arXiv subjects

Bryce L. Ferguson

Publications and source records attributed to Bryce L. Ferguson.

18 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Characterization and Analysis of Emergency Landing Flight Envelopes with Graded Safety Specifications

Emergency landing flight envelope analysis traditionally adopts a binary notion of safety, whereby a trajectory is safe only if state constraints are satisfied pointwise in time. In practice, ensuring a successful landing requires recognizing that aircraft operation spans a continuum in the state space from the nominal to the critical regime. Between these regimes lies a degraded regime of states outside nominal operation that may be visited only for limited durations. Safety is therefore inherently graded, in the sense that limited exposure to degraded states may be tolerated, and must be assessed using a trajectory-dependent criterion rather than a purely pointwise-in-time one. This paper develops a Hamilton-Jacobi reachability framework for analyzing emergency landing flight envelopes under this graded notion of safety. Safety is encoded through a soft constraint defined by a designer-specified continuous violation cost function that assigns zero cost in the nominal regime and larger cost to more safety-critical off-nominal states. We introduce a general class of state- and time-dependent violation cost functions and establish monotonicity and continuity properties that characterize how the flight envelope varies with the cost of off-nominal operation. These results provide a principled sensitivity analysis linking safety conservativeness to operational capability. Building on this analysis, we propose a synthesis algorithm for parameterized violation cost functions in this class. The algorithm provably converges to the least conservative parameter under which a prescribed off-nominal safety requirement is satisfied. Numerical results for a fixed-wing emergency landing scenario under propulsion failure demonstrate the sensitivity properties and validate the algorithm.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Dynamic Multi-Robot Task Allocation under Uncertainty and Communication Constraints: A Game-Theoretic Approach

We study dynamic multi-robot task allocation under uncertain task completion, time-window constraints, and incomplete information. Tasks arrive online over a finite horizon and must be completed within specified deadlines, while agents operate from distributed hubs with limited sensing and communication. We model incomplete information through hub-based sensing regions that determine task visibility and a communication graph that governs inter-hub information exchange. Using this framework, we propose Iterative Best Response (IBR), a decentralized policy in which each agent selects the task that maximizes its marginal contribution to the locally observed welfare. We compare IBR against three baselines: Earliest Due Date first (EDD), Hungarian algorithm, and Stochastic Conflict-Based Allocation (SCoBA), on a city-scale package-delivery domain with up to 100 drones and varying task arrival scenarios. Under full and sparse communication, IBR achieves competitive task-completion performance with lower computation time.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Robust Information Design with Heterogeneous Beliefs in Bayesian Congestion Games

In many engineered systems, agents make decisions under incomplete information, creating opportunities for a planner to influence decentralized behavior through signaling. We study how such signaling can be designed in parallel-network, affine latency congestion games when users may not interpret recommendations using the same beliefs assumed by the planner. To do so, we consider Bayesian congestion games with private recommendations and formulate a robust information design problem in which obedience must hold uniformly over a neighborhood of a nominal prior. This addresses the previously uncharacterized issue of whether obedience itself remains reliable under belief heterogeneity, rather than only under the single prior used at the design stage. We characterize policy-level robustness radii, identify regimes in which the robust obedience region remains nonempty, and analyze the resulting robustness--performance tradeoff through a robust value function whose optimal cost is monotone in the robustness requirement and whose local sensitivity is governed by the active obedience constraints.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Stability and Sensitivity Analysis for Objective Misspecifications Among Model Predictive Game Controllers

Model-based multi-agent control requires agents to possess a model of the behavior of others to make strategic decisions. Solution concepts from game theory are often used to model the emergent collective behavior of self-interested agents and have found active use in multi-agent control design. Model predictive games are a class of controllers in which an agent iteratively solves a finite-horizon game to predict the behavior of a multi-agent system and synthesize their own control action. When multiple agents implement these types of controllers, there may exist misspecifications in the respective game models embedded in their controllers, stemming from inaccurate estimates or conjectures of other agents' objectives. This paper analyzes the resulting prediction misalignments and their effects on the system's behavior. We provide criteria for the stability of multi-agent dynamic systems with heterogeneous model predictive game controllers, and quantify the sensitivity of the equilibria to individual agents' game parameters.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Distributionally Robust Tolls for Traffic Networks with Affine Latency Functions

In network congestion games, system operators often utilize latency models, estimated from real-world traffic flow and travel time data, to design monetary incentives which steer equilibrium user behaviors towards lowering system-wide latency. This work studies the impact of latency model uncertainty when designing incentives in non-atomic network congestion games. Our approach leverages distributionally robust optimization (DRO), which captures data-driven uncertainty in latency models by considering worst-case distribution shifts. We prove that, under mild and practically relevant assumptions, the distributionally robust tolling problem in single origin-destination, affine-latency congestion games can be solved via convex programming. Numerical simulations illustrate that tolls designed to be distributionally robust against unknown disturbances can outperform tolls designed using fixed, nominal disturbance models in minimizing system-wide latency.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Average Unfairness in Routing Games

We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness notions: loaded unfairness, which compares maximum and minimum latencies of routes with positive flow, and user equilibrium (UE) unfairness, which compares maximum latency with the latency of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the worst-case values of all three unfairness measures coincide and are characterized by a steepness parameter intrinsic to the latency function class. We show that average unfairness is always no greater than loaded unfairness, and the two measures are equal only when the flow is fully fair. Besides that, we offer a complete comparison of the three unfairness measures, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first theoretical analysis in this direction. Finally, we study the constrained system optimum (CSO) problem, where one seeks to minimize total latency subject to an upper bound on unfairness. We prove that, for the same tolerance level, the optimal flow under an average unfairness constraint achieves lower total latency than any flow satisfying a loaded unfairness constraint. We show that such improvement is always strict in parallel-link networks and establish sufficient conditions for general networks. We further illustrate the latter with numerical examples. Our results provide theoretical guarantees and valuable insights for evaluating fairness-efficiency tradeoffs in network routing.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Game-to-Real Gap: Quantifying the Effect of Model Misspecification in Network Games

Game-theoretic models and solution concepts provide rigorous tools for predicting collective behavior in multi-agent systems. In practice, however, different agents may rely on different game-theoretic models to design their strategies. As a result, when these heterogeneous models interact, the realized outcome can deviate substantially from the outcome each agent expects based on its own local model. In this work, we introduce the game-to-real gap, a new metric that quantifies the impact of such model misspecification in multi-agent environments. The game-to-real gap is defined as the difference between the utility an agent actually obtains in the multi-agent environment (where other agents may have misspecified models) and the utility it expects under its own game model. Focusing on quadratic network games, we show that misspecifications in either (i) the external shock or (ii) the player interaction network can lead to arbitrarily large game-to-real gaps. We further develop novel network centrality measures that allow exact evaluation of this gap in quadratic network games. Our analysis reveals that standard network centrality measures fail to capture the effects of model misspecification, underscoring the need for new structural metrics that account for this limitation. Finally, through illustrative numerical experiments, we show that existing centrality measures in network games may provide a counterintuitive understanding of the impact of model misspecification.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Robustness of Incentive Mechanisms Against System Misspecification in Congestion Games

To steer the behavior of selfish, resource-sharing agents in a socio-technical system towards the direction of higher efficiency, the system designer requires accurate models of both agent behaviors and the underlying system infrastructure. For instance, traffic controllers often use road latency models to design tolls whose deployment can effectively mitigate traffic congestion. However, misspecifications of system parameters may restrict a system designer's ability to influence collective agent behavior toward efficient outcomes. In this work, we study the impact of system misspecifications on toll design for atomic congestion games. We prove that tolls designed under sufficiently minor system misspecifications, when deployed, do not introduce new Nash equilibria in atomic congestion games compared to tolls designed in the noise-free setting, implying a form of local robustness. We then upper bound the degree to which the worst-case equilibrium system performance could decrease when tolls designed under a given level of system misspecification are deployed. We validate our theoretical results via Monte-Carlo simulations as well as realizations of our worst-case guarantees.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Trial-and-Error Learning in Decentralized Matching Markets

Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a stable matching. However, in dynamic, decentralized markets where agents must learn their preferences through interaction, such algorithms cannot be used. Our goal in this paper is to identify achievable stability guarantees in decentralized matching markets where (i) agents have limited information about their preferences and (ii) no central entity determines the match. Surprisingly, our first result demonstrates that these constraints do not preclude stability--simple "trial and error" learning policies guarantee convergence to a stable matching without requiring coordination between agents. Our second result shows that more sophisticated policies can direct the system toward a particular group's optimal stable matching. This finding highlights an important dimension of strategic learning: when agents can accurately model others' policies, they can adapt their own behavior to systematically influence outcomes in their favor--a phenomenon with broad implications for learning in multi-agent systems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Learning Optimal Stable Matches in Decentralized Markets with Unknown Preferences

Matching algorithms have demonstrated great success in several practical applications, but they often require centralized coordination and plentiful information. In many modern online marketplaces, agents must independently seek out and match with another using little to no information. For these kinds of settings, can we design decentralized, limited-information matching algorithms that preserve the desirable properties of standard centralized techniques? In this work, we constructively answer this question in the affirmative. We model a two-sided matching market as a game consisting of two disjoint sets of agents, referred to as proposers and acceptors, each of whom seeks to match with their most preferable partner on the opposite side of the market. However, each proposer has no knowledge of their own preferences, so they must learn their preferences while forming matches in the market. We present a simple online learning rule that guarantees a strong notion of probabilistic convergence to the welfare-maximizing equilibrium of the game, referred to as the proposer-optimal stable match. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first completely decoupled, communication-free algorithm that guarantees probabilistic convergence to an optimal stable match, irrespective of the structure of the matching market.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Collaborative Decision-Making and the k-Strong Price of Anarchy in Common Interest Games

The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation technologies, we can consider new collaborative decision-making paradigms that exist somewhere between centralized and distributed control. In this work, we seek to understand the benefits and costs of increased collaborative communication in multi-agent systems. We specifically study this in the context of common interest games in which groups of up to k agents can coordinate their actions in maximizing the common objective function. The equilibria that emerge in these systems are the k-strong Nash equilibria of the common interest game; studying the properties of these states can provide relevant insights into the efficacy of inter-agent collaboration. Our contributions come threefold: 1) provide bounds on how well k-strong Nash equilibria approximate the optimal system welfare, formalized by the k-strong price of anarchy, 2) study the run-time and transient performance of collaborative agent-based dynamics, and 3) consider the task of redesigning objectives for groups of agents which improve system performance. We study these three facets generally as well as in the context of resource allocation problems, in which we provide tractable linear programs that give tight bounds on the k-strong price of anarchy.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Collaborative Coalitions in Multi-Agent Systems: Quantifying the Strong Price of Anarchy for Resource Allocation Games

The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or agents) are enabled to communicate and collaborate on their actions with one another to attain better system behavior. By limiting the amount of communication, these algorithms exist somewhere between centralized and fully distributed approaches. To understand the possible benefits of this inter-agent collaboration, we model a multi-agent system as a common-interest game in which groups of agents can collaborate on their actions to jointly increase the system welfare. We specifically consider $k$-strong Nash equilibria as the emergent behavior of these systems and address how well these states approximate the system optimal, formalized by the $k$-strong price of anarchy ratio. Our main contributions are in generating tight bounds on the $k$-strong price of anarchy in finite resource allocation games as the solution to a tractable linear program. By varying $k$ --the maximum size of a collaborative coalition--we observe exactly how much performance is gained from inter-agent collaboration. To investigate further opportunities for improvement, we generate upper bounds on the maximum attainable $k$-strong price of anarchy when the agents' utility function can be designed.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

The Cost of Informing Decision-Makers in Multi-Agent Maximum Coverage Problems with Random Resource Values

The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers with more information will improve system performance; in this work, we find that this is not necessarily the case. In multi-agent maximum coverage problems, we find that even when agents' objectives are aligned with the global welfare, informing agents about the realization of the resource's random values can reduce equilibrium performance by a factor of 1/2. This affirms an important aspect of designing distributed systems: information need be shared carefully. We further this understanding by providing lower and upper bounds on the ratio of system welfare when information is (fully or partially) revealed and when it is not, termed the value-of-informing. We then identify a trade-off that emerges when optimizing the performance of the best-case and worst-case equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Path Defense in Dynamic Defender-Attacker Blotto Games (dDAB) with Limited Information

We consider a path guarding problem in dynamic Defender-Attacker Blotto games (dDAB), where a team of robots must defend a path in a graph against adversarial agents. Multi-robot systems are particularly well suited to this application, as recent work has shown the effectiveness of these systems in related areas such as perimeter defense and surveillance. When designing a defender policy that guarantees the defense of a path, information about the adversary and the environment can be helpful and may reduce the number of resources required by the defender to achieve a sufficient level of security. In this work, we characterize the necessary and sufficient number of assets needed to guarantee the defense of a shortest path between two nodes in dDAB games when the defender can only detect assets within $k$-hops of a shortest path. By characterizing the relationship between sensing horizon and required resources, we show that increasing the sensing capability of the defender greatly reduces the number of defender assets needed to defend the path.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Avoiding Unintended Consequences: How Incentives Aid Information Provisioning in Bayesian Congestion Games

When users lack specific knowledge of various system parameters, their uncertainty may lead them to make undesirable deviations in their decision making. To alleviate this, an informed system operator may elect to signal information to uninformed users with the hope of persuading them to take more preferable actions. In this work, we study public and truthful signalling mechanisms in the context of Bayesian congestion games on parallel networks. We provide bounds on the possible benefit a signalling policy can provide with and without the concurrent use of monetary incentives. We find that though revealing information can reduce system cost in some settings, it can also be detrimental and cause worse performance than not signalling at all. However, by utilizing both signalling and incentive mechanisms, the system operator can guarantee that revealing information does not worsen performance while offering similar opportunities for improvement. These findings emerge from the closed form bounds we derive on the benefit a signalling policy can provide. We provide a numerical example which illustrates the phenomenon that revealing more information can degrade performance when incentives are not used and improves performance when incentives are used.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

The Effectiveness of Subsidies and Tolls in Congestion Games

Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing user behavior in congestion games. The predominantly studied method of influencing user behavior in network routing problems is to institute taxes which alter users' observed costs in a manner that causes their self-interested choices to more closely align with a system-level objective. Another conceivable method to accomplish the same goal is to subsidize the users' actions that are preferable from a system-level perspective. We show that, when users behave similarly and predictably, subsidies offer superior performance guarantees to tolls under similar budgetary constraints; however, in the presence of unknown player heterogeneity, subsidies fail to offer the same robustness as tolls.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Carrots or Sticks? The Effectiveness of Subsidies and Tolls in Congestion Games

Are rewards or penalties more effective in influencing user behavior? This work compares the effectiveness of subsidies and tolls in incentivizing users in congestion games. The predominantly studied method of influencing user behavior in network routing problems is to institute taxes which alter users' observed costs in a manner that causes their self-interested choices to more closely align with a system-level objective. Another feasible method to accomplish the same goal is to subsidize the users' actions that are preferable from a system-level perspective. We show that, when users behave similarly and predictably, subsidies offer comparable performance guarantees to tolls while requiring smaller monetary transactions with users; however, in the presence of unknown player heterogeneity, subsidies fail to offer the same performance as tolls. We further investigate these relationships in affine congestion games, deriving explicit performance bounds under optimal tolls and subsidies with and without user heterogeneity; we show that the differences in performance can be significant.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Utilizing Information Optimally to Influence Distributed Network Routing

How can a system designer exploit system-level knowledge to derive incentives to optimally influence social behavior? The literature on network routing contains many results studying the application of monetary tolls to influence behavior and improve the efficiency of self-interested network traffic routing. These results typically fall into two categories: (1) optimal tolls which incentivize socially-optimal behavior for a known realization of the network and population, or (2) robust tolls which provably reduce congestion given uncertainty regarding networks and user types, but may fail to optimize routing in general. This paper advances the study of robust influencing, mechanisms asking how a system designer can optimally exploit additional information regarding the network structure and user price sensitivities to design pricing mechanisms which influence behavior. We design optimal scaled marginal-cost pricing mechanisms for a class of parallel-network routing games and derive the tight performance guarantees when the network structure and/or the average user price-sensitivity is known. Our results demonstrate that from the standpoint of the system operator, in general it is more important to know the structure of the network than it is to know distributional information regarding the user population.

cs.GT↗