SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Brian Swenson

Publications and source records attributed to Brian Swenson.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

AircraftVerse: A Large-Scale Multimodal Dataset of Aerial Vehicle Designs

We present AircraftVerse, a publicly available aerial vehicle design dataset. Aircraft design encompasses different physics domains and, hence, multiple modalities of representation. The evaluation of these cyber-physical system (CPS) designs requires the use of scientific analytical and simulation models ranging from computer-aided design tools for structural and manufacturing analysis, computational fluid dynamics tools for drag and lift computation, battery models for energy estimation, and simulation models for flight control and dynamics. AircraftVerse contains 27,714 diverse air vehicle designs - the largest corpus of engineering designs with this level of complexity. Each design comprises the following artifacts: a symbolic design tree describing topology, propulsion subsystem, battery subsystem, and other design details; a STandard for the Exchange of Product (STEP) model data; a 3D CAD design using a stereolithography (STL) file format; a 3D point cloud for the shape of the design; and evaluation results from high fidelity state-of-the-art physics models that characterize performance metrics such as maximum flight distance and hover-time. We also present baseline surrogate models that use different modalities of design representation to predict design performance metrics, which we provide as part of our dataset release. Finally, we discuss the potential impact of this dataset on the use of learning in aircraft design and, more generally, in CPS. AircraftVerse is accompanied by a data card, and it is released under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike (CC BY-SA) license. The dataset is hosted at https://zenodo.org/record/6525446, baseline models and code at https://github.com/SRI-CSL/AircraftVerse, and the dataset description at https://aircraftverse.onrender.com/.

cs.RO

Distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent: Nonconvexity, Nonsmoothness, and Convergence to Local Minima

In centralized settings, it is well known that stochastic gradient descent (SGD) avoids saddle points and converges to local minima in nonconvex problems. However, similar guarantees are lacking for distributed first-order algorithms. The paper studies distributed stochastic gradient descent (D-SGD)--a simple network-based implementation of SGD. Conditions under which D-SGD avoids saddle points and converges to local minima are studied. First, we consider the problem of computing critical points. Assuming loss functions are nonconvex and possibly nonsmooth, it is shown that, for each fixed initialization, D-SGD converges to critical points of the loss with probability one. Next, we consider the problem of avoiding saddle points. In this case, we again assume that loss functions may be nonconvex and nonsmooth, but are smooth in a neighborhood of a saddle point. It is shown that, for any fixed initialization, D-SGD avoids such saddle points with probability one. Results are proved by studying the underlying (distributed) gradient flow, using the ordinary differential equation (ODE) method of stochastic approximation, and extending classical techniques from dynamical systems theory such as stable manifolds. Results are proved in the general context of subspace-constrained optimization, of which D-SGD is a special case.

math.OC

Distributed Gradient Methods for Nonconvex Optimization: Local and Global Convergence Guarantees

The article discusses distributed gradient-descent algorithms for computing local and global minima in nonconvex optimization. For local optimization, we focus on distributed stochastic gradient descent (D-SGD)--a simple network-based variant of classical SGD. We discuss local minima convergence guarantees and explore the simple but critical role of the stable-manifold theorem in analyzing saddle-point avoidance. For global optimization, we discuss annealing-based methods in which slowly decaying noise is added to D-SGD. Conditions are discussed under which convergence to global minima is guaranteed. Numerical examples illustrate the key concepts in the paper.

math.OC

Distributed Gradient Flow: Nonsmoothness, Nonconvexity, and Saddle Point Evasion

The paper considers distributed gradient flow (DGF) for multi-agent nonconvex optimization. DGF is a continuous-time approximation of distributed gradient descent that is often easier to study than its discrete-time counterpart. The paper has two main contributions. First, the paper considers optimization of nonsmooth, nonconvex objective functions. It is shown that DGF converges to critical points in this setting. The paper then considers the problem of avoiding saddle points. It is shown that if agents' objective functions are assumed to be smooth and nonconvex, then DGF can only converge to a saddle point from a zero-measure set of initial conditions. To establish this result, the paper proves a stable manifold theorem for DGF, which is a fundamental contribution of independent interest. In a companion paper, analogous results are derived for discrete-time algorithms.

math.OC

Smooth Fictitious Play in $N\times 2$ Potential Games

The paper shows that smooth fictitious play converges to a neighborhood of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with probability 1 in almost all $N\times 2$ ($N$-player, two-action) potential games. The neighborhood of convergence may be made arbitrarily small by taking the smoothing parameter to zero. Simple proof techniques are furnished by considering regular potential games.

cs.GT

Distributed Gradient Descent: Nonconvergence to Saddle Points and the Stable-Manifold Theorem

The paper studies a distributed gradient descent (DGD) process and considers the problem of showing that in nonconvex optimization problems, DGD typically converges to local minima rather than saddle points. The paper considers unconstrained minimization of a smooth objective function. In centralized settings, the problem of demonstrating nonconvergence to saddle points of gradient descent (and variants) is typically handled by way of the stable-manifold theorem from classical dynamical systems theory. However, the classical stable-manifold theorem is not applicable in distributed settings. The paper develops an appropriate stable-manifold theorem for DGD showing that convergence to saddle points may only occur from a low-dimensional stable manifold. Under appropriate assumptions (e.g., coercivity), this result implies that DGD typically converges to local minima and not to saddle points.

math.OC

On Distributed Stochastic Gradient Algorithms for Global Optimization

The paper considers the problem of network-based computation of global minima in smooth nonconvex optimization problems. It is known that distributed gradient-descent-type algorithms can achieve convergence to the set of global minima by adding slowly decaying Gaussian noise in order escape local minima. However, the technical assumptions under which convergence is known to occur can be restrictive in practice. In particular, in known convergence results, the local objective functions possessed by agents are required to satisfy a highly restrictive bounded-gradient-dissimilarity condition. The paper demonstrates convergence to the set of global minima while relaxing this key assumption.

math.OC

Regular Potential Games

A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence of certain "structurally deficient" equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robustness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a "regular" Nash equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi. Such equilibria are isolated, highly robust, and relatively simple to analyze. A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game are regular. In this paper it is shown that almost all potential games are regular. That is, except for a closed subset with Lebesgue measure zero, all potential games are regular. As an immediate consequence of this, the paper also proves an oddness result for potential games: in almost all potential games, the number of Nash equilibrium strategies is finite and odd. Specialized results are given for weighted potential games, exact potential games, and games with identical payoffs. Applications of the results to game-theoretic learning are discussed.

math.OC

Distributed Global Optimization by Annealing

The paper considers a distributed algorithm for global minimization of a nonconvex function. The algorithm is a first-order consensus + innovations type algorithm that incorporates decaying additive Gaussian noise for annealing, converging to the set of global minima under certain technical assumptions. The paper presents simple methods for verifying that the required technical assumptions hold and illustrates it with a distributed target-localization application.

math.OC

Annealing for Distributed Global Optimization

The paper proves convergence to global optima for a class of distributed algorithms for nonconvex optimization in network-based multi-agent settings. Agents are permitted to communicate over a time-varying undirected graph. Each agent is assumed to possess a local objective function (assumed to be smooth, but possibly nonconvex). The paper considers algorithms for optimizing the sum function. A distributed algorithm of the consensus+innovations type is proposed which relies on first-order information at the agent level. Under appropriate conditions on network connectivity and the cost objective, convergence to the set of global optima is achieved by an annealing-type approach, with decaying Gaussian noise independently added into each agent's update step. It is shown that the proposed algorithm converges in probability to the set of global minima of the sum function.

math.OC

Clustering with Distributed Data

We consider $K$-means clustering in networked environments (e.g., internet of things (IoT) and sensor networks) where data is inherently distributed across nodes and processing power at each node may be limited. We consider a clustering algorithm referred to as networked $K$-means, or $NK$-means, which relies only on local neighborhood information exchange. Information exchange is limited to low-dimensional statistics and not raw data at the agents. The proposed approach develops a parametric family of multi-agent clustering objectives (parameterized by $ρ$) and associated distributed $NK$-means algorithms (also parameterized by $ρ$). The $NK$-means algorithm with parameter $ρ$ converges to a set of fixed points relative to the associated multi-agent objective (designated as `generalized minima'). By appropriate choice of $ρ$, the set of generalized minima may be brought arbitrarily close to the set of Lloyd's minima. Thus, the $NK$-means algorithm may be used to compute Lloyd's minima of the collective dataset up to arbitrary accuracy.

cs.LG

Revisiting Normalized Gradient Descent: Fast Evasion of Saddle Points

The note considers normalized gradient descent (NGD), a natural modification of classical gradient descent (GD) in optimization problems. A serious shortcoming of GD in non-convex problems is that GD may take arbitrarily long to escape from the neighborhood of a saddle point. This issue can make the convergence of GD arbitrarily slow, particularly in high-dimensional non-convex problems where the relative number of saddle points is often large. The paper focuses on continuous-time descent. It is shown that, contrary to standard GD, NGD escapes saddle points `quickly.' In particular, it is shown that (i) NGD `almost never' converges to saddle points and (ii) the time required for NGD to escape from a ball of radius $r$ about a saddle point $x^*$ is at most $5\sqrtκr$, where $κ$ is the condition number of the Hessian of $f$ at $x^*$. As an application of this result, a global convergence-time bound is established for NGD under mild assumptions.

math.OC

On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games

The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the discontinuous, set-valued nature of the best-response map. The paper focuses on elucidating several important properties of best-response dynamics in the class of multi-agent games known as potential games---a class of games with fundamental importance in multi-agent systems and distributed control. It is shown that in almost every potential game and for almost every initial condition, the best-response dynamics (i) have a unique solution, (ii) converge to pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and (iii) converge at an exponential rate.

math.OC

On the Exponential Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play in Potential Games

The paper studies fictitious play (FP) learning dynamics in continuous time. It is shown that in almost every potential game, and for almost every initial condition, the rate of convergence of FP is exponential. In particular, the paper focuses on studying the behavior of FP in potential games in which all equilibria of the game are regular, as introduced by Harsanyi. Such games are referred to as regular potential games. Recently it has been shown that almost all potential games (in the sense of the Lebesgue measure) are regular. In this paper it is shown that in any regular potential game (and hence, in almost every potential game), FP converges to the set of Nash equilibria at an exponential rate from almost every initial condition.

cs.GT

Robustness Properties in Fictitious-Play-Type Algorithms

Fictitious play (FP) is a canonical game-theoretic learning algorithm which has been deployed extensively in decentralized control scenarios. However standard treatments of FP, and of many other game-theoretic models, assume rather idealistic conditions which rarely hold in realistic control scenarios. This paper considers a broad class of best response learning algorithms, that we refer to as FP-type algorithms. In such an algorithm, given some (possibly limited) information about the history of actions, each individual forecasts the future play and chooses a (myopic) best action given their forecast. We provide a unifed analysis of the behavior of FP-type algorithms under an important class of perturbations, thus demonstrating robustness to deviations from the idealistic operating conditions that have been previously assumed. This robustness result is then used to derive convergence results for two control-relevant relaxations of standard game-theoretic applications: distributed (network-based) implementation without full observability and asynchronous deployment (including in continuous time). In each case the results follow as a direct consequence of the main robustness result.

math.OC

Distributed Inertial Best-Response Dynamics

The note considers the problem of computing pure Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies in distributed (i.e., network-based) settings. The paper studies a class of inertial best response dynamics based on the fictitious play (FP) algorithm. It is shown that inertial best response dynamics are robust to informational limitations common in distributed settings. Fully distributed variants of FP with inertia and joint strategy FP with inertia are developed and convergence is proven to the set of pure NE. The distributed algorithms rely on consensus methods. Results are validated using numerical simulations.

eess.SY

From Weak Learning to Strong Learning in Fictitious Play Type Algorithms

The paper studies the highly prototypical Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm, as well as a broad class of learning processes based on best-response dynamics, that we refer to as FP-type algorithms. A well-known shortcoming of FP is that, while players may learn an equilibrium strategy in some abstract sense, there are no guarantees that the period-by-period strategies generated by the algorithm actually converge to equilibrium themselves. This issue is fundamentally related to the discontinuous nature of the best response correspondence and is inherited by many FP-type algorithms. Not only does it cause problems in the interpretation of such algorithms as a mechanism for economic and social learning, but it also greatly diminishes the practical value of these algorithms for use in distributed control. We refer to forms of learning in which players learn equilibria in some abstract sense only (to be defined more precisely in the paper) as weak learning, and we refer to forms of learning where players' period-by-period strategies converge to equilibrium as strong learning. An approach is presented for modifying an FP-type algorithm that achieves weak learning in order to construct a variant that achieves strong learning. Theoretical convergence results are proved.

math.OC

On Robustness Properties in Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play

Empirical Centroid Fictitious Play (ECFP) is a generalization of the well-known Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm designed for implementation in large-scale games. In ECFP, the set of players is subdivided into equivalence classes with players in the same class possessing similar properties. Players choose a next-stage action by tracking and responding to aggregate statistics related to each equivalence class. This setup alleviates the difficult task of tracking and responding to the statistical behavior of every individual player, as is the case in traditional FP. Aside from ECFP, many useful modifications have been proposed to classical FP, e.g., rules allowing for network-based implementation, increased computational efficiency, and stronger forms of learning. Such modifications tend to be of great practical value; however, their effectiveness relies heavily on two fundamental properties of FP: robustness to alterations in the empirical distribution step size process, and robustness to best-response perturbations. The main contribution of the paper is to show that similar robustness properties also hold for the ECFP algorithm. This result serves as a first step in enabling practical modifications to ECFP, similar to those already developed for FP.

math.OC