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Canhui Liu

Publications and source records attributed to Canhui Liu.

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The Organizational Behavior of Agentic AI: Collective Intelligence in Human-Agent Workflows

Agentic artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed not as a single assistant but as a collective of planners, solvers, reviewers, memory managers, tool users, and orchestrators. These systems are entering organisational workflows under familiar labels such as teams, managers, committees, markets, and workflows. This article asks whether such agent collectives exhibit organisational behaviour in a sense that is analytically comparable to, yet distinct from, human organisational behaviour. I argue that agentic AI is a partial organisational analogue. It resembles a human organisation because it differentiates work, coordinates interdependence, performs recurrent routines, crosses boundaries, and produces collective outcomes. It differs because these patterns are not sustained by motivation, identity, trust, employment, socialisation, or moral accountability. They are sustained by context architecture: prompts, memory, traces, schemas, tools, validators, and permissions. The article develops contextual transaction cost as the central mechanism linking these similarities and differences. Computational theorising, synthetic task simulations, real LLM agent traces, and robustness analyses show that human-imitation forms often underperform when they add lossy handoffs, correlated deliberation, and verification burdens, whereas shared-state and adaptive forms perform better when they make context durable, inspectable, and task-contingent. The article contributes to organisation studies by theorising agentic AI as an emerging object of organising and by specifying the interface conditions under which human and agentic organisational behaviour can jointly support collective intelligence.

cs.CY

Time Without Death: Finitude, Social Order, and What Machines Lack

Machine collectives increasingly coordinate, reciprocate, and form shared conventions on their own, tempting us to call them societies like ours. We argue that this conflates two registers of social order and misses what the human one is for. Human sociality is the way a finite, natal, generational form of life organises its own finitude: members die with their tacit knowledge, newcomers start ignorant, and cohorts must hand on what they cannot keep. Kinship, inheritance, teaching, and much of obligation and trust are the forms this takes, and machine collectives reproduce only the residue once finitude is subtracted. We meet the objection that machines already have death with two distinctions. Autonomy versus heteronomy: a death an operator can reset, roll back, or copy around is not constitutive finitude; the test is resettability. Representation versus binding force: humans learn finitude from others' deaths, so its representation is machine-learnable, but its grip on motivation needs the learner's own end to be inescapable. Treating machines as a model organism, a controlled experiment varying only whether death means loss shows that cumulative, transmissible culture arises only under irreversible loss; a copyable-immortal population is more capable yet culturally empty. Across a machine population and three real human genealogies, copying over-transmits status relative to every human regime and fragments lineage like blood descent, whereas externalisation lowers transmission into the human range and connects lineage like intellectual descent. In a real frontier model, language-model end-game defection vanishes when the game is de-labelled, a sign of recognition, not a mechanism. The gap between a machine collective and a human society is therefore not one of intelligence but of finitude, and it closes only when finitude is built in.

cs.CY