arXiv subjects

Brian P. Hanley

Publications and source records attributed to Brian P. Hanley.

10 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases -- OPTiMEM and the Heat Conjecture(s)

Despite well-meaning scenarios that propose global CO2 emissions will decline presented in every IPCC report since 1988, the trend of global CO2 increase continues without significant change. Even if any individual nation manages to flatten its emissions, what matters is the trajectory of the globe. Together the gulf between climate science and climate economics, plus the urgent need for alternative methods of estimation, provided the incentives for development of our Ocean-Heat-Content (OHC) Physics and Time Macro Economic Model (OPTiMEM) system. To link NOAA damages to climate required creating a carbon consumption model to drive a physics model of climate. How fast could carbon be burned and how much coal, oil and natural gas was reasonably available? A carbon model driving climate meant burning the carbon, and modelling how the earth heated up. We developed this using the most recent best greenhouse gas equations and production models for CO2, CH4, N2O, and halogenated gases. This developed an ocean heat content model for the globe. Each step is validated against Known carbon consumption, CO2, temperature, and ocean heat content. This allows a physics founded model of climate costs to be projected.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

A new monetary metric is found in the thermodynamic relation between energy and GDP

A robust thermodynamic relation between inflation corrected monetary valuation and energy emerges from existing work. This is based on the energy used, the aggregate efficiency of all production processes ($Λ(t)$) in terms of Joules per dollar of gross world product, and the gross world product: $\frac{E_A(t) \text{[J]}}{Λ(t) \text{[J/\$]}} = Y(t) [\$]$ where: J = Joules, \$= currency. This directs us to the production system and all of its processes in addition to alternatives to carbon energy. The original relation appeared in 'Are there basic physical constraints on future anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide?' (Garrett 2011). There a foundation assumption was made that a variable $λ$ representing energy per dollar would disprove the presented model. However, because $λ$ has dimension [$\frac{E}{\$ \; GWP}$], it represents the aggregate efficiency of all global production, and cannot be a constant in an economic model. Thus, aggregate production efficiency is: $Λ(t) \equiv \sum {λ_i(t) \cdot \frac{P_i}{GWP}}$. The claimed 50 year constant relation of $W$ ($\sum_{i = n}^{t} Y_i \text{ [\$]}$) to the energy $E$ of the final year is incorrect -- the relation is not flat, nor should this be expected. The graph of $W$ from 1970 back in time is shown to have an historic minimum in 1970 driven by growth in energy consumption and increasing efficiency of energy use that is unlikely to be repeated. With improvements, a robust thermodynamic model is obtained that has general application to the relationship between money and energy and may be useable for evaluating the health of currencies and economies.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2024

Cancellation of principal in banking: Four radical ideas emerge from deep examination of double entry bookkeeping in banking

Four radical ideas are presented. First, that the rationale for cancellation of principal can be modified in modern banking. Second, that non-cancellation of loan principal upon payment may cure an old problem of maintenance of positive equity in the non-governmental sector. Third and fourth, that crediting this money to local/state government, and crediting to at-risk loans that create new utility value, creates an additional virtuous monetary circuit that ties finances of government directly to commercial activity. Taking these steps can cure a problem I have identified with modern monetary theory, which is that breaking the monetary circuit of taxation in the minds of politicians will free them from centuries of restraint, optimizing their opportunities for implementing tyranny. It maintains and strengthens the current circuit, creating a new, more direct monetary circuit that in some respects combats inequality.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2022

The Sign of Risk for Present Value of Future Losses

In the ongoing debate over discount rates and climate change, William Nordhaus has championed a higher discount rate to account for risk. Nicholas Stern has championed a lower rate. Here we prove that in the case of a stream of future losses, risk can only be represented by a lower discount rate, never a higher one.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2020

Equity Default Clawback Swaps to Implement Venture Banking

In this theoretical paper, I propose creation of a venture bank, able to multiply the capital of a venture capital firm by at least 47 times, without requiring access to the Federal Reserve or other central bank apart from settlement. This concept rests on obtaining default swap instruments on loans in order to create the capital required, and expand Tier 1 and 2 base capital. Profitability depends on overall portfolio performance, availability of equity default swaps, cost of default swap, and the multiple of original capital (MOC) adopted by the venture bank. A new derivative financial instrument, the equity default swap (EDS), to cover loans made as venture investments. An EDS is similar to a credit default swap (CDS) but with some unique features. The features and operation of these new derivative instruments are outlined along with audit requirements. This instrument would be traded on open-outcry exchanges with special features to ensure orderly operation of the market. It is the creation of public markets for EDSs that makes possible the use of public market pricing to indirectly provide a potential market capitalization for the underlying venture-bank investment. Full coverage insulates the venture-bank from losses in most situations, and multiplies profitability quite dramatically in all scenarios. Ten year returns above 20X are attainable. Further, a new feature for EDS derivatives, a clawback lien, closes out the equity default swap. Here it is optimized at 77%, and is to be paid back to the underwriter at a future date to prevent perverse incentive to deliberately fail. This new feature creates an Equity Default Clawback Swap (EDCS) which can be used safely. This proposal also solves an old problem in banking, because it matches the term of the loan with the term of the investment. I show that the venture-bank investment and the EDCS underwriting business are profitable.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2019

The perverse incentive for insurance instruments that are derivatives: solving the jackpot problem with a clawback lien for default insurance notes

When an insurance note is also a derivative a serious problem arises because a derivative must be fulfilled immediately. This feature of derivatives prevents claims processing procedures that screen out ineligible claims. This, in turn, creates a perverse incentive for insured holders of notes to commit acts that result in payment. This problem first surfaced with CDS contracts, which are part of a class of loan insurance I term a default insurance note. Without an address to this problem, within the average range of returns for a large venture capital portfolio, a venture-bank makes less money the better their investments do, in a continuous function. The highest rate of return is a total loss, 64% more than a top portfolio. Here, a strategy for removing this perverse incentive is defined, consisting of a clawback lien that returns part of the payment value as a lien on the firm that is the beneficiary of the insurance. This is presented as the final major component for implementing a default insurance note system so that venture-banking can operate to maximum benefit. Removing the perverse incentive also minimizes disincentive for underwriters to deny DIN coverage to new venture capital firms, or to those firms that have historical earnings which are below average.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2019

The Impact of LIBOR Linked Borrowing to Cover Venture Bank Investment Loans Creates a New Systemic Risk

A scenario in which regulators take the drastic step of requiring coverage of all venture bank investment loans using interbank borrowed funds is considered. In this scenario, a minimal amount of default insurance is used, such that Tier 1 and 2 capital requirements are still met. To do this, the default insurance percentage on all investment loans is cut to 3.88%, although the minimum is 2.88%. Results: For a portfolio of 1.31X (ten year total conventional return) or better, at interest rates of 2% or better, the venture bank survives and can have excellent returns. For a portfolio of 1.5X (ten year total conventional return) the bank can have extraordinary returns below 1.5% interest and survive up to 3%. interest. However, if returns fall, or interest rates rise, then venture banks go underwater quite rapidly. Conclusion: Using LIBOR funds limits profitability, and damages stability of the bank, with no visible benefit to any party, thus creating a new systemic risk to the banking system.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2018

A zero-sum monetary system, interest rates, and implications

To the knowledge of the author, this is the first time it has been shown that interest rates that are extremely high by modern standards (100% and higher) are necessary within a zero-sum monetary system, and not just driven by greed. Extreme interest rates that appeared in various places and times reinforce the idea that hard money may have contributed to high rates of interest. Here a model is presented that examines the interest rate required to succeed as an investor in a zero-sum fixed quantity hard-money system. Even when the playing field is significantly tilted toward the investor, interest rates need to be much higher than expected. In a completely fair zero-sum system, an investor cannot break even without charging 100% interest. Even with a 5% advantage, an investor won't break even at 15% interest. From this it is concluded that what we consider usurious rates today are, within a hard-money system, driven by necessity. Cryptocurrency is a novel form of hard-currency. The inability to virtualize the money creates a system close to zero-sum because of the limited supply design. Therefore, within the bounds of a cryptocurrency system that limits money creation, interest rates must rise to levels that the modern world considers usury. It is impossible, therefore, that a cryptocurrency that is not expandable could take over a modern economy and replace modern fiat currency.

cs.CE↗

arXiv2018

The False Premises and Promises of Bitcoin

Designed to compete with fiat currencies, bitcoin proposes it is a crypto-currency alternative. Bitcoin makes a number of false claims, including: solving the double-spending problem is a good thing; bitcoin can be a reserve currency for banking; hoarding equals saving, and that we should believe bitcoin can expand by deflation to become a global transactional currency supply. Bitcoin's developers combine technical implementation proficiency with ignorance of currency and banking fundamentals. This has resulted in a failed attempt to change finance. A set of recommendations to change finance are provided in the Afterword: Investment/venture banking for the masses; Venture banking to bring back what investment banks once were; Open-outcry exchange for all CDS contracts; Attempting to develop CDS type contracts on investments in startup and existing enterprises; and Improving the connection between startup tech/ideas, business organization and investment.

cs.CE↗

arXiv2014

Release of the Kraken: A Novel Money Multiplier Equation's Debut in 21st Century Banking

Historically, the banking multiplier has been in a range of 4 to 100, with 25% to 1% reserve ratios at most layers of the banking system encompassing the majority of its range in recent centuries. Here it is shown that multipliers over 1 000 can occur from a new mechanism in banking. This new multiplier uses a default insurance note to insure an outstanding loan in order to return the value of the insured amount into capital. The economic impact of this invention is calculably greater than the original invention of reserve banking. The consequence of this lending invention is to render the existing money multiplier equations of reserve banking obsolete where it occurs. The equations describing this new multiplier do not converge. Each set of parameters for reserve percentage, nesting depth, etc. creates a unique logarithmic curve rather than approaching a limit. Thus it is necessary to show the behavior of this new equation by numerical methods. Understanding this new multiplier and associated issues is necessary for economic analyses of the Global Financial Crisis.

q-fin.GN↗