SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Carlos Rubio-Medrano

Publications and source records attributed to Carlos Rubio-Medrano.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

HoneySat: A Network-based Satellite Honeypot Framework

Satellites are the backbone of several mission-critical services that enable our modern society to function, for example, GPS. For years, satellites were assumed to be secure because of their indecipherable architectures and the reliance on security by obscurity. However, technological advancements have made these assumptions obsolete, paving the way for potential attacks, and sparking interest in satellite security. Unfortunately, to this day, there is no efficient way to collect data on adversarial techniques for satellites, hurting the generation of security intelligence that can lead to the development of effective countermeasures. In this paper, we present HoneySat, the first high-interaction satellite honeypot framework, fully capable of convincingly simulating a real-world CubeSat, a type of Small Satellite (SmallSat). To provide evidence of HoneySat's effectiveness, we surveyed experienced SmallSat operators in charge of in-orbit satellites and deployed HoneySat over the Internet to entice adversaries. Our results show that 90% of satellite operators agreed that HoneySat provides a realistic and engaging simulation of a SmallSat mission. Additionally, HoneySat successfully deceived human adversaries in the wild and collected 22 real-world satellite-specific adversarial interactions. Finally, in a major demonstration of HoneySat's robustness, we collaborated with an aerospace company to perform a hardware-in-the-loop operation that resulted in HoneySat successfully communicating with an in-orbit, operational SmallSat mission.

cs.CR

"I Apologize For Not Understanding Your Policy": Exploring the Specification and Evaluation of User-Managed Access Control Policies by AI Virtual Assistants

The rapid evolution of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based Virtual Assistants (VAs) e.g., Google Gemini, ChatGPT, Microsoft Copilot, and High-Flyer Deepseek has turned them into convenient interfaces for managing emerging technologies such as Smart Homes, Smart Cars, Electronic Health Records, by means of explicit commands,e.g., prompts, which can be even launched via voice, thus providing a very convenient interface for end-users. However, the proper specification and evaluation of User-Managed Access Control Policies (U-MAPs), the rules issued and managed by end-users to govern access to sensitive data and device functionality - within these VAs presents significant challenges, since such a process is crucial for preventing security vulnerabilities and privacy leaks without impacting user experience. This study provides an initial exploratory investigation on whether current publicly-available VAs can manage U-MAPs effectively across differing scenarios. By conducting unstructured to structured tests, we evaluated the comprehension of such VAs, revealing a lack of understanding in varying U-MAP approaches. Our research not only identifies key limitations, but offers valuable insights into how VAs can be further improved to manage complex authorization rules and adapt to dynamic changes.

cs.AI

SoK: Security of Programmable Logic Controllers

Billions of people rely on essential utility and manufacturing infrastructures such as water treatment plants, energy management, and food production. Our dependence on reliable infrastructures makes them valuable targets for cyberattacks. One of the prime targets for adversaries attacking physical infrastructures are Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) because they connect the cyber and physical worlds. In this study, we conduct the first comprehensive systematization of knowledge that explores the security of PLCs: We present an in-depth analysis of PLC attacks and defenses and discover trends in the security of PLCs from the last 17 years of research. We introduce a novel threat taxonomy for PLCs and Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Finally, we identify and point out research gaps that, if left ignored, could lead to new catastrophic attacks against critical infrastructures.

cs.CR