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Cedric Langbort

Publications and source records attributed to Cedric Langbort.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Regret-Guaranteed Safe Switching: LQR Setting with Unknown Dynamics

We consider learning-based control in LQR setting, where the parameters associated with each mode are a priori unknown. The next mode to be activated is revealed online only at the time of switching. The objective is to determine both the switching times and the control gains for each mode such that (1) the norm of the system state remains bounded according to a prescribed criterion, and (2) the accumulated cost is minimized. To formalize the state-norm requirement, we introduce the notion of $(\alpha,\beta)$-controllability for given parameters $\alpha$ and $\beta$. We first study the problem in a known model setting and show that, under the switching mechanism described above and under the assumption that each mode is visited infinitely often, the strategy that minimizes the average expected cost consists of applying, in each mode, the feedback gain obtained from the solution of the discrete algebraic Riccati equation, while selecting dwell times that sufficiently satisfy the controllability condition. We refer to this strategy as the benchmark policy. Next, we propose an algorithm for the unknown-model setting that minimizes the regret, defined as the difference between the cumulative cost incurred by the online algorithm and that of the offline benchmark. By accurately estimating dwell-time errors, our method achieves an expected regret of $\mathcal{O}(|\mathcal{M}|^{1/4} n_s^{3/4} + n_m)$, where $n_s$ denotes the number of switches, $|\mathcal{M}|$ is the number of modes, and $n_m$ is the number of malignant switches.

eess.SY

Live LTL Progress Tracking: Towards Task-Based Exploration

Motivated by the challenge presented by non-Markovian objectives in reinforcement learning (RL), we present a novel framework to track and represent the progress of autonomous agents through complex, multi-stage tasks. Given a specification in finite linear temporal logic (LTL), the framework establishes a 'tracking vector' which updates at each time step in a trajectory rollout. The values of the vector represent the status of the specification as the trajectory develops, assigning true, false, or 'open' labels (where 'open' is used for indeterminate cases). Applied to an LTL formula tree, the tracking vector can be used to encode detailed information about how a task is executed over a trajectory, providing a potential tool for new performance metrics, diverse exploration, and reward shaping. In this paper, we formally present the framework and algorithm, collectively named Live LTL Progress Tracking, give a simple working example, and demonstrate avenues for its integration into RL models. Future work will apply the framework to problems such as task-space exploration and diverse solution-finding in RL.

cs.LG

Pointwise-in-Time Explanation for Linear Temporal Logic Rules

The new field of Explainable Planning (XAIP) has produced a variety of approaches to explain and describe the behavior of autonomous agents to human observers. Many summarize agent behavior in terms of the constraints, or ''rules,'' which the agent adheres to during its trajectories. In this work, we narrow the focus from summary to specific moments in individual trajectories, offering a ''pointwise-in-time'' view. Our novel framework, which we define on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) rules, assigns an intuitive status to any rule in order to describe the trajectory progress at individual time steps; here, a rule is classified as active, satisfied, inactive, or violated. Given a trajectory, a user may query for status of specific LTL rules at individual trajectory time steps. In this paper, we present this novel framework, named Rule Status Assessment (RSA), and provide an example of its implementation. We find that pointwise-in-time status assessment is useful as a post-hoc diagnostic, enabling a user to systematically track the agent's behavior with respect to a set of rules.

cs.AI

"What are my options?": Explaining RL Agents with Diverse Near-Optimal Alternatives (Extended)

In this work, we provide an extended discussion of a new approach to explainable Reinforcement Learning called Diverse Near-Optimal Alternatives (DNA), first proposed at L4DC 2025. DNA seeks a set of reasonable "options" for trajectory-planning agents, optimizing policies to produce qualitatively diverse trajectories in Euclidean space. In the spirit of explainability, these distinct policies are used to "explain" an agent's options in terms of available trajectory shapes from which a human user may choose. In particular, DNA applies to value function-based policies on Markov decision processes where agents are limited to continuous trajectories. Here, we describe DNA, which uses reward shaping in local, modified Q-learning problems to solve for distinct policies with guaranteed epsilon-optimality. We show that it successfully returns qualitatively different policies that constitute meaningfully different "options" in simulation, including a brief comparison to related approaches in the stochastic optimization field of Quality Diversity. Beyond the explanatory motivation, this work opens new possibilities for exploration and adaptive planning in RL.

cs.LG

Any-Time Regret-Guaranteed Algorithm for Control of Linear Quadratic Systems

We propose a computationally efficient algorithm that achieves anytime regret of order $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{t})$, with explicit dependence on the system dimensions and on the solution of the Discrete Algebraic Riccati Equation (DARE). Our approach builds on the SDP-based framework of \cite{cohen2019learning}, using an appropriately tuned regularization and a sufficiently accurate initial estimate to construct confidence ellipsoids for control design. A carefully designed input-perturbation mechanism is incorporated to ensure anytime performance. We develop two variants of the algorithm. The first enforces a notion of strong sequential stability, requiring each policy to be stabilizing and successive policies to remain close. However, enforcing this notion results in a suboptimal regret scaling. The second removes the sequential-stability requirement and instead requires only that each generated policy be stabilizing. Closed-loop stability is then preserved through a dwell-time-inspired policy-update rule, adapting ideas from switched-systems control to carefully balance exploration and exploitation. This class of algorithms also addresses key shortcomings of most existing approaches including certainty-equivalence-based methods which typically guarantee stability only in the Lyapunov sense and lack explicit uniform high-probability bounds on the state trajectory expressed in system-theoretic terms. Our analysis explicitly characterizes the trade-off between state amplification and regret, and shows that partially relaxing the sequential-stability requirement yields optimal regret. Finally, our method eliminates the need for any a priori bound on the norm of the DARE solution, an assumption required by all existing computationally efficient optimism in the face of uncertainty (OFU) based algorithms, and thereby removes the reliance of regret guarantees on such external inputs.

stat.ML

Regret-Guaranteed Safe Switching with Minimum Cost: LQR Setting with Unknown Dynamics

Externally Forced Switched (EFS) systems represent a subset of switched systems where switches occur deliberately to meet an external requirement. However, fast switching can lead to instability, even when all closed-loop modes are stable. In this study, our focus is on an EFS scenario with \textit{unknown system dynamics}, where the next mode to switch to is revealed by an external entity in real-time as the switch occurs. The challenge is to track the revealed sequence while (1) minimizing accumulated cost in a regretful sense and (2) ensuring that the norm of the system's state does not grow excessively-a property we refer to as 'the safety of switching.' Achieving the latter involves requiring the closed-loop system to remain in each revealed mode for some minimum dwell time, which must be learned online. We propose an algorithm based on the principles of Optimism in the Face of Uncertainty. This algorithm jointly establishes confidence sets for unknown parameters, devises a feedback policy, and estimates a minimum dwell time for each revealed mode from data. By precisely estimating dwell-time error, our strategy yields an expected regret of $\mathcal{O}(|M| \sqrt{ns})$, where $ns$ and $|M|$ denote the total switches and mode count, respectively. We benchmark this approach against scenarios with known parameters.

eess.SY

Online Decision Making with History-Average Dependent Costs (Extended)

In many online sequential decision-making scenarios, a learner's choices affect not just their current costs but also the future ones. In this work, we look at one particular case of such a situation where the costs depend on the time average of past decisions over a history horizon. We first recast this problem with history dependent costs as a problem of decision making under stage-wise constraints. To tackle this, we then propose the novel Follow-The-Adaptively-Regularized-Leader (FTARL) algorithm. Our innovative algorithm incorporates adaptive regularizers that depend explicitly on past decisions, allowing us to enforce stage-wise constraints while simultaneously enabling us to establish tight regret bounds. We also discuss the implications of the length of history horizon on design of no-regret algorithms for our problem and present impossibility results when it is the full learning horizon.

cs.LG

Safety-Aware Learning-Based Control of Systems with Uncertainty Dependent Constraints (extended version)

The problem of safely learning and controlling a dynamical system - i.e., of stabilizing an originally (partially) unknown system while ensuring that it does not leave a prescribed 'safe set' - has recently received tremendous attention in the controls community. Further complexities arise, however, when the structure of the safe set itself depends on the unknown part of the system's dynamics. In particular, a popular approach based on control Lyapunov functions (CLF), control barrier functions (CBF) and Gaussian processes (to build confidence set around the unknown term), which has proved successful in the known-safe set setting, becomes inefficient as-is, due to the introduction of higher-order terms to be estimated and bounded with high probability using only system state measurements. In this paper, we build on the recent literature on GPs and reproducing kernels to perform this latter task, and show how to correspondingly modify the CLF-CBF-based approach to obtain safety guarantees. Namely, we derive exponential CLF and second relative order exponential CBF constraints whose satisfaction guarantees stability and forward in-variance of the partially unknown safe set with high probability. To overcome the intractability of verification of these conditions on the continuous domain, we apply discretization of the state space and use Lipschitz continuity properties of dynamics to derive equivalent CLF and CBF certificates in discrete state space. Finally, we present an algorithm for the control design aim using the derived certificates.

eess.SY

Regret Bounds for LQ Adaptive Control Under Database Attacks (Extended Version)

This paper is concerned with understanding and countering the effects of database attacks on a learning-based linear quadratic adaptive controller. This attack targets neither sensors nor actuators, but just poisons the learning algorithm and parameter estimator that is part of the regulation scheme. We focus on the adaptive optimal control algorithm introduced by Abbasi-Yadkori and Szepesvari and provide regret analysis in the presence of attacks as well as modifications that mitigate their effects. A core step of this algorithm is the self-regularized on-line least squares estimation, which determines a tight confidence set around the true parameters of the system with high probability. In the absence of malicious data injection, this set provides an appropriate estimate of parameters for the aim of control design. However, in the presence of attack, this confidence set is not reliable anymore. Hence, we first tackle the question of how to adjust the confidence set so that it can compensate for the effect of the poisonous data. Then, we quantify the deleterious effect of this type of attack on the optimality of control policy by bounding regret of the closed-loop system under attack.

eess.SY

On The Role of Social Identity in the Market for (Mis)information

Motivated by recent works in the communication and psychology literature, we model and study the role social identity -- a person's sense of belonging to a group -- plays in human information consumption. A hallmark of Social Identity Theory (SIT) is the notion of 'status', i.e., an individual's desire to enhance their and their 'in-group's' utility relative to that of an 'out-group'. In the context of belief formation, this comes off as a desire to believe positive news about the in-group and negative news about the out-group, which has been empirically shown to support belief in misinformation and false news. We model this phenomenon as a Stackelberg game being played over an information channel between a news-source (sender) and news-consumer (receiver), with the receiver incorporating the 'status' associated with social identity in their utility, in addition to accuracy. We characterize the strategy that must be employed by the sender to ensure that its message is trusted by receivers of all identities while maximizing their overall quality of information. We show that, as a rule, this optimal quality of information at equilibrium decreases when a receiver's sense of identity increases. We further demonstrate how extensions of our model can be used to quantitatively estimate the level of importance given to identity in a population.

cs.GT

Joint Stabilization and Regret Minimization through Switching in Over-Actuated Systems (extended version)

Adaptively controlling and minimizing regret in unknown dynamical systems while controlling the growth of the system state is crucial in real-world applications. In this work, we study the problem of stabilization and regret minimization of linear over-actuated dynamical systems. We propose an optimism-based algorithm that leverages possibility of switching between actuating modes in order to alleviate state explosion during initial time steps. We theoretically study the rate at which our algorithm learns a stabilizing controller and prove that it achieves a regret upper bound of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$.

eess.SY

Protecting Consumers Against Personalized Pricing: A Stopping Time Approach

The widespread availability of behavioral data has led to the development of data-driven personalized pricing algorithms: sellers attempt to maximize their revenue by estimating the consumer's willingness-to-pay and pricing accordingly. Our objective is to develop algorithms that protect consumer interests against personalized pricing schemes. In this paper, we consider a consumer who learns more and more about a potential purchase across time, while simultaneously revealing more and more information about herself to a potential seller. We formalize a strategic consumer's purchasing decision when interacting with a seller who uses personalized pricing algorithms, and contextualize this problem among the existing literature in optimal stopping time theory and computational finance. We provide an algorithm that consumers can use to protect their own interests against personalized pricing algorithms. This algorithmic stopping method uses sample paths to train estimates of the optimal stopping time. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first works that provides computational methods for the consumer to maximize her utility when decision making under surveillance. We demonstrate the efficacy of the algorithmic stopping method using a numerical simulation, where the seller uses a Kalman filter to approximate the consumer's valuation and sets prices based on myopic expected revenue maximization. Compared to a myopic purchasing strategy, we demonstrate increased payoffs for the consumer in expectation.

cs.CE

Detection and Mitigation of Biasing Attacks on Distributed Estimation Networks

The paper considers a problem of detecting and mitigating biasing attacks on networks of state observers targeting cooperative state estimation algorithms. The problem is cast within the recently developed framework of distributed estimation utilizing the vector dissipativity approach. The paper shows that a network of distributed observers can be endowed with an additional attack detection layer capable of detecting biasing attacks and correcting their effect on estimates produced by the network. An example is provided to illustrate the performance of the proposed distributed attack detector.

eess.SY

On Estimating Multi-Attribute Choice Preferences using Private Signals and Matrix Factorization

Revealed preference theory studies the possibility of modeling an agent's revealed preferences and the construction of a consistent utility function. However, modeling agent's choices over preference orderings is not always practical and demands strong assumptions on human rationality and data-acquisition abilities. Therefore, we propose a simple generative choice model where agents are assumed to generate the choice probabilities based on latent factor matrices that capture their choice evaluation across multiple attributes. Since the multi-attribute evaluation is typically hidden within the agent's psyche, we consider a signaling mechanism where agents are provided with choice information through private signals, so that the agent's choices provide more insight about his/her latent evaluation across multiple attributes. We estimate the choice model via a novel multi-stage matrix factorization algorithm that minimizes the average deviation of the factor estimates from choice data. Simulation results are presented to validate the estimation performance of our proposed algorithm.

stat.ML

An LP Approach for Solving Two-Player Zero-Sum Repeated Bayesian Games

This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are independently chosen according to the initial probabilities, and are kept the same all through the game. At every stage, players simultaneously choose actions, and announce their actions publicly. For finite horizon cases, an explicit linear program is provided to compute players' security strategies. Moreover, based on the existing results in [1], this paper shows that a player's sufficient statistics, which is independent of the strategy of the other player, consists of the belief over the player's own type, the regret with respect to the other player's type, and the stage. Explicit linear programs are provided to compute the initial regrets, and the security strategies that only depends on the sufficient statistics. For discounted cases, following the same idea in the finite horizon, this paper shows that a player's sufficient statistics consists of the belief of the player's own type and the anti-discounted regret with respect to the other player's type. Besides, an approximated security strategy depending on the sufficient statistics is provided, and an explicit linear program to compute the approximated security strategy is given. This paper also obtains a bound on the performance difference between the approximated security strategy and the security strategy.

cs.GT

Iterative Computation of Security Strategies of Matrix Games with Growing Action Set

This paper studies how to efficiently update the saddle-point strategy, or security strategy of one player in a matrix game when the other player develops new actions in the game. It is well known that the saddle-point strategy of one player can be computed by solving a linear program. Developing a new action will add a new constraint to the existing LP. Therefore, our problem becomes how to solve the new LP with a new constraint efficiently. Considering the potentially huge number of constraints, which corresponds to the large size of the other player's action set, we use shadow vertex simplex method, whose computational complexity is lower than linear with respect to the size of the constraints, as the basis of our iterative algorithm. We first rebuild the main theorems in shadow vertex method with relaxed assumption to make sure such method works well in our model, then analyze the probability that the old optimum remains optimal in the new LP, and finally provides the iterative shadow vertex method whose computational complexity is shown to be strictly less than that of shadow vertex method. The simulation results demonstrates our main results about the probability of re-computing the optimum and the computational complexity of the iterative shadow vertex method.

cs.GT

Security Strategies of Both Players in Asymmetric Information Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with an Informed Controller

This paper considers a zero-sum two-player asymmetric information stochastic game where only one player knows the system state, and the transition law is controlled by the informed player only. For the informed player, it has been shown that the security strategy only depends on the belief and the current stage. We provide LP formulations whose size is only linear in the size of the uninformed player's action set to compute both history based and belief based security strategies. For the uninformed player, we focus on the regret, the difference between 0 and the future payoff guaranteed by the uninformed player in every possible state. Regret is a real vector of the same size as the belief, and depends only on the action of the informed player and the strategy of the uninformed player. This paper shows that the uninformed player has a security strategy that only depends on the regret and the current stage. LP formulations are then given to compute the history based security strategy, the regret at every stage, and the regret based security strategy. The size of the LP formulations are again linear in the size of the uninformed player action set. Finally, an intrusion detection problem is studied to demonstrate the main results in this paper.

cs.GT

Strategic Communication Between Prospect Theoretic Agents over a Gaussian Test Channel

In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower). We model human decision making using prospect theory models proposed for continuous decision spaces. Assuming that the value function is the squared distortion at both the transmitter and the receiver, we analyze the effects of the weight functions at both the transmitter and the receiver on optimal communication strategies, namely encoding at the transmitter and decoding at the receiver, in the Stackelberg sense. We show that the optimal strategies for the behavioral agents in the Stackelberg sense are identical to those designed for unbiased agents. At the same time, we also show that the prospect-theoretic distortions at both the transmitter and the receiver are both larger than the expected distortion, thus making behavioral agents less contended than unbiased agents. Consequently, the presence of cognitive biases increases the need for transmission power in order to achieve a given distortion at both transmitter and receiver.

cs.GT