arXiv subjects

Bulat Nasrulin

Publications and source records attributed to Bulat Nasrulin.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Robust and Automated Reconfiguration of Byzantine Wide-Area Replication

Distributed systems handle adversarial nodes through redundancy, which imposes a significant performance overhead. In blockchain systems, Byzantine fault-tolerant state-machine replication (BFT-SMR) is the replicated service that totally orders client transactions before execution. While prior research has primarily focused on designing novel consensus algorithms with improved performance, recent studies have shown that further gains can be achieved through configuration optimization. More precisely, replicas can monitor network latency to dynamically assign the leader role and tune voting weights, thereby improving consensus performance. However, we identify three vulnerabilities in this process that Byzantine nodes can exploit. To address these weaknesses, we propose Beware, a reconfiguration framework that filters out falsified latency reports, computes robust weight distributions, and applies machine learning to converge towards Byzantine-resilient configurations. Our evaluation shows that Beware reduces consensus latency by up to 45% compared to existing solutions.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

StarveSpam: Mitigating Spam with Local Reputation in Permissionless Blockchains

Spam poses a growing threat to blockchain networks. Adversaries can easily create multiple accounts to flood transaction pools, inflating fees and degrading service quality. Existing defenses against spam, such as fee markets and staking requirements, primarily rely on economic deterrence, which fails to distinguish between malicious and legitimate users and often exclude low-value but honest activity. To address these shortcomings, we present StarveSpam, a decentralized reputation-based protocol that mitigates spam by operating at the transaction relay layer. StarveSpam combines local behavior tracking, peer scoring, and adaptive rate-limiting to suppress abusive actors, without requiring global consensus, protocol changes, or trusted infrastructure. We evaluate StarveSpam using real Ethereum data from a major NFT spam event and show that it outperforms existing fee-based and rule-based defenses, allowing each node to block over 95% of spam while dropping just 3% of honest traffic, and reducing the fraction of the network exposed to spam by 85% compared to existing rule-based methods. StarveSpam offers a scalable and deployable alternative to traditional spam defenses, paving the way toward more resilient and equitable blockchain infrastructure.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

MeritRank: Sybil Tolerant Reputation for Merit-based Tokenomics

Decentralized reputation systems are emerging as promising mechanisms to enhance the effectiveness of token-based economies. Unlike traditional monetary incentives, these systems reward participants based on the actual value of their contributions to the network. However, the advantages and challenges associated with such systems remain largely unexplored. In this work, we investigate the inherent trade-offs in designing a decentralized reputation system that is simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil-resistant. Specifically, `generalizable' means that the system can assess various types of contributions across different contexts, `trustless' indicates that it functions without the need for a central authority to oversee reputations, and `Sybil-resistant' refers to its ability to withstand manipulations by fake identities, i.e., Sybil attacks. We propose MeritRank, a Sybil-tolerant reputation system based on feedback aggregation from participants. Instead of entirely preventing Sybil attacks, our approach effectively limits the benefits that attackers can gain from such strategies. This is achieved by reducing the perceived value of the attacker's and Sybil nodes' contributions through the application of decay mechanisms -- specifically, transitivity decay, connectivity decay, and epoch decay. Using a dataset of participant interactions in MakerDAO, we conducted experiments to demonstrate the Sybil tolerance of MeritRank.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2025

Taming Double-Spending in Offline Payments with Reputation-Weighted Loan Networks

Blockchain solutions typically assume a synchronous network to ensure consistency and achieve consensus. In contrast, offline transaction systems aim to enable users to agree on and execute transactions without assuming bounded communication delays when interacting with the blockchain. Most existing offline payment schemes depend on trusted hardware wallets that are assumed to be secure and tamper-proof. While this work introduces Overdraft, a novel offline payment system that shifts the reliance from hardware to users themselves. Overdraft allows potential payment receivers to assess the likelihood of being paid, allowing them to accept transactions with confidence or deny them. Overdraft achieves this by maintaining a loan network that is weighted by online reputation. This loan network contains time-limited agreements where users pledge to cover another user's payment if necessary. For example, when a payer lacks sufficient funds at the moment of commitment. Offline users rely on the last known view of the loan network -- which they had access to when last online -- to determine whether to participate in an offline transaction. This view is used to estimate the probability of eventual payment, possibly using multiple loans. Once online again, users commit their transactions to the blockchain with any conflicts being resolved deterministically. Overdraft incorporates incentives for users and is designed to be resilient against Sybil attacks. As a proof of concept, we implemented Overdraft as an Ethereum Solidity smart contract and deployed it on the Sepolia testnet to evaluate its performance.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Sustainable Cooperation in Peer-To-Peer Networks

Traditionally, peer-to-peer systems have relied on altruism and reciprocity. Although incentive-based models have gained prominence in new-generation peer-to-peer systems, it is essential to recognize the continued importance of cooperative principles in achieving performance, fairness, and correctness. The lack of this acknowledgment has paved the way for selfish peers to gain unfair advantages in these systems. As such, we address the challenge of selfish peers by devising a mechanism to reward sustained cooperation. Instead of relying on global accountability mechanisms, we propose a protocol that naturally aggregates local evaluations of cooperation. Traditional mechanisms are often vulnerable to Sybil and misreporting attacks. However, our approach overcomes these issues by limiting the benefits selfish peers can gain without incurring any cost. The viability of our algorithm is proven with a deployment to 27,259 Internet users and a realistic simulation of a blockchain gossip protocol. We show that our protocol sustains cooperation even in the presence of a majority of selfish peers while incurring only negligible overhead.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2023

LØ: An Accountable Mempool for MEV Resistance

Possible manipulation of user transactions by miners in a permissionless blockchain systems is a growing concern. This problem is a pervasive and systemic issue, known as Miner Extractable Value (MEV), incurs highs costs on users of decentralised applications. Furthermore, transaction manipulations create other issues in blockchain systems such as congestion, higher fees, and system instability. Detecting transaction manipulations is difficult, even though it is known that they originate from the pre-consensus phase of transaction selection for a block building, at the base layer of blockchain protocols. In this paper we summarize known transaction manipulation attacks. We then present LØ, an accountable base layer protocol specifically designed to detect and mitigate transaction manipulations. LØ is built around accurate detection of transaction manipulations and assignment of blame at the granularity of a single mining node. LØ forces miners to log all the transactions they receive into a secure mempool data structure and to process them in a verifiable manner. Overall, LØ quickly and efficiently detects reordering, injection or censorship attempts. Our performance evaluation shows that LØ is also practical and only introduces a marginal performance overhead.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2022

Gromit: Benchmarking the Performance and Scalability of Blockchain Systems

The growing number of implementations of blockchain systems stands in stark contrast with still limited research on a systematic comparison of performance characteristics of these solutions. Such research is crucial for evaluating fundamental trade-offs introduced by novel consensus protocols and their implementations. These performance limitations are commonly analyzed with ad-hoc benchmarking frameworks focused on the consensus algorithm of blockchain systems. However, comparative evaluations of design choices require macro-benchmarks for uniform and comprehensive performance evaluations of blockchains at the system level rather than performance metrics of isolated components. To address this research gap, we implement Gromit, a generic framework for analyzing blockchain systems. Gromit treats each system under test as a transaction fabric where clients issue transactions to validators. We use Gromit to conduct the largest blockchain study to date, involving seven representative systems with varying consensus models. We determine the peak performance of these systems with a synthetic workload in terms of transaction throughput and scalability and show that transaction throughput does not scale with the number of validators. We explore how robust the subjected systems are against network delays and reveal that the performance of permissoned blockchain is highly sensitive to network conditions.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2019

A Blockchain Database Application Platform

A blockchain is a decentralised linked data structure that is characterised by its inherent resistance to data modification, but it is deficient in search queries, primarily due to its inferior data formatting. A distributed database is also a decentralised data structure which features quick query processing and well-designed data formatting but suffers from data reliability. In this demonstration, we showcase a blockchain database application platform developed by integrating the blockchain with the database, i.e. we demonstrate a system that has the decentralised, distributed and audibility features of the blockchain and quick query processing and well-designed data structure of the distributed databases. The system features a tamper-resistant, consistent and cost-effective multi-active database and an effective and reliable data-level disaster recovery backup. The system is demonstrated in practice as a multi-active database along with the data-level disaster recovery backup feature.

cs.DB↗

arXiv2018

YAC: BFT Consensus Algorithm for Blockchain

Consensus in decentralized systems that asynchronously receive events and which are subject to Byzantine faults is a common problem with many real-life applications. Advances in decentralized systems, such as distributed ledger (i.e., blockchain) technology, has only increased the importance of finding performant and secure solutions to consensus of state machine replication in decentralized systems. YAC is a practical decentralized consensus algorithm, that solves the problems of inefficient message passing and strong leaders that occur in classical Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithms. The algorithm is open source and currently is used to provide Byzantine fault tolerant consensus for the Hyperledger Iroha blockchain project. We provide proofs of safety and liveness, as well as empirical results showing that our algorithm can scale to dozens of validating peers.

cs.DC↗