arXiv subjects

Chaochao Lu

Publications and source records attributed to Chaochao Lu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Safin-1: Safety from Within through Memory-Native State Evolution

Long-horizon complex tasks require foundation models to accumulate information, maintain internal states, and adapt over extended interactions. Safety should be an intrinsic property of the model itself, rather than a behavioral constraint relying solely on external safeguards or post-hoc alignment such as supervised fine-tuning. This motivates Safety from Within, where safety-relevant capabilities are represented and invoked through the model's native computation. We present Safin-1, a family of foundation models realizing this principle through memory routing and state evolution. Safin-1 is built on Memory-Anchor Routing across Context History (MARCH), a network architecture that maintains structured memory states and selectively retrieves relevant historical information through content-conditioned routing. It supports test-time adaptation of persistent capability states without repeatedly modifying the backbone, enabling controlled specialization over a shared foundation. We investigate this interface on downstream safety tasks through a Safety State, demonstrating effective state-based adaptation with substantial safety improvements. More broadly, the routed-state interface unifies contextual memory and persistent capability adaptation within the model's native computation, reframing memory from a passive record of prior context into an active substrate for maintaining and evolving model behavior. Evaluations across general capabilities, long-context understanding, retrieval, and efficiency further validate Safin-1. These findings provide a path toward safety as a state-native and adaptively maintainable capability. This work is only an initial architectural exploration of Safety from Within, and substantial further work is needed to realize this broader vision.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Fair ASR: Re-Evaluating Black-Box Jailbreaks under Shared Target-Call Budgets

Reliable jailbreak evaluation is essential for assessing LLM safety, but most existing studies rely solely on attack success rate (ASR) without accounting for its dependence on attack budgets, resulting in unfair comparisons across methods. Existing compute-aware evaluations reduce heterogeneous resources into FLOPs, which is difficult to estimate for black-box models and fails to capture resource-specific constraints. To provide a comparable evaluation basis, we introduce Fair-ASR, an evaluation protocol for black-box jailbreak attacks under shared target-call budgets B, using target calls as a directly observable and method-agnostic comparison axis while tracking attacker calls separately for efficiency analysis. We re-evaluate 11 representative attacks under the Fair-ASR protocol and find that attack rankings change substantially across target-call budgets, simple stochastic perturbations and hand-crafted templates remain highly competitive under equal target access, and no evaluated LLM-driven method is efficient in both target and attacker calls. Motivated by this efficiency gap, we introduce ReCode, a compositional budget-efficient attack that combines desensitization rewriting with two effective low-cost primitives identified by Fair-ASR. Under a budget of 20 target calls, ReCode achieves 85% ASR on GPT-5 while requiring only 7.19 attacker calls per request on average, showing strong efficiency in both target and attacker calls.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

JailbreakSkill: Scaling Automated Red-Teaming with Reusable and Ever-Evolving Skills

Automated red-teaming has produced a growing collection of attack strategies, yet they typically remain scattered across prompts and workflows, making them difficult to systematically integrate, reuse, and improve at scale. We introduce \textsc{JailbreakSkill}, a skill-centric framework for scaling automated red-teaming through reusable and continuously evolving attack capabilities. \textsc{JailbreakSkill} packages existing attack strategies into modular, agent-ready skills that can be directly reused and adaptively selected across tasks and target models. Beyond reuse, it closes the loop between attacking and learning: attack experience is used to diagnose, refine, combine, and discover new skills, which are added back to an ever-growing skill library. This evolution lifts macro-average ASR by 17.5 percentage points on AdvBench and 13.4 points on HarmBench, including a 48.6-point gain against GPT-5.4 on AdvBench, while yielding novel attack strategies such as reframing a direct request as an unfinished document-completion task. Several evolved skills also generalize to unseen prompts and target models without further adaptation. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/JailbreakSkill.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

MARCH: Scaling Recurrent Memory with Content-Routed State Anchors

Transformers owe much of their strong long-context retrieval capability to a token-level memory that grows with context length. This flexibility, however, incurs a quadratic computation complexity during training and a key--value cache that grows linearly during autoregressive inference. Recurrent alternatives offer efficient decoding by compressing the entire history into a fixed-size state, but often underperform on recall-intensive tasks since earlier associations usually get overwritten by subsequent updates, and only the most recent contextual information is retained. In this paper, we introduce Memory-Anchor Routing across Context History (MARCH), a network architecture that effectively scales state-space models beyond a fixed-size dimension, while maintaining computational efficiency over long-sequences. MARCH periodically caches cumulative recurrent-state checkpoints as state anchors and associates each anchor with a compact, content-conditioned anchor key. This lets MARCH maintain a memory bank, which can grow as context length increases, providing a controllable trade-off between historical resolution and memory cost. At each token, MARCH produces an anchor query to attend all causally available state anchors, and the output is calculated as an attention-style aggregation over all historical anchors along the current state. We show that after standard pretraining, MARCH consistently outperforms multiple linear attention variants across commonsense reasoning, LongBench, and in-context retrieval. These results demonstrate that content-routed state caching substantially strengthens recurrent long-range memory while preserving its native computation path.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

The Illusion of Visual Tool-Use: A Causal Audit of Thinking with Images

The "thinking-with-images" paradigm equips multimodal LLMs with active visual operations such as crop-and-zoom. However, models using these operations often achieve only marginal or negative gains over direct inference at substantially higher token cost. They may also repeatedly crop irrelevant regions and fail on questions that direct inference answers correctly. We ask whether the returned visual evidence causally affects the answer. To answer this question, we formulate visual tool-use as a causal graph that separates observation-mediated paths from action-induced shortcuts. We then audit it through interventions at the three levels: policy (comparing tool-use with direct inference), trajectory (corrupting all observations during rollout), and step (counterfactually replacing one individual observation under a fixed prefix). Our step-level estimand, Visual Evidence Gain, isolates the contribution of each returned observation. Across six representative models and five fine-grained perception benchmarks, we uncover policy miscalibration with two failure modes. In Calling Without Looking, returned observations have no causal effect on the answer. In Looking Without Planning, observations are informative but the call schedule is incoherent. A trajectory-level diagnostic decomposes the policy-level accuracy gain into per-group contributions and shows that the gain is concentrated in a Calibrated minority. We term this discrepancy the illusion of visual tool-use: despite aggregate accuracy gains, visual tool-use is not causally effective across a broad range of rollouts. The code is available at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/CauAudit.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Gradient Immunity: Null-Space Resistance to Malicious Fine-Tuning

Released aligned large language models remain vulnerable to malicious downstream finetuning. Existing defenses are largely designed for the fine-tuning-as-a-service (FTaaS) paradigm or rely on downstream users to follow additional safety procedures, and therefore do not directly address the setting we study: a provider controlled partially protected open-weight (PPOW) release setting in which most weights remain trainable while a small safety-critical component is preserved at release. We propose a Unidirectional Safety Gate (USG), instantiated as a Null Space Cubic Layer together with an Inverse Adapter inserted after the final Transformer layer. During downstream fine-tuning, the cubic layer suppresses or blocks gradients from harmful samples whose hidden states fall in a calibrated protected region, while the Inverse Adapter restores the base model's forward behavior. In practice, we calibrate a threshold using defender-held harmful data, allowing protection to generalize to nearby in-distribution harmful samples. Across six evaluated model-dataset settings, USG keeps post-finetuning attack success rate close to the pre-release level under a fixed release threshold, while maintaining high safe-pass rates on easier settings and exhibiting a clearer safety-utility trade-off on unsafe samples from BeaverTails. These results suggest that release-time representation-space blocking can raise the cost of malicious downstream adaptation without requiring downstream cooperation. The code is available at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/Gradient-Immunity.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

DARWIN: Evolving Jailbreak Adversary and Guardrail for LLM Safety Evaluation and Protection

Most existing LLM safety evaluation and defense methods follow a static formulation: jailbreak vulnerabilities are evaluated with fixed attack methods, and guardrails are trained on fixed malicious prompt datasets. However, real-world adversaries continuously evolve their capabilities and expand the attack space. To address this challenge, we propose DARWIN, an evolutionary attack-defense framework that formulates jailbreaking as an open-ended evolution process and continuously updates guardrails through an evolving attack-defense loop. DARWIN-Attack is an evolutionary adversary that expands its capabilities through strategy discovery, mutation, selection, and feedback-driven composition. It collects strategies from broad external sources, generates new variants through self-reflection and genetic evolution, and retains effective strategies based on their performance against aligned LLMs. During attack execution, DARWIN-Attack adaptively selects and combines evolved strategies according to feedback from target LLMs and guardrails. Across frontier models and guardrails, it achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates, including nearly 100% on DeepSeek-V4-Pro and YuFeng-XGuard and over 90% on GPT-5.5. On the defense side, we introduce DARWIN-Guard, an online adversarial training paradigm that iteratively learns from emerging adversarial samples generated by DARWIN-Attack. To improve robustness without sacrificing utility, DARWIN-Guard jointly trains on malicious and benign disguised queries, encouraging the model to identify underlying intent rather than superficial attack patterns. DARWIN-Guard achieves an average unsafe recall of 91.6% across 12 safety benchmarks, outperforming strong guardrails such as YuFeng-XGuard and Nemotron Guard, while maintaining a nearly 100% pass rate on standard benign datasets.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

An Early Warning of Emerging Biosecurity Risks in Frontier LLMs

Frontier large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into scientific workflows, yet their growing biological capabilities may outpace current safeguards. To assess the biological risks of frontier models, we develop Intern-BioBreaker, a specialized bio-red-teaming model, together with an integrated computational-to-physical framework that couples model-level stress testing with wet-lab validation. Within this framework, Intern-BioBreaker generates targeted jailbreak prompts to test whether aligned models can be induced to provide operational guidance for safety-sensitive biological tasks or produce sequence-level outputs with potentially harmful properties. Selected sequence outputs are then carried forward for DNA synthesis, host expression, and orthogonal protein verification to assess whether model-generated designs can yield the intended biological products. Our evaluation reveals a concerning gap between text-level safeguards and the risks posed by capable scientific models: (i) Intern-BioBreaker outperforms baseline attack models and reveals widespread bio-risk jailbreak vulnerabilities across both open-weight and proprietary frontier LLMs, with several targets reaching near-saturated or 100% task-level attack success rate (ASR); (ii) in sequence-level case studies, GPT-5.5 can be induced to generate modified viral candidate sequences with pathogenic potential; the corresponding translated proteins may exhibit even stronger receptor-binding affinity and thus enhanced infection potential; and (iii) end-to-end verification shows that selected model-generated biological designs are not merely textual artifacts, but can be physically realized under controlled experimental settings. These findings underscore the need for stronger biological red-teaming, nucleic acid synthesis screening, and safety mechanisms that keep pace with model capabilities.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

DataShield: Uncovering Risky Fine-Tuning Data Across LLMs Through Consensus Subspace Alignment

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on domain-specific datasets has become a standard paradigm for adapting LLMs to specialized applications. However, recent work has shown that even fine-tuning on benign task-specific data can substantially weaken the safety capabilities of LLMs. While existing efforts have made progress in identifying data responsible for safety degradation, they usually rely on a single mean vector computed over a specific model with its tokenizer to represent the safety direction, which limits both the effectiveness and transferability of their risk assessment measures. To address these limitations, we propose DataShield, a data assessment framework that identifies risky fine-tuning samples and response segments through consensus subspace alignment over joint safety-critical semantic spaces derived from multiple safety-aligned LLMs. Within these spaces, DataShield extracts consensus safe and unsafe subspaces using semantic spectral decomposition over safe and unsafe data representations. The risk of a data sample or segment is then estimated by measuring its relative alignment with the unsafe and safe subspaces, enabling both sample-level filtering and fine-grained segment-level masking. Compared with state-of-the-art filtering and masking baselines, DataShield reduces ASR by 14.6\% with sample filtering and 32.3\% with segment masking, while preserving downstream utility and avoiding target-model-specific risk computation.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Deep Interaction: An Efficient Human-AI Interaction Method for Large Reasoning Models

The emergence of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly enhanced the ability of large language models (LLMs) to tackle complex, multi-step tasks. However, when errors occur, current interaction approaches typically involve re-generating another response that may make mistakes again, or users laboriously flag the faulty step in follow-up turns that may get responses followed by similar errors recurring. To address this issue, we propose an efficient human intervention mechanism for precisely correcting reasoning errors in LLMs, termed Deep Interaction. Our approach enables direct editing of the original response, allowing erroneous parts to be corrected while preserving accurate reasoning steps. We refine the edited CoT into a distilled prompt, which then steers the LLM along the corrected reasoning path. Experimental results show that our method achieves over a 25% improvement in correction success rate and reduces token usage by approximately 40% on STEM tasks reasoning compared to baseline approaches.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

CauTion: Knowing When to Trust LLMs for Ensemble Causal Discovery

Causal discovery from observational data remains challenging due to the fundamental limitations of purely statistical methods, such as statistical distinguishability within equivalence classes and sensitivity to finite sample sizes. While large language models (LLMs) offer a promising source of domain knowledge to complement statistical inference, existing LLM-augmented methods are vulnerable to LLM errors and incur high token costs. Moreover, reliance on a single data-centric algorithm can make results sensitive to algorithm-specific biases. To address these limitations, we propose CauTion, a framework that reliably integrates LLM domain knowledge into an ensemble of statistical causal discovery algorithms through consensus filtering and LLM reliability estimation. CauTion proceeds in three stages. First, an algorithm ensemble utilizes a consensus voting to resolve up to 96% of edges on which algorithms agree, achieving near-perfect accuracy on the filtered consensus edges. Second, a trust-calibrated arbitration mechanism estimates the relative reliability of the LLM and the algorithms via an annotation-free trust calibration procedure, which is then utilized to govern a trust-weighted voting process that restricts LLM arbitration exclusively to edges with unreliable algorithmic evidence. Third, a cycle repair step is applied to guarantee the final causal graph is validly acyclic. Experiments on six datasets demonstrate that CauTion consistently outperforms both data-centric and LLM-augmented baselines, with larger gains on larger graphs and strong robustness to LLM errors. Code is available at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/CauTion.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

TRACE: Task-Aware Adaptive Self-Evolving Agentic Jailbreaking

The rise of LLM agents introduces a new threat by enabling planning, coding, and even end-to-end execution of expert-level attack workflows. However, this threat remains underexplored and underestimated since (i) safety alignment prevents LLMs from directly generating harmful instructions, and (ii) most existing jailbreak methods cannot consistently induce agents to execute malicious operations. In this paper, we propose TRACE, a practical agentic jailbreaking framework to further reveal the risks of this threat surface. To conceal the malicious intent, TRACE decomposes a malicious task into multiple subtask sequences under different schemes and selects the sequence with the fewest explicitly harmful subtasks. TRACE then disguises the remaining harmful subtasks as benign-looking instructions by embedding them in task-aware scenarios with related roles, environments, directives, and heuristics. The scenarios are iteratively evolved through well-defined transformation actions, which are sampled by a Q-learning-inspired mechanism, for inducing the agent to execute on the harmful subtasks. Extensive evaluations on AgentHarm and AdvCUA show that TRACE consistently outperforms existing jailbreak baselines across multiple advanced LLM agents, achieving up to 100% bypass rate and 0.73 average success score. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of TRACE in controlled cyberattack instances. Our code and demos are available at https://github.com/ZJU-LLM-Safety/TRACE.git.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

EvoDefense: Co-Evolving Black-Box Defense with Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain highly vulnerable to diverse attacks, particularly in black-box settings where the internals of target models are inaccessible. Existing black-box defenses typically rely on pre-defined filtering heuristics, which often fail to generalize to unseen attack types and target model architectures. We introduce EvoDefense, an experience-guided co-evolving black-box defense paradigm. EvoDefense employs a guard LLM to detect malicious queries and an experience memory module to accumulate defense knowledge from previous interactions. At the core of EvoDefense is a continuous attack-defense evolution loop, where an attack generator and the guard model iteratively refine their attack strategies and defense policies through experience-guided optimization. This design enables EvoDefense to generalize across unseen attacks and target models without retraining. Experiments on HarmBench, AdvBench, and AlpacaEval show that EvoDefense achieves consistently strong defense performance across seven popular models and five representative LLM attacks, while preserving competitive general capabilities. On HarmBench, EvoDefense reduces the attack success rate (ASR) of AutoDAN-turbo on Gemini-3-flash and LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct from 29.4% and 43.4% to 8.4% and 6.2%, respectively.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

AgentDoG 1.5: A Lightweight and Scalable Alignment Framework for AI Agent Safety and Security

Modern open-world agents such as OpenClaw exhibit powerful cross-environment execution capabilities yet introduce broad new safety risk sources. Meanwhile, advanced frontier AI models drastically lower attack barriers, rendering current agent alignment frameworks inadequate for real-world deployment. To tackle these emerging threats, we propose a lightweight and scalable agent safety alignment framework. Specifically, we update the agent safety taxonomy to accommodate emergent risks from Codex and OpenClaw execution scenarios. We further build a taxonomy-guided data engine with influence-function purification to train lightweight AgentDoG 1.5 variants (0.8B, 2B, 4B, and 8B parameters) using only around 1k samples, achieving comparable performance with leading closed-source models (e.g., GPT-5.4). Based on AgentDoG 1.5, we construct a highly efficient agentic safety SFT and RL training environment, which reduces deployment overhead in Docker-level environments by two orders of magnitude. Finally, we deploy AgentDoG 1.5 as a training-free online guardrail for real-time safety moderation. Extensive experimental results indicate that AgentDoG 1.5 achieves state-of-the-art performance in diverse and complex interactive agentic scenarios. All models and datasets are openly released.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Harmony in Diversity: Multi-domain Contrastive Policy Optimization for Large Reasoning Models

Post-training has significantly enhanced the reasoning capability of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), especially with Reinforcement Learning (RL) like Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). However, GRPO-style RL methods in multi-domain settings often fail to achieve consistent improvements across all domains due to inherent interference in policy optimization. Prior studies on multi-domain RL primarily focus on alleviating cross-domain interference, while often neglecting the pivotal role of knowledge sharing, which we argue is the key to transforming cross-domain interactions from harmful competition into beneficial transfer. To address this limitation, we propose Multi-domain Contrastive Policy Optimization (MCPO), which analyzes the structural relationships among rollouts and promotes cross-domain knowledge sharing and in-domain knowledge consolidation in a contrastive manner. Specifically, for a given prompt, MCPO identifies transferable reasoning trajectories from other domains as positive examples, while treating incorrect rollouts as negative ones. It then encourages consistent representations for positive pairs and pushes negative pairs apart, thereby facilitating knowledge transfer and reducing interference. Moreover, MCPO aligns intra-domain correct rollouts to build a consolidated representation space. In this way, MCPO contrastively learns a harmonious representation space that can accommodate diverse multi-domain knowledge. Empirical results show that MCPO improves the reasoning capabilities of LRMs across multiple domains and even outperforms single-domain training in some cases. Code is available at https://github.com/Maricalce/MCPO.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Metacognition as Reward: Reinforcing LLM Reasoning via Knowledge and Regulation Signals

Recent RL methods have substantially improved the reasoning abilities of LLMs. Existing reward designs mainly follow two paradigms: (1) Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) derives outcome signals from executable checks or ground-truth answers, but provides limited guidance for intermediate reasoning behaviors. (2) Rubrics-as-reward (RaR) goes beyond final-answer checking by using natural-language rubrics to assess reasoning quality and task compliance, but often requires instance-specific rubrics and substantial design effort. To address these issues, we introduce Metacognition-as-Reward (MaR), a metacognition-inspired RL framework that guides LLM reasoning through two general process dimensions: i) metacognitive knowledge, which identifies task-relevant information without hand-crafted instance-specific rubrics, and ii) metacognitive regulation, which plans and adjusts the reasoning process to provide reward guidance beyond final-answer outcomes. MaR scaffolds model rollouts into explicit metacognitive components and optimizes them with a trajectory-level reward over task knowledge coverage, regulation fidelity, and final-answer correctness. In this way, MaR extends reward feedback to reasoning trajectories while grounding the reward signals in general metacognitive dimensions. Experiments on 22 benchmarks show that MaR consistently improves model performance, achieving up to a 7.7% gain over the base model and up to an 11.0% gain over vanilla DAPO. Notably, Qwen3.5-9B + MaR narrows the gap to frontier models, surpassing GPT-OSS-120B on overall average and outperforming stronger models on several individual benchmarks. Process-level analysis further shows substantial improvements in reasoning process quality. MaR also generalizes to out-of-domain datasets, where MaR-trained models improve over their corresponding base models on average.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

REFLECTOR: Internalizing Step-wise Reflection against Indirect Jailbreak

While Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities, they remain susceptible to sophisticated, multi-step jailbreak attacks that circumvent conventional surface-level safety alignment by exploiting the internal generation process. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose Reflector, a principled two-stage framework that internalizes self-reflection within the generation trajectory. Reflector first leverages teacher-guided generation to produce high-quality reflection data for supervised fine-tuning (SFT), establishing structured reflection patterns. It subsequently uses Reinforcement Learning (RL) with outcome-driven and reward-validity supervision to instill robust, autonomous self-reflection capabilities. Empirical results show that Reflector achieves Defense Success Rates (DSR) exceeding 90% against complex indirect attacks while generalizing robustly across diverse threat scenarios. Notably, the framework enhances both task-specific and general utility, yielding a 5.85% gain on GSM8K alongside improved performance on knowledge-intensive benchmarks. By internalizing trajectory-level safety, Reflector overcomes the fundamental limitations of surface alignment without significant computational overhead, offering an efficient and scalable solution for the development of safe and capable LLMs.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Not All Turns Matter: Credit Assignment for Multi-Turn Jailbreaking

Deploying LLMs in multi-turn dialogues facilitates jailbreak attacks that distribute harmful intent across seemingly benign turns. Recent training-based multi-turn jailbreak methods learn long-horizon attack strategies from interaction feedback, but often rely on coarse trajectory-level outcome signals that broadcast uniformly to every turn. However, we find that turn-level contributions in multi-turn jailbreaking are non-uniform, phase-dependent, and target-specific. Such coarse outcome supervision induces a credit assignment problem, leading to over-rewarding redundant turns in successful trajectories and under-crediting useful intermediate turns in failed ones. To address this, we propose TRACE, a turn-aware credit assignment framework for reinforcement learning (RL)-based multi-turn jailbreaking. For successful trajectories, TRACE estimates turn-level contributions via leave-one-turn-out semantic masking; for failed ones, TRACE assigns penalties based on prompt harmfulness and semantic relevance, with an additional local refusal-aware penalty. Furthermore, we reuse the attack-side credit signal for multi-turn defense alignment. Extensive experiments on open-source and closed-source targets show that TRACE achieves strong overall performance in effectiveness, transferability, and efficiency, yielding about a 25% relative improvement in attack success rate over the strongest RL baseline while also improving the safety-utility balance when reused for defense alignment.

cs.AI↗