant: any outcome implementable under private messaging can also be implemented under public messaging. Moreover, in a canonical environment with linear payoffs, we characterize the principal's optimal test in each regime and show that public messaging can be strictly dominant if and only if there exist two agents who are the principal's conflicting allies.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2025

Robust Contracting for Sequential Search

A principal contracts with an agent who sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. The principal initially knows only one of the agent's available projects and evaluates a contract by its worst-case performance. We characterize the principal's robustly optimal contracts, which are all debt-like: the agent is only paid when the prize exceeds a threshold. Debt is optimal because it preserves the option value of continued exploration. Our characterization encompasses several common contract forms, including pure debt, debt-plus-equity, and capped-earnout debt. We identify settings in which each of these contracts is uniquely optimal.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2024

Learning and Communication Towards Unanimous Consent

A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn about the state and then communicate with the agent, but has limited commitment, as she may misreport her findings. We show that limited commitment makes binary tests optimal. Moreover, when players' preferences are positively aligned, the optimal test is a threshold test. When their preferences are negatively aligned, the optimal test is either an interval test or a tail test, depending on the agent's relative risk attitude. Additionally, the principal can benefit from screening the agent through a menu of tests, which admits a simple structure regardless of the complexity of the agent's type space.

econ.TH↗