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Can Urgun

Publications and source records attributed to Can Urgun.

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Schedules and Prioritization: A Behavioral Foundation for Multi-Armed Bandits and Stopping Problems

Bandit models typically begin with arms, states, rewards, and transition rules. This paper instead begins with preferences over stopped local contingent schedules: possible unfoldings of a responsibility, project, experiment, or opportunity in its own local time. Behavioral axioms on single schedules characterize a generalized stopping representation with current utility, local discounting, and a broad continuation aggregator. A common-tail compensation axiom then allows calendar time to be priced across schedules. Imposing a tight elapsed-calendar constraint generates a rested generalized bandit and yields index optimality: the index is the shadow price of advancing a local clock. Expected-utility, learning, robust, rank-dependent, Choquet, and Pandora models arise as special cases.

econ.TH

Delusions of Grandeur and Their Benefits (and Hazards)

We study a population-wide tournament in which agents, who care both about their absolute and relative wealth, experiment by searching over correlated objects. We explore the role of the agents' beliefs about the environment; namely, the stochastic processes corresponding to their experimentation. We find that although optimism leads to higher output, it also produces greater inequality. We connect these observations with empirical evidence suggesting a positive relationship between inequality and entrepreneurship.

econ.TH

Best Garbling is No Garbling: Persuasion in Real Time

We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. There is an exogenous signal process, which the sender both garbles and stops, delaying the receiver's decision at a convex, increasing cost of time. We show that, although both instruments are available, under natural regularity conditions, full transparency is always optimal: the sender keeps the signal fully informative and persuades solely by choosing when to stop.

econ.TH

Collective Progress: Dynamics of Exit Waves

We study a model of collective search by teams. Discoveries beget discoveries and correlated search results are governed by a Brownian path. Search results' variation at any point -- the search scope -- is jointly controlled. Agents individually choose when to cease search and implement their best discovery. We characterize equilibrium and optimal policies. Search scope is constant and independent of search outcomes as long as no member leaves. It declines after departures. A simple drawdown stopping boundary governs each agent's search termination. We show the emergence of endogenous exit waves, whereby possibly heterogeneous agents cease search all at once.

econ.TH