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Brent Byunghoon Kang

Publications and source records attributed to Brent Byunghoon Kang.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Zero2Text: Zero-Training Cross-Domain Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings

The proliferation of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has established vector databases as critical infrastructure, yet they introduce severe privacy risks via embedding inversion attacks. Existing paradigms face a fundamental trade-off: optimization-based methods require computationally prohibitive queries, while alignment-based approaches hinge on the unrealistic assumption of accessible in-domain training data. These constraints render them ineffective in strict black-box and cross-domain settings. To dismantle these barriers, we introduce Zero2Text, a novel training-free framework based on recursive online alignment. Unlike methods relying on static datasets, Zero2Text synergizes LLM priors with a dynamic ridge regression mechanism to iteratively align generation to the target embedding on-the-fly. We further demonstrate that standard defenses, such as differential privacy, fail to effectively mitigate this adaptive threat. Extensive experiments across diverse benchmarks validate Zero2Text; notably, on MS MARCO against the OpenAI victim model, it achieves 1.8x higher ROUGE-L and 6.4x higher BLEU-2 scores compared to baselines, recovering sentences from unknown domains without a single leaked data pair.

cs.CL↗

CF-DETR: Coarse-to-Fine Transformer for Real-Time Object Detection

Detection Transformers (DETR) are increasingly adopted in autonomous vehicle (AV) perception systems due to their superior accuracy over convolutional networks. However, concurrently executing multiple DETR tasks presents significant challenges in meeting firm real-time deadlines (R1) and high accuracy requirements (R2), particularly for safety-critical objects, while navigating the inherent latency-accuracy trade-off under resource constraints. Existing real-time DNN scheduling approaches often treat models generically, failing to leverage Transformer-specific properties for efficient resource allocation. To address these challenges, we propose CF-DETR, an integrated system featuring a novel coarse-to-fine Transformer architecture and a dedicated real-time scheduling framework NPFP**. CF-DETR employs three key strategies (A1: coarse-to-fine inference, A2: selective fine inference, A3: multi-level batch inference) that exploit Transformer properties to dynamically adjust patch granularity and attention scope based on object criticality, aiming to satisfy R2. The NPFP** scheduling framework (A4) orchestrates these adaptive mechanisms A1-A3. It partitions each DETR task into a safety-critical coarse subtask for guaranteed critical object detection within its deadline (ensuring R1), and an optional fine subtask for enhanced overall accuracy (R2), while managing individual and batched execution. Our extensive evaluations on server, GPU-enabled embedded platforms, and actual AV platforms demonstrate that CF-DETR, under an NPFP** policy, successfully meets strict timing guarantees for critical operations and achieves significantly higher overall and critical object detection accuracy compared to existing baselines across diverse AV workloads.

eess.SY↗

Rethinking Misalignment to Raise the Bar for Heap Pointer Corruption

Heap layout randomization renders a good portion of heap vulnerabilities unexploitable. However, some remnants of the vulnerabilities are still exploitable even under the randomized layout. According to our analysis, such heap exploits often abuse pointer-width allocation granularity to spray crafted pointers. To address this problem, we explore the efficacy of byte-granularity (the most fine-grained) heap randomization. Heap randomization, in general, has been a well-trodden area; however, the efficacy of byte-granularity randomization has never been fully explored as \emph{misalignment} raises various concerns. This paper unravels the pros and cons of byte-granularity heap randomization by conducting comprehensive analysis in three folds: (i) security effectiveness, (ii) performance impact, and (iii) compatibility analysis to measure deployment cost. Security discussion based on 20 CVE case studies suggests that byte-granularity heap randomization raises the bar against heap exploits more than we initially expected; as pointer spraying approach is becoming prevalent in modern heap exploits. Afterward, to demystify the skeptical concerns regarding misalignment, we conduct cycle-level microbenchmarks and report that the performance cost is highly concentrated to edge cases depending on L1-cache line. Based on such observations, we design and implement an allocator suited to optimize the performance cost of byte-granularity heap randomization; then evaluate the performance with the memory-intensive benchmark (SPEC2006). Finally, we discuss compatibility issues using Coreutils, Nginx, and ChakraCore.

cs.CR↗

Lord of the x86 Rings: A Portable User Mode Privilege Separation Architecture on x86

Modern applications are increasingly advanced and complex, and inevitably contain exploitable software bugs despite the ongoing efforts. The applications today often involve processing of sensitive information. However, the lack of privilege separation within the user space leaves sensitive application secret such as cryptographic keys just as unprotected as a "hello world" string. Cutting-edge hardware-supported security features are being introduced. However, the features are often vendor-specific or lack compatibility with older generations of the processors. The situation leaves developers with no portable solution to incorporate protection for the sensitive application component. We propose LOTRx86, a fundamental and portable approach for user space privilege separation. Our approach creates a more privileged user execution layer called PrivUser through harnessing the underused intermediate privilege levels on the x86 architecture. The PrivUser memory space, a set of pages within process address space that are inaccessible to user mode, is a safe place for application secrets and routines that access them. We implement the LOTRx86 ABI that exports the privilege-based, accessing the protected application secret only requires a change in the privilege, eliminating the need for costly remote procedure calls or change in address space. We evaluated our platform by developing a proof-of-concept LOTRx86-enabled web server that employs our architecture to securely access its private key during SSL connection and thereby mitigating the HeartBleed vulnerability by design. We conducted a set of experiments including a performance measurement on the PoC on both Intel and AMD PCs, and confirmed that LOTRx86 incurs only a limited performance overhead.

cs.CR↗