arXiv subjects

Charles Kamhoua

Publications and source records attributed to Charles Kamhoua.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Cyber Deception for Mission Surveillance via Hypergame-Theoretic Deep Reinforcement Learning

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are valuable for mission-critical systems like surveillance, rescue, or delivery. Not surprisingly, such systems attract cyberattacks, including Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to overwhelm the resources of mission drones (MDs). How can we defend UAV mission systems against DoS attacks? We adopt cyber deception as a defense strategy, in which honey drones (HDs) are proposed to bait and divert attacks. The attack and deceptive defense hinge upon radio signal strength: The attacker selects victim MDs based on their signals, and HDs attract the attacker from afar by emitting stronger signals, despite this reducing battery life. We formulate an optimization problem for the attacker and defender to identify their respective strategies for maximizing mission performance while minimizing energy consumption. To address this problem, we propose a novel approach, called HT-DRL. HT-DRL identifies optimal solutions without a long learning convergence time by taking the solutions of hypergame theory into the neural network of deep reinforcement learning. This achieves a systematic way to intelligently deceive attackers. We analyze the performance of diverse defense mechanisms under different attack strategies. Further, the HT-DRL-based HD approach outperforms existing non-HD counterparts up to two times better in mission performance while incurring low energy consumption.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

Coordinated Multi-Domain Deception: A Stackelberg Game Approach

This paper explores coordinated deception strategies by synchronizing defenses across coupled cyber and physical systems to mislead attackers and strengthen defense mechanisms. We introduce a Stackelberg game framework to model the strategic interaction between defenders and attackers, where the defender leverages CVSS-based exploit probabilities and real-world vulnerability data from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) to guide the deployment of deception. Cyber and physical replicas are used to disrupt attacker reconnaissance and enhance defensive effectiveness. We propose a CVE-based utility function to identify the most critical vulnerabilities and demonstrate that coordinated multilayer deception outperforms single-layer and baseline strategies in improving defender utility across both CVSS versions.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Decision Theory-Guided Deep Reinforcement Learning for Fast Learning

This paper introduces a novel approach, Decision Theory-guided Deep Reinforcement Learning (DT-guided DRL), to address the inherent cold start problem in DRL. By integrating decision theory principles, DT-guided DRL enhances agents' initial performance and robustness in complex environments, enabling more efficient and reliable convergence during learning. Our investigation encompasses two primary problem contexts: the cart pole and maze navigation challenges. Experimental results demonstrate that the integration of decision theory not only facilitates effective initial guidance for DRL agents but also promotes a more structured and informed exploration strategy, particularly in environments characterized by large and intricate state spaces. The results of experiment demonstrate that DT-guided DRL can provide significantly higher rewards compared to regular DRL. Specifically, during the initial phase of training, the DT-guided DRL yields up to an 184% increase in accumulated reward. Moreover, even after reaching convergence, it maintains a superior performance, ending with up to 53% more reward than standard DRL in large maze problems. DT-guided DRL represents an advancement in mitigating a fundamental challenge of DRL by leveraging functions informed by human (designer) knowledge, setting a foundation for further research in this promising interdisciplinary domain.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Honeypot Allocation for Cyber Deception in Dynamic Tactical Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Honeypots play a crucial role in implementing various cyber deception techniques as they possess the capability to divert attackers away from valuable assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers' preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that generates optimal honeypot allocation strategies within an attack/defense scenario. Our proposed approach takes into consideration the changes in network connectivity. In particular, we introduce a two-player dynamic game model that explicitly incorporates the future state evolution resulting from changes in network connectivity. The defender's objective is twofold: to maximize the likelihood of the attacker hitting a honeypot and to minimize the cost associated with deception and reconfiguration due to changes in network topology. We present an iterative algorithm to find Nash equilibrium strategies and analyze the scalability of the algorithm. Finally, we validate our approach and present numerical results based on simulations, demonstrating that our game model successfully enhances network security. Additionally, we have proposed additional enhancements to improve the scalability of the proposed approach.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Cyber Deception against Zero-day Attacks: A Game Theoretic Approach

Reconnaissance activities precedent other attack steps in the cyber kill chain. Zero-day attacks exploit unknown vulnerabilities and give attackers the upper hand against conventional defenses. Honeypots have been used to deceive attackers by misrepresenting the true state of the network. Existing work on cyber deception does not model zero-day attacks. In this paper, we address the question of "How to allocate honeypots over the network?" to protect its most valuable assets. To this end, we develop a two-player zero-sum game theoretic approach to study the potential reconnaissance tracks and attack paths that attackers may use. However, zero-day attacks allow attackers to avoid placed honeypots by creating new attack paths. Therefore, we introduce a sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of different zero-day vulnerabilities on the performance of the proposed deception technique. Next, we propose several mitigating strategies to defend the network against zero-day attacks based on this analysis. Finally, our numerical results validate our findings and illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed defense approach.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

IoTFlowGenerator: Crafting Synthetic IoT Device Traffic Flows for Cyber Deception

Over the years, honeypots emerged as an important security tool to understand attacker intent and deceive attackers to spend time and resources. Recently, honeypots are being deployed for Internet of things (IoT) devices to lure attackers, and learn their behavior. However, most of the existing IoT honeypots, even the high interaction ones, are easily detected by an attacker who can observe honeypot traffic due to lack of real network traffic originating from the honeypot. This implies that, to build better honeypots and enhance cyber deception capabilities, IoT honeypots need to generate realistic network traffic flows. To achieve this goal, we propose a novel deep learning based approach for generating traffic flows that mimic real network traffic due to user and IoT device interactions. A key technical challenge that our approach overcomes is scarcity of device-specific IoT traffic data to effectively train a generator. We address this challenge by leveraging a core generative adversarial learning algorithm for sequences along with domain specific knowledge common to IoT devices. Through an extensive experimental evaluation with 18 IoT devices, we demonstrate that the proposed synthetic IoT traffic generation tool significantly outperforms state of the art sequence and packet generators in remaining indistinguishable from real traffic even to an adaptive attacker.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

AIIPot: Adaptive Intelligent-Interaction Honeypot for IoT Devices

The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) has raised concerns about the security of connected devices. There is a need to develop suitable and cost-efficient methods to identify vulnerabilities in IoT devices in order to address them before attackers seize opportunities to compromise them. The deception technique is a prominent approach to improving the security posture of IoT systems. Honeypot is a popular deception technique that mimics interaction in real fashion and encourages unauthorised users (attackers) to launch attacks. Due to the large number and the heterogeneity of IoT devices, manually crafting the low and high-interaction honeypots is not affordable. This has forced researchers to seek innovative ways to build honeypots for IoT devices. In this paper, we propose a honeypot for IoT devices that uses machine learning techniques to learn and interact with attackers automatically. The evaluation of the proposed model indicates that our system can improve the session length with attackers and capture more attacks on the IoT network.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2023

Optimal Decoy Resource Allocation for Proactive Defense in Probabilistic Attack Graphs

This paper investigates the problem of synthesizing proactive defense systems in which the defender can allocate deceptive targets and modify the cost of actions for the attacker who aims to compromise security assets in this system. We model the interaction of the attacker and the system using a formal security model -- a probabilistic attack graph. By allocating fake targets/decoys, the defender aims to distract the attacker from compromising true targets. By increasing the cost of some attack actions, the defender aims to discourage the attacker from committing to certain policies and thereby improve the defense. To optimize the defense given limited decoy resources and operational constraints, we formulate the synthesis problem as a bi-level optimization problem, while the defender designs the system, in anticipation of the attacker's best response given that the attacker has disinformation about the system due to the use of deception. Though the general formulation with bi-level optimization is NP-hard, we show that under certain assumptions, the problem can be transformed into a constrained optimization problem. We proposed an algorithm to approximately solve this constrained optimization problem using a novel incentive-design method for projected gradient ascent. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method using extensive numerical experiments.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Incentivizing Data Contribution in Cross-Silo Federated Learning

In cross-silo federated learning, clients (e.g., organizations) train a shared global model using local data. However, due to privacy concerns, the clients may not contribute enough data points during training. To address this issue, we propose a general incentive framework where the profit/benefit obtained from the global model can be appropriately allocated to clients to incentivize data contribution. We formulate the clients' interactions as a data contribution game and study its equilibrium. We characterize conditions for an equilibrium to exist, and prove that each client's equilibrium data contribution increases in its data quality and decreases in the privacy sensitivity. We further conduct experiments using CIFAR-10 and show that the results are consistent with the analysis. Moreover, we show that practical allocation mechanisms such as linearly proportional, leave-one-out, and Shapley-value incentivize more data contribution from clients with higher-quality data, in which leave-one-out tends to achieve the highest global model accuracy at equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

MAVIPER: Learning Decision Tree Policies for Interpretable Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Many recent breakthroughs in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) require the use of deep neural networks, which are challenging for human experts to interpret and understand. On the other hand, existing work on interpretable reinforcement learning (RL) has shown promise in extracting more interpretable decision tree-based policies from neural networks, but only in the single-agent setting. To fill this gap, we propose the first set of algorithms that extract interpretable decision-tree policies from neural networks trained with MARL. The first algorithm, IVIPER, extends VIPER, a recent method for single-agent interpretable RL, to the multi-agent setting. We demonstrate that IVIPER learns high-quality decision-tree policies for each agent. To better capture coordination between agents, we propose a novel centralized decision-tree training algorithm, MAVIPER. MAVIPER jointly grows the trees of each agent by predicting the behavior of the other agents using their anticipated trees, and uses resampling to focus on states that are critical for its interactions with other agents. We show that both algorithms generally outperform the baselines and that MAVIPER-trained agents achieve better-coordinated performance than IVIPER-trained agents on three different multi-agent particle-world environments.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Learning Generative Deception Strategies in Combinatorial Masking Games

Deception is a crucial tool in the cyberdefence repertoire, enabling defenders to leverage their informational advantage to reduce the likelihood of successful attacks. One way deception can be employed is through obscuring, or masking, some of the information about how systems are configured, increasing attacker's uncertainty about their targets. We present a novel game-theoretic model of the resulting defender-attacker interaction, where the defender chooses a subset of attributes to mask, while the attacker responds by choosing an exploit to execute. The strategies of both players have combinatorial structure with complex informational dependencies, and therefore even representing these strategies is not trivial. First, we show that the problem of computing an equilibrium of the resulting zero-sum defender-attacker game can be represented as a linear program with a combinatorial number of system configuration variables and constraints, and develop a constraint generation approach for solving this problem. Next, we present a novel highly scalable approach for approximately solving such games by representing the strategies of both players as neural networks. The key idea is to represent the defender's mixed strategy using a deep neural network generator, and then using alternating gradient-descent-ascent algorithm, analogous to the training of Generative Adversarial Networks. Our experiments, as well as a case study, demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed approach.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Understanding Adversarial Examples Through Deep Neural Network's Response Surface and Uncertainty Regions

Deep neural network (DNN) is a popular model implemented in many systems to handle complex tasks such as image classification, object recognition, natural language processing etc. Consequently DNN structural vulnerabilities become part of the security vulnerabilities in those systems. In this paper we study the root cause of DNN adversarial examples. We examine the DNN response surface to understand its classification boundary. Our study reveals the structural problem of DNN classification boundary that leads to the adversarial examples. Existing attack algorithms can generate from a handful to a few hundred adversarial examples given one clean image. We show there are infinitely many adversarial images given one clean sample, all within a small neighborhood of the clean sample. We then define DNN uncertainty regions and show transferability of adversarial examples is not universal. We also argue that generalization error, the large sample theoretical guarantee established for DNN, cannot adequately capture the phenomenon of adversarial examples. We need new theory to measure DNN robustness.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Game-Theoretic and Machine Learning-based Approaches for Defensive Deception: A Survey

Defensive deception is a promising approach for cyber defense. Via defensive deception, the defender can anticipate attacker actions; it can mislead or lure attacker, or hide real resources. Although defensive deception is increasingly popular in the research community, there has not been a systematic investigation of its key components, the underlying principles, and its tradeoffs in various problem settings. This survey paper focuses on defensive deception research centered on game theory and machine learning, since these are prominent families of artificial intelligence approaches that are widely employed in defensive deception. This paper brings forth insights, lessons, and limitations from prior work. It closes with an outline of some research directions to tackle major gaps in current defensive deception research.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

Foureye: Defensive Deception based on Hypergame Theory Against Advanced Persistent Threats

Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain consistent views under uncertainty. They do not consider players' possible, subjective beliefs formed due to asymmetric information given to them. In this work, we formulate a hypergame between an attacker and a defender where they can interpret the same game differently and accordingly choose their best strategy based on their respective beliefs. This gives a chance for defensive deception strategies to manipulate an attacker's belief, which is the key to the attacker's decision making. We consider advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks, which perform multiple attacks in the stages of the cyber kill chain where both the attacker and the defender aim to select optimal strategies based on their beliefs. Through extensive simulation experiments, we demonstrated how effectively the defender can leverage defensive deception techniques while dealing with multi-staged APT attacks in a hypergame in which the imperfect information is reflected based on perceived uncertainty, cost, and expected utilities of both attacker and defender, the system lifetime (i.e., mean time to security failure), and improved false positive rates in detecting attackers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Pareto GAN: Extending the Representational Power of GANs to Heavy-Tailed Distributions

Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are often billed as "universal distribution learners", but precisely what distributions they can represent and learn is still an open question. Heavy-tailed distributions are prevalent in many different domains such as financial risk-assessment, physics, and epidemiology. We observe that existing GAN architectures do a poor job of matching the asymptotic behavior of heavy-tailed distributions, a problem that we show stems from their construction. Additionally, when faced with the infinite moments and large distances between outlier points that are characteristic of heavy-tailed distributions, common loss functions produce unstable or near-zero gradients. We address these problems with the Pareto GAN. A Pareto GAN leverages extreme value theory and the functional properties of neural networks to learn a distribution that matches the asymptotic behavior of the marginal distributions of the features. We identify issues with standard loss functions and propose the use of alternative metric spaces that enable stable and efficient learning. Finally, we evaluate our proposed approach on a variety of heavy-tailed datasets.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Blocking Adversarial Influence in Social Networks

While social networks are widely used as a media for information diffusion, attackers can also strategically employ analytical tools, such as influence maximization, to maximize the spread of adversarial content through the networks. We investigate the problem of limiting the diffusion of negative information by blocking nodes and edges in the network. We formulate the interaction between the defender and the attacker as a Stackelberg game where the defender first chooses a set of nodes to block and then the attacker selects a set of seeds to spread negative information from. This yields an extremely complex bi-level optimization problem, particularly since even the standard influence measures are difficult to compute. Our approach is to approximate the attacker's problem as the maximum node domination problem. To solve this problem, we first develop a method based on integer programming combined with constraint generation. Next, to improve scalability, we develop an approximate solution method that represents the attacker's problem as an integer program, and then combines relaxation with duality to yield an upper bound on the defender's objective that can be computed using mixed integer linear programming. Finally, we propose an even more scalable heuristic method that prunes nodes from the consideration set based on their degree. Extensive experiments demonstrate the efficacy of our approaches.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2020

Learning and Planning in the Feature Deception Problem

Today's high-stakes adversarial interactions feature attackers who constantly breach the ever-improving security measures. Deception mitigates the defender's loss by misleading the attacker to make suboptimal decisions. In order to formally reason about deception, we introduce the feature deception problem (FDP), a domain-independent model and present a learning and planning framework for finding the optimal deception strategy, taking into account the adversary's preferences which are initially unknown to the defender. We make the following contributions. (1) We show that we can uniformly learn the adversary's preferences using data from a modest number of deception strategies. (2) We propose an approximation algorithm for finding the optimal deception strategy given the learned preferences and show that the problem is NP-hard. (3) We perform extensive experiments to validate our methods and results. In addition, we provide a case study of the credit bureau network to illustrate how FDP implements deception on a real-world problem.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Exploring the Attack Surface of Blockchain: A Systematic Overview

In this paper, we systematically explore the attack surface of the Blockchain technology, with an emphasis on public Blockchains. Towards this goal, we attribute attack viability in the attack surface to 1) the Blockchain cryptographic constructs, 2) the distributed architecture of the systems using Blockchain, and 3) the Blockchain application context. To each of those contributing factors, we outline several attacks, including selfish mining, the 51% attack, Domain Name System (DNS) attacks, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, consensus delay (due to selfish behavior or distributed denial-of-service attacks), Blockchain forks, orphaned and stale blocks, block ingestion, wallet thefts, smart contract attacks, and privacy attacks. We also explore the causal relationships between these attacks to demonstrate how various attack vectors are connected to one another. A secondary contribution of this work is outlining effective defense measures taken by the Blockchain technology or proposed by researchers to mitigate the effects of these attacks and patch associated vulnerabilities

cs.CR↗