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Can Savcı

Publications and source records attributed to Can Savcı.

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GARIP: A Running-Average Moving Reference for Last-Iterate Self-Play in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

Self-play with naive gradient ascent cycles in two-player zero-sum games: the last iterate orbits the equilibrium. Modern methods restore last-iterate convergence by regularizing toward a reference policy -- MMD a fixed one (reaching only the regularized equilibrium), R-NaD a periodic snapshot (the engine of DeepNash). We study GARIP, which anchors to the running average, and isolate what the choice of reference controls. Our central result is a mechanism: collapse tracks the peak lag of the reference, and among causal convex averages of a fixed mean lag the running average (flat profile, peak $=$ mean) uniquely minimizes that peak, while a snapshot's sawtooth has peak $= 2\times$ mean (a one-line theorem). Two consequences follow. Convergence: we prove local last-iterate convergence at constant anchor strength -- the anchor scales the base map's rotation by $1-β$, crossing the stability boundary and turning a recurrent base into a contraction (global convergence is conjectured at small $β$; we characterize a large-$β$ consensus failure). Robustness: GARIP matches R-NaD's peak performance -- on matrix games, the Coin Game, and the board games Connect Four/Othello, both moving references are far more robust than fixed-magnet and magnet-free baselines -- but is the better hyperparameter default; we report it both ways: over the full grid collapse rates are statistically indistinguishable, yet at conventional parameterizations a matched-mean-lag setting collapses in 0/40 vs 10/40 seeds (a snapshot matches it only by knowing to shorten $K$). The boundaries: an anticipatory (negative-weight) reference does better still on the stale side, and the advantage appears only where naive self-play cycles (five deep self-play loops). All experiments are pure JAX and reproducible.

cs.MA

Learning to Contest: Decentralized Robust Fairness in Cooperative MARL via Cross-Attention

Fair cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) teams that maximize an egalitarian welfare are exploitable: a single self-interested agent free-rides on the surplus that fair agents forgo to raise the worst-off, and the known remedy is a centralized need-based allocator. We show that a decentralized defense becomes possible once contention is graded: when a contested resource still delivers a fraction $1-c$, a worst-off cooperator that contests a free-rider strictly improves on yielding, so leverage exists for every $c < 1$. We introduce CAN, a permutation-equivariant cross-attention policy over agents' observed behaviour that infers how many free-riders are present and responds proportionally -- turn-taking when none, contesting just enough when some. Trained against an adversarial league, CAN keeps best-response exploitability near the centralized oracle ($ρ\approx 1.2\text{--}1.5$ vs. $ρ= N$ unprotected) at essentially no efficiency cost, whereas the fair-MARL learners (GGF, FEN, SOTO) each collapse to an exploitable or wasteful extreme. Giving those objectives CAN's identical adversarial training does not rescue them, so the objective -- not adversarial training alone -- is what makes hardening possible. Against a committed (non-adaptive) defector, every learned defense including ours provides deterrence rather than immunity, weakening as the leverage $(1-c)/2$ vanishes. Across further environments and team sizes the same principle sets the scope: robustness holds exactly as far as the game's contest leverage reaches, and we map that boundary rather than claim to remove it.

cs.MA