arXiv subjects

Charles A. Kamhoua

Publications and source records attributed to Charles A. Kamhoua.

13 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

TripleFlow: Training-Free Video Object Removal by Bridging Residual Editing and Native Generation

Video object removal presents a uniquely difficult editing challenge. Because a removal prompt specifies only what to erase rather than what to generate, the model must infer and reconstruct a highly specific occluded background entirely from the surrounding context. Existing training-free methods struggle with this because their editing mechanisms act primarily as localized erasers. They fail to actively synthesize the missing background details and often leave behind ghosting artifacts. To solve this, we propose TripleFlow, a training-free framework that tightly couples erasure and generation. It coordinates a source flow, a residual flow, and a synthesis flow throughout the entire process. By reusing a single target prediction, the residual flow isolates and suppresses the object, while the synthesis flow independently reconstructs the occluded background. Crucially, TripleFlow injects this newly synthesized background back into the editing trajectory at every step. This continuous feedback loop ensures that the generated structures actively guide the removal process, achieving seamless completion that is spatiotemporally consistent with the unedited scene. Extensive evaluations across five challenging benchmarks demonstrate that TripleFlow establishes a new state-of-the-art, significantly outperforming existing baselines in both reconstruction fidelity and temporal consistency.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2026

Beyond Best Response: Quantal Stackelberg Deception as Insurance Against Attacker Misspecification

Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) assume that an attacker observes the defender's strategy and chooses the target that maximizes their expected utility perfectly. In most realistic applications this is not plausible, and in the case of cyber deception (e.g., using decoys) the purpose of the game is to induce uncertainty and mistakes. Quantal response is a common way to represent noise and mistakes in decision-making; here it replaces perfect best-response with a logit choice with rationality parameter $λ$ and results in a generalized Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE), which recovers the classical solution exactly as $λ\rightarrow \infty$. We conduct a deeper analysis of how QSE can function as a generalized form of insurance against a variety of forms of model specification error/uncertainty; our analysis shows that QSE provides a practical way to address the important role of tie-breaking rules and model uncertainty in SSG from both a theoretical and practical perspective. We conduct an empirical evaluation in a cybersecurity case study with two networks and real vulnerabilities drawn from CVE and scored using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). QSE beats Stackelberg in realized defender utility spanning 144 scenarios with specification errors and 25 parameter configurations, with gains of 46\% to 175\% showing a substantial advantage in a wide variety of realistic cases.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Planning Stealthy Backdoor Attacks in MDPs with Observation-Based Triggers

This paper investigates backdoor attack planning in stochastic control systems modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). A backdoor attack involves an adversary deploying a policy that performs well in the original MDP to pass testing, but behaves maliciously at runtime when combined with a trigger that perturbs system dynamics. We consider a sophisticated attacker capable of jointly optimizing the backdoor policy and its trigger using only a blackbox simulator. During execution, the attacker has access only to partial observations of the system state and is restricted to introduce small perturbations to the system's transition dynamics. We formulate the attack planning problem as a constrained Markov game with an augmented state space and two players: Player 0 learns a backdoor policy that maximizes attack rewards when the trigger is active. However, when the trigger is inactive, the backdoor policy behaves near-optimally in the original MDP; Player 1 designs a finite-memory, observation-based trigger to activate the attack. We propose a switching gradient-based optimization algorithm to jointly solve for the backdoor policy and trigger. Experiments on a case study demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in achieving stealthy and successful backdoor attacks, and how the attack performance varies under different parameters related to the stealthiness of the backdoor attack.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2025

Active Inference through Incentive Design in Markov Decision Processes

We present a method for active inference with partial observations in stochastic systems through incentive design, also known as the leader-follower game. Consider a leader agent who aims to infer a follower agent's type given a finite set of possible types. Different types of followers differ in either the dynamical model, the reward function, or both. We assume the leader can partially observe a follower's behavior in the stochastic system modeled as a Markov decision process, in which the follower takes an optimal policy to maximize a total reward. To improve inference accuracy and efficiency, the leader can offer side payments (incentives) to the followers such that different types of them, under the incentive design, can exhibit diverging behaviors that facilitate the leader's inference task. We show the problem of active inference through incentive design can be formulated as a special class of leader-follower games, where the leader's objective is to balance the information gain and cost of incentive design. The information gain is measured by the entropy of the estimated follower's type given partial observations. Furthermore, we demonstrate that this problem can be solved by reducing a single-level optimization through softmax temporal consistency between followers' policies and value functions. This reduction allows us to develop an efficient gradient-based algorithm. We utilize observable operators in the hidden Markov model (HMM) to compute the necessary gradients and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through experiments in stochastic grid world environments.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2024

Reactive Synthesis of Sensor Revealing Strategies in Hypergames on Graphs

In many security applications of cyber-physical systems, a system designer must guarantee that critical missions are satisfied against attacks in the sensors and actuators of the CPS. Traditional security design of CPSs often assume that attackers have complete knowledge of the system. In this article, we introduce a class of deception techniques and study how to leverage asymmetric information created by deception to strengthen CPS security. Consider an adversarial interaction between a CPS defender and an attacker, who can perform sensor jamming attacks. To mitigate such attacks, the defender introduces asymmetrical information by deploying a "hidden sensor," whose presence is initially undisclosed but can be revealed if queried. We introduce hypergames on graphs to model this game with asymmetric information. Building on the solution concept called subjective rationalizable strategies in hypergames, we identify two stages in the game: An initial game stage where the defender commits to a strategy perceived rationalizable by the attacker until he deviates from the equilibrium in the attacker's perceptual game; Upon the deviation, a delay-attack game stage starts where the defender plays against the attacker, who has a bounded delay in attacking the sensor being revealed. Based on backward induction, we develop an algorithm that determines, for any given state, if the defender can benefit from hiding a sensor and revealing it later. If the answer is affirmative, the algorithm outputs a sensor revealing strategy to determine when to reveal the sensor during dynamic interactions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our deceptive strategies through two case studies related to CPS security applications.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Integrated Resource Allocation and Strategy Synthesis in Safety Games on Graphs with Deception

Deception plays a crucial role in strategic interactions with incomplete information. Motivated by security applications, we study a class of two-player turn-based deterministic games with one-sided incomplete information, in which player 1 (P1) aims to prevent player 2 (P2) from reaching a set of target states. In addition to actions, P1 can place two kinds of deception resources: "traps" and "fake targets" to disinform P2 about the transition dynamics and payoff of the game. Traps "hide the real" by making trap states appear normal, while fake targets "reveal the fiction" by advertising non-target states as targets. We are interested in jointly synthesizing optimal decoy placement and deceptive defense strategies for P1 that exploits P2's misinformation. We introduce a novel hypergame on graph model and two solution concepts: stealthy deceptive sure winning and stealthy deceptive almost-sure winning. These identify states from which P1 can prevent P2 from reaching the target in a finite number of steps or with probability one without allowing P2 to become aware that it is being deceived. Consequently, determining the optimal decoy placement corresponds to maximizing the size of P1's deceptive winning region. Considering the combinatorial complexity of exploring all decoy allocations, we utilize compositional synthesis concepts to show that the objective function for decoy placement is monotone, non-decreasing, and, in certain cases, sub- or super-modular. This leads to a greedy algorithm for decoy placement, achieving a $(1 - 1/e)$-approximation when the objective function is sub- or super-modular. The proposed hypergame model and solution concepts contribute to understanding the optimal deception resource allocation and deception strategies in various security applications.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Optimizing Sensor Allocation against Attackers with Uncertain Intentions: A Worst-Case Regret Minimization Approach

This paper is concerned with the optimal allocation of detection resources (sensors) to mitigate multi-stage attacks, in the presence of the defender's uncertainty in the attacker's intention. We model the attack planning problem using a Markov decision process and characterize the uncertainty in the attacker's intention using a finite set of reward functions -- each reward represents a type of the attacker. Based on this modeling framework, we employ the paradigm of the worst-case absolute regret minimization from robust game theory and develop mixed-integer linear program (MILP) formulations for solving the worst-case regret minimizing sensor allocation strategies for two classes of attack-defend interactions: one where the defender and attacker engage in a zero-sum game, and another where they engage in a non-zero-sum game. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework using a stochastic gridworld example.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Synthesizing Attack-Aware Control and Active Sensing Strategies under Reactive Sensor Attacks

We consider the probabilistic planning problem for a defender (P1) who can jointly query the sensors and take control actions to reach a set of goal states while being aware of possible sensor attacks by an adversary (P2) who has perfect observations. To synthesize a provably-correct, attack-aware joint control and active sensing strategy for P1, we construct a stochastic game on graph with augmented states that include the actual game state (known only to the attacker), the belief of the defender about the game state (constructed by the attacker based on his knowledge of defender's observations). We present an algorithm to compute a belief-based, randomized strategy for P1 to ensure satisfying the reachability objective with probability one, under the worst-case sensor attack carried out by an informed P2. We prove the correctness of the algorithm and illustrate using an example.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Qualitative Planning in Imperfect Information Games with Active Sensing and Reactive Sensor Attacks: Cost of Unawareness

We consider the probabilistic planning problem where the agent (called Player 1, or P1) can jointly plan the control actions and sensor queries in a sensor network and an attacker (called player 2, or P2) can carry out attacks on the sensors. We model such an adversarial interaction using a formal model -- a reachability game with partially controllable observation functions. The main contribution of this paper is to assess the cost of P1's unawareness: Suppose P1 misinterprets the sensor failures as probabilistic node failures due to unreliable network communication, and P2 is aware of P1's misinterpretation in addition to her partial observability. Then, from which states can P2 carry out sensor attacks to ensure, with probability one, that P1 will not be able to complete her reachability task even though, due to misinterpretation, P1 believes that she can almost-surely achieve her task. We develop an algorithm to solve the almost-sure winning sensor-attack strategy given P1's observation-based strategy. Our attack analysis could be used for attack detection in wireless communication networks and the design of provably secured attack-aware sensor allocation in decision-theoretic models for cyber-physical systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Decoy Allocation Games on Graphs with Temporal Logic Objectives

We study a class of games, in which the adversary (attacker) is to satisfy a complex mission specified in linear temporal logic, and the defender is to prevent the adversary from achieving its goal. A deceptive defender can allocate decoys, in addition to defense actions, to create disinformation for the attacker. Thus, we focus on the problem of jointly synthesizing a decoy placement strategy and a deceptive defense strategy that maximally exploits the incomplete information the attacker about the decoy locations. We introduce a model of hypergames on graphs with temporal logic objectives to capture such adversarial interactions with asymmetric information. Using the hypergame model, we analyze the effectiveness of a given decoy placement, quantified by the set of deceptive winning states where the defender can prevent the attacker from satisfying the attack objective given its incomplete information about decoy locations. Then, we investigate how to place decoys to maximize the defender's deceptive winning region. Considering the large search space for all possible decoy allocation strategies, we incorporate the idea of compositional synthesis from formal methods and show that the objective function in the class of decoy allocation problem is monotone and non-decreasing. We derive the sufficient conditions under which the objective function for the decoy allocation problem is submodular, or supermodular, respectively. We show a sub-optimal allocation can be efficiently computed by iteratively composing the solutions of hypergames with a subset of decoys and the solution of a hypergame given a single decoy. We use a running example to illustrate the proposed method.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Deceptive Labeling: Hypergames on Graphs for Stealthy Deception

With the increasing sophistication of attacks on cyber-physical systems, deception has emerged as an effective tool to improve system security and safety by obfuscating the attacker's perception. In this paper, we present a solution to the deceptive game in which a control agent is to satisfy a Boolean objective specified by a co-safe temporal logic formula in the presence of an adversary. The agent intentionally introduces asymmetric information to create payoff misperception, which manifests as the misperception of the labeling function in the game model. Thus, the adversary is unable to accurately determine which logical formula is satisfied by a given outcome of the game. We introduce a model called hypergame on graph to capture the asymmetrical information with one-sided payoff misperception. Based on this model, we present the solution of such a hypergame and use the solution to synthesize stealthy deceptive strategies. Specifically, deceptive sure winning and deceptive almost-sure winning strategies are developed by reducing the hypergame to a two-player game and one-player stochastic game with reachability objectives. A running example is introduced to demonstrate the game model and the solution concept used for strategy synthesis.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Secure-by-synthesis network with active deception and temporal logic specifications

This paper is concerned with the synthesis of strategies in network systems with active cyber deception. Active deception in a network employs decoy systems and other defenses to conduct defensive planning against the intrusion of malicious attackers who have been confirmed by sensing systems. In this setting, the defender's objective is to ensure the satisfaction of security properties specified in temporal logic formulas. We formulate the problem of deceptive planning with decoy systems and other defenses as a two-player games with asymmetrical information and Boolean payoffs in temporal logic. We use level-2 hypergame with temporal logic objectives to capture the incomplete/incorrect knowledge of the attacker about the network system as a payoff misperception. The true payoff function is private information of the defender. Then, we extend the solution concepts of $omega$-regular games to analyze the attacker's rational strategy given her incomplete information. By generalizing the solution of level-2 hypergame in the normal form to extensive form, we extend the solutions of games with safe temporal logic objectives to decide whether the defender can ensure security properties to be satisfied with probability one, given any possible strategy that is perceived to be rational by the attacker. Further, we use the solution of games with co-safe (reachability) temporal logic objectives to determine whether the defender can engage the attacker, by directing the attacker to a high-fidelity honeypot. The effectiveness of the proposed synthesis methods is illustrated with synthetic network systems with honeypots.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Optimal Deployments of Defense Mechanisms for the Internet of Things

Internet of Things (IoT) devices can be exploited by the attackers as entry points to break into the IoT networks without early detection. Little work has taken hybrid approaches that combine different defense mechanisms in an optimal way to increase the security of the IoT against sophisticated attacks. In this work, we propose a novel approach to generate the strategic deployment of adaptive deception technology and the patch management solution for the IoT under a budget constraint. We use a graphical security model along with three evaluation metrics to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed defense mechanisms. We apply the multi-objective genetic algorithm (GA) to compute the {\em Pareto optimal} deployments of defense mechanisms to maximize the security and minimize the deployment cost. We present a case study to show the feasibility of the proposed approach and to provide the defenders with various ways to choose optimal deployments of defense mechanisms for the IoT. We compare the GA with the exhaustive search algorithm (ESA) in terms of the runtime complexity and performance accuracy in optimality. Our results show that the GA is much more efficient in computing a good spread of the deployments than the ESA, in proportion to the increase of the IoT devices.

cs.CR↗