arXiv subjects

Chaemin Jang

Publications and source records attributed to Chaemin Jang.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

From Simulated Citizens to Simulated Deliberation: Challenges in Representation and Interaction

Multi-agent LLM deliberation has been explored as a scalable way to simulate public deliberation. For such simulations to be informative, persona agents should reflect population opinion patterns and interaction should shape their conclusions. We evaluate whether LLM-based deliberation can meet these two conditions using census-grounded Korean personas debating real policy questions benchmarked against national surveys. Persona agents do not reliably reproduce population opinion patterns: responses are often far more concentrated and frequently reverse demographic differences in the human data. Deliberations nonetheless produce reasoned, reciprocal, and varied arguments alongside substantial stance movement. Yet much of this movement does not require peer exchange: sealed-monologue agents change position at similar rates and reach nearly the same final balance as full debates, while groups initialized with very different positions often converge to similar endpoints. Anchoring population-informed starting positions, meanwhile, sharply suppresses updating. Thus, population representation, argument generation, and interaction-driven opinion change do not necessarily go together. The simulations readily surface arguments on both sides, though whether they capture the diversity of human perspectives remains untested, leaving open a promising role for argument surfacing even as population simulation requires further validation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Instruction-Tuned Language Models Cannot Sample from Distributions They Can Describe

Silicon sampling uses language models as proxies for human survey respondents, treating each model call as an independent draw from the persona's response distribution. We show this draw does not exist: instruction-tuned models do not sample from distributions, they collapse to a single output. The same persona on the same question returns the same answer on more than half of items in a public-opinion benchmark, and the model's internal probabilities concentrate on a single option. The failure is associated with, and amplified by, instruction-targeted post-training: instruction-tuned models are worse than their own bases in every family we can compare, the gap widens at each successive post-training stage and with the size of the tuning update, and continued pretraining on non-instruction tokens leaves it unchanged. Yet the knowledge survives: the same model that cannot sample from a distribution can describe it accurately in a single call. We call this gap the KNOWS/DOES split. Exploiting the split, a single call that asks the model to describe the response distribution more than halves the error against human survey data compared to persona aggregation. When per-persona outputs are required, we propose Prompt-Perturbed Argyle (PPA), which reduces the same error by 21\%, spreading each persona's answers to mirror real population differences at no added cost.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

In-Context Examples Suppress Scientific Knowledge Recall in LLMs

Scientific reasoning rarely stops at what is directly observable; it often requires uncovering hidden structure from data. From estimating reaction constants in chemistry to inferring demand elasticities in economics, this latent structure recovery is what distinguishes scientific reasoning from curve fitting. Large language models (LLMs) can often recall and apply relevant scientific formulas, but we show that this ability is surprisingly easy to suppress. We show that adding in-context examples makes models rely less on pretrained domain knowledge, even when those examples are generated by the very same formula. Rather than reinforcing knowledge-driven derivation, examples shift computation toward empirical pattern fitting. We document this knowledge displacement on 60 latent structure recovery tasks across five scientific domains, 6,000 trials, and four models. This displacement is consistent across domains, but its accuracy consequences depend on how the displaced strategy compares to the one that replaces it: the same shift can lower accuracy, leave it unchanged, or appear to improve it. In all cases, however, the model shifts away from knowledge-driven reasoning. For practitioners deploying LLMs on scientific tasks, the message is cautionary: in-context examples may displace, rather than reinforce, the knowledge they are intended to support.

cs.AI↗