arXiv subjects

Bruno Mazorra

Publications and source records attributed to Bruno Mazorra.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Competing Auctions in Intermediated Markets

We analyze competing auctions in intermediated markets, where a seller selects among parallel mechanisms for the sale of a single good, most prominently the relay-and-protocol architecture of proposer-builder separation in Ethereum. When the intermediary can enforce single-homing on its bidders, sealed-bid second-price intermediary auctions fully unravel into the sealed first-price principal auction; open bidding-format intermediaries unravel only partially, collapsing into first-price in equilibrium under symmetric latency and sorting fast bidders to the intermediary under asymmetric latency. Any last-look advantage is removed through the availability of a credible sealed bidding channel. These results extend to multi-plexing environments (no enforcement by the intermediary). While the unraveling result indicates that the availability of a sealed first-price bidding channel pushes the overall market to the same auction structure, the very assumption of the credibility of such channel is problematic, as the seller may have an incentive to leak information: a first-price auction is leakage-resistant in the presence of a single ``fast'' bidder but not against two or more. However, if the seller can credibly commit to not leak bids, it is optimal for them to do so. A main motivation is the forthcoming Glamsterdam update of Ethereum: our analysis suggests that the availability of an in-protocol (first-price) bidding channel severely limits the design space for out-of-protocol auctions by relays and other intermediaries.

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arXiv2026

The Price of Decentralization in Block Building

Decentralized block building mechanisms replace the monopoly of a single proposer with multiple builders. However, their censorship-resistance and fair-access benefits depend not only on the number of builders, but also on where builders are geographically positioned to provide transaction coverage. We study this tension between builder location choice, user transaction coverage, and utility concentration by modeling decentralized block building as a stochastic coverage game. Builders choose regions, information sources emit transactions over a block construction round, and latency determines whether a transaction is received before the deadline. We show that the game is an exact potential game and admits a pure Nash equilibrium. We prove an asymptotically tight factor-2 bound on the Price of Anarchy, which we interpret as the price of decentralization from uncoordinated builder placement. We also study builder utility concentration, showing that the lowest-utility builder earns at least half of the highest-utility builder's payoff, and the utility-share HHI is at most 12.5% above the egalitarian benchmark. We complement the theory with simulations under richer latency and source environments and show that slot times, builder participation, and reward-sharing rules are important protocol design choices that can shape the price of decentralization.

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arXiv2026

Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam

There are $n$ players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen wins. The occurrence of the opportunity is observed only with a delay. Taking actions is costly. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game and study worst-case inefficiency of equilibria. Our main motivation is the study of ``probabilistic backrunning" on blockchains, where arbitrageurs want to place an order immediately after a trade that impacts the price on an exchange or after an oracle update. In this context, the number of actions taken can be interpreted as a measure of costly ``spam" generated to compete for the opportunity.

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arXiv2025

The Free Option Problem of ePBS

Ethereum's upcoming Glamsterdam upgrade introduces EIP-7732 enshrined Proposer--Builder Separation (ePBS), which improves the block production pipeline by addressing trust and scalability challenges. Yet it also creates a new liveness risk: builders gain a short-dated ``free'' option to prevent the execution payload they committed to from becoming canonical, without incurring an additional penalty. Exercising this option renders an empty block for the slot in question, thereby degrading network liveness. We present the first systematic study of the free option problem. Our theoretical results predict that option value and exercise probability grow with market volatility, the length of the option window, and the share of block value derived from external signals such as external market prices. The availability of a free option will lead to mispricing and LP losses. The problem would be exacerbated if Ethereum further scales and attracts more liquidity. Empirical estimates of values and exercise probabilities on historical blocks largely confirm our theoretical predictions. While the option is rarely profitable to exercise on average (0.82\% of blocks assuming an 8-second option time window), it becomes significant in volatile periods, reaching up to 6\% of blocks on high-volatility days -- precisely when users most require timely execution. Moreover, builders whose block value relies heavily on CEX-DEX arbitrage are more likely to exercise the option. We demonstrate that mitigation strategies -- shortening the option window or penalizing exercised options -- effectively reduce liveness risk.

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arXiv2025

Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance

Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against centralized exchanges (CEXes), whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them the primary venue for price discovery. As trading volume migrates on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges (DEXes) will become the canonical mechanism for price alignment. Yet, despite its importance to DeFi-and the on-chain transparency making real activity tractable in a way CEX-to-DEX arbitrage is not-existing research remains confined to conceptual overviews and hypothetical opportunity analyses. We study cross-chain arbitrage with a profit-cost model and a year-long measurement. The model shows that opportunity frequency, bridging time, and token depreciation determine whether inventory- or bridge-based execution is more profitable. Empirically, we analyze one year of transactions (September 2023 - August 2024) across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling 868.64 million USD volume. Activity clusters on Ethereum-centric L1-L2 pairs, grows 5.5x over the study period, and surges-higher volume, more trades, lower fees-after the Dencun upgrade (March 13, 2024). Most trades use pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, underscoring the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is high: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one alone captures almost 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. We conclude that cross-chain arbitrage fosters vertical integration, centralizing sequencing infrastructure and economic power and thereby exacerbating censorship, liveness, and finality risks; decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are critical to countering these threats.

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arXiv2024

On Sybil-proof Mechanisms

We show that in the single-parameter mechanism design environment, the only non-wasteful, symmetric, incentive compatible and Sybil-proof direct mechanism is a second price auction with symmetric tie-breaking. Thus, if there is private information, lotteries or other mechanisms that do not always allocate to a highest-value bidder are not Sybil-proof or not incentive compatible. Moreover, we show that our main (im)possibility result extends beyond linear valuations, but not to multi-unit object allocation with capacity constrained bidders. We also provide examples of mechanisms (with higher interim payoff for the bidders than a second price auction) that satisfy all of the other axioms and a weaker, Bayesian notion of Sybil-proofness. Thus, our (im)possibility result does not generalize to the Bayesian setting and we have a larger design space: With Sybil constraints, equivalence between dominant strategy and Bayesian implementation (that holds in classical single-parameter mechanism design without Sybils) no longer holds.

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arXiv2023

On the optimality of Shapley mechanism for funding public excludable goods under Sybil strategies

In the realm of cost-sharing mechanisms, the vulnerability to Sybil strategies -- also known as false-name strategies, where agents create fake identities to manipulate outcomes -- has not yet been studied. In this paper, we delve into the details of different cost-sharing mechanisms proposed in the literature, highlighting their non-Sybil-resistant nature. Furthermore, we prove no deterministic, anonymous, truthful, Sybil-proof, upper semicontinuous, and individually rational cost-sharing mechanism for public excludable goods is better than $\Omega(n)$-approximate. This finding reveals an exponential increase in the worst-case social cost in environments where agents are restricted from using Sybil strategies. To circumvent these negative results, we introduce the concept of \textit{Sybil Welfare Invariant} mechanisms, where a mechanism does not decrease its welfare under Sybil strategies when agents choose weak dominant strategies and have subjective prior beliefs over other players' actions. Finally, we prove that the Shapley value mechanism for symmetric and submodular cost functions holds this property, and so deduce that the worst-case social cost of this mechanism is the $n$th harmonic number $\mathcal H_n$ under equilibrium with Sybil strategies, matching the worst-case social cost bound for cost-sharing mechanisms. This finding suggests that any group of agents, each with private valuations, can fund public excludable goods both permissionless and anonymously, achieving efficiency comparable to that of non-anonymous domains, even when the total number of participants is unknown.ess and anonymously, achieving efficiency comparable to that of permissioned and non-anonymous domains, even when the total number of participants is unknown.

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arXiv2023

Towards Optimal Prior-Free Permissionless Rebate Mechanisms, with applications to Automated Market Makers & Combinatorial Orderflow Auctions

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a critical issue for blockchain ecosystems, as it enables validators or block proposers to extract value by ordering, including or censoring users' transactions. This paper aims to present a formal approach for determining the appropriate compensation for users whose transactions are executed in bundles, as opposed to individually. We explore the impact of MEV on users, discuss the Shapley value as a solution for fair compensation, and delve into the mechanisms of MEV rebates and auctions as a means to undermine the power of the block producer.

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arXiv2023

The Cost of Sybils, Credible Commitments, and False-Name Proof Mechanisms

Consider a mechanism that cannot observe how many players there are directly, but instead must rely on their self-reports to know how many are participating. Suppose the players can create new identities to report to the auctioneer at some cost $c$. The usual mechanism design paradigm is equivalent to implicitly assuming that $c$ is infinity for all players, while the usual Sybil attacks literature is that it is zero or finite for one player (the attacker) and infinity for everyone else (the 'honest' players). The false-name proof literature largely assumes the cost to be 0. We consider a model with variable costs that unifies these disparate streams. A paradigmatic normal form game can be extended into a Sybil game by having the action space by the product of the feasible set of identities to create action where each player chooses how many players to present as in the game and their actions in the original normal form game. A mechanism is (dominant) false-name proof if it is (dominant) incentive-compatible for all the players to self-report as at most one identity. We study mechanisms proposed in the literature motivated by settings where anonymity and self-identification are the norms, and show conditions under which they are not Sybil-proof. We characterize a class of dominant Sybil-proof mechanisms for reward sharing and show that they achieve the efficiency upper bound. We consider the extension when agents can credibly commit to the strategy of their sybils and show how this can break mechanisms that would otherwise be false-name proof.

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arXiv2022

Constant Function Market Making, Social Welfare and Maximal Extractable Value

We consider the social welfare that can be facilitated by a constant function market maker (CFMM). When there is sufficient liquidity available to the CFMM, it can approximate the optimal social welfare when all users transactions are executed. When one of the agent has the role of proposing the block, and blockspace is scarce, they can obtain higher expected utility than otherwise identical agents. This gives a lower bound on the maximal extractable value exposed when blockspace is scarce.

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arXiv2022

An Automated Market Maker Minimizing Loss-Versus-Rebalancing

The always-available liquidity of automated market makers (AMMs) has been one of the most important catalysts in early cryptocurrency adoption. However, it has become increasingly evident that AMMs in their current form are not viable investment options for passive liquidity providers. This is large part due to the cost incurred by AMMs providing stale prices to arbitrageurs against external market prices, formalized as loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) [Milionis et al., 2022]. In this paper, we present Diamond, an automated market making protocol that aligns the incentives of liquidity providers and block producers in the protocol-level retention of LVR. In Diamond, block producers effectively auction the right to capture any arbitrage that exists between the external market price of a Diamond pool, and the price of the pool itself. The proceeds of these auctions are shared by the Diamond pool and block producer in a way that is proven to remain incentive compatible for the block producer. Given the participation of competing arbitrageurs to capture LVR, LVR is minimized in Diamond. We formally prove this result, and detail an implementation of Diamond. We also provide comparative simulations of Diamond to relevant benchmarks, further evidencing the LVR-protection capabilities of Diamond. With this new protection, passive liquidity provision on blockchains can become rationally viable, beckoning a new age for decentralized finance.

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arXiv2022

Price of MEV: Towards a Game Theoretical Approach to MEV

Maximal (also miner) extractable value, or MEV, usually refers to the value that privileged players can extract by strategically ordering, censoring, and placing transactions in a blockchain. Each blockchain network, which we refer to as a domain, has its own consensus, ordering, and block-creation mechanisms, which gives rise to different optimal strategies to extract MEV. The strategic behaviour of rational players, known as searchers, lead to MEV games that have different impacts and externalities in each domain. Several ordering mechanisms, which determine the inclusion and position of transactions in a block, have been considered to construct alternative games to organise MEV extraction, and minimize negative externalities; examples include sealed bid auctions, first input first output, and private priority gas auctions. However, to date, no sufficiently formal and abstract definition of MEV games have been made. In this paper, we take a step toward the formalization of MEV games and compare different ordering mechanisms and their externalities. In particular, we attempt to formalize games that arise from common knowledge MEV opportunities, such as arbitrage and sandwich attacks. In defining these games, we utilise a theoretical framework that provides groundwork for several important roles and concepts, such as the searcher, sequencer, domain, and bundle. We also introduce the price of MEV as the price of anarchy of MEV games, a measure that provides formal comparison between different ordering mechanisms.

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arXiv2022

Do not rug on me: Zero-dimensional Scam Detection

Uniswap, like other DEXs, has gained much attention this year because it is a non-custodial and publicly verifiable exchange that allows users to trade digital assets without trusted third parties. However, its simplicity and lack of regulation also makes it easy to execute initial coin offering scams by listing non-valuable tokens. This method of performing scams is known as rug pull, a phenomenon that already existed in traditional finance but has become more relevant in DeFi. Various projects such as [34,37] have contributed to detecting rug pulls in EVM compatible chains. However, the first longitudinal and academic step to detecting and characterizing scam tokens on Uniswap was made in [44]. The authors collected all the transactions related to the Uniswap V2 exchange and proposed a machine learning algorithm to label tokens as scams. However, the algorithm is only valuable for detecting scams accurately after they have been executed. This paper increases their data set by 20K tokens and proposes a new methodology to label tokens as scams. After manually analyzing the data, we devised a theoretical classification of different malicious maneuvers in Uniswap protocol. We propose various machine-learning-based algorithms with new relevant features related to the token propagation and smart contract heuristics to detect potential rug pulls before they occur. In general, the models proposed achieved similar results. The best model obtained an accuracy of 0.9936, recall of 0.9540, and precision of 0.9838 in distinguishing non-malicious tokens from scams prior to the malicious maneuver.

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