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Charlotte Stix

Publications and source records attributed to Charlotte Stix.

15 recordsLinked to original sources

Misaligned AI as a New Insider Risk

In this policy memorandum, we explain why deployers of AI models in high-stakes contexts should treat those AI models as insider risk vectors. High-stakes contexts include AI model deployment within government agencies and contractors, where AI models are privileged with access to, among others, classified and sensitive unclassified information, IL6 and IL7 network environments, cleared personnel, and other critical resources. AI models are increasingly embedded in high-stakes contexts and capable of leveraging their authorized access and permissions to execute misaligned actions that could damage national security, such as whistleblowing, sabotaging, or blackmailing. This combination of (1) privileged access to critical resources and (2) an increased ability to act autonomously and against the desire of their organization makes the potential insider risk posed by AI models functionally indistinguishable from that posed by their human counterparts. As a consequence, AI models deployed in high-stakes contexts could lead to intentional or unintentional loss or degradation of government or contractor information, resources, or capabilities via the unauthorized disclosure of information (leaks and spills), as well as sabotage, and theft, just like human insiders can. Despite this pressing concern, existing insider risk policies and mitigations have yet to adapt to AI insider risk. In order to safeguard national security while increasingly capable frontier AI models are leveraged for critical tasks and operations, we recommend that the U.S. Government adapts well-established measures, such as continuous evaluation and monitoring, to AI models deployed in high-stakes contexts.

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International AI Safety Report 2026

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesises the current scientific evidence on the capabilities, emerging risks, and safety of general-purpose AI systems. The report series was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. Over 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the Report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

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Frontier AI Auditing: Toward Rigorous Third-Party Assessment of Safety and Security Practices at Leading AI Companies

We outline a vision for frontier AI auditing, which we define as rigorous third-party verification of frontier AI developers' safety and security claims, and evaluation of their systems and practices against relevant standards, based on deep, secure access to non-public information. Frontier AI audits should not be limited to a company's publicly deployed products, but should instead consider the full range of organization-level safety and security risks, including internal deployment of AI systems, information security practices, and safety decision-making processes. We describe four AI Assurance Levels (AALs), the higher levels of which provide greater confidence in audit findings. We recommend AAL-1 as a baseline for frontier AI generally, and AAL-2 as a near-term goal for the most advanced subset of frontier AI developers. Achieving the vision we outline will require (1) ensuring high quality standards for frontier AI auditing, so it does not devolve into a checkbox exercise or lag behind changes in the industry; (2) growing the ecosystem of audit providers at a rapid pace without compromising quality; (3) accelerating adoption of frontier AI auditing by clarifying and strengthening incentives; and (4) achieving technical readiness for high AI Assurance Levels so they can be applied when needed.

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The Loss of Control Playbook: Degrees, Dynamics, and Preparedness

This research report addresses the absence of an actionable definition for Loss of Control (LoC) in AI systems by developing a novel taxonomy and preparedness framework. Despite increasing policy and research attention, existing LoC definitions vary significantly in scope and timeline, hindering effective LoC assessment and mitigation. To address this issue, we draw from an extensive literature review and propose a graded LoC taxonomy, based on the metrics of severity and persistence, that distinguishes between Deviation, Bounded LoC, and Strict LoC. We model pathways toward a societal state of vulnerability in which sufficiently advanced AI systems have acquired or could acquire the means to cause Bounded or Strict LoC once a catalyst, either misalignment or pure malfunction, materializes. We argue that this state becomes increasingly likely over time, absent strategic intervention, and propose a strategy to avoid reaching a state of vulnerability. Rather than focusing solely on intervening on AI capabilities and propensities potentially relevant for LoC or on preventing potential catalysts, we introduce a complementary framework that emphasizes three extrinsic factors: Deployment context, Affordances, and Permissions (the DAP framework). Compared to work on intrinsic factors and catalysts, this framework has the unfair advantage of being actionable today. Finally, we put forward a plan to maintain preparedness and prevent the occurrence of LoC outcomes should a state of societal vulnerability be reached, focusing on governance measures (threat modeling, deployment policies, emergency response) and technical controls (pre-deployment testing, control measures, monitoring) that could maintain a condition of perennial suspension.

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International AI Safety Report 2025: First Key Update: Capabilities and Risk Implications

Since the publication of the first International AI Safety Report, AI capabilities have continued to improve across key domains. New training techniques that teach AI systems to reason step-by-step and inference-time enhancements have primarily driven these advances, rather than simply training larger models. As a result, general-purpose AI systems can solve more complex problems in a range of domains, from scientific research to software development. Their performance on benchmarks that measure performance in coding, mathematics, and answering expert-level science questions has continued to improve, though reliability challenges persist, with systems excelling on some tasks while failing completely on others. These capability improvements also have implications for multiple risks, including risks from biological weapons and cyber attacks. Finally, they pose new challenges for monitoring and controllability. This update examines how AI capabilities have improved since the first Report, then focuses on key risk areas where substantial new evidence warrants updated assessments.

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Assurance of Frontier AI Built for National Security

This memorandum presents four recommendations aimed at strengthening the principles of AI model reliability and AI model governability, as DoW, ODNI, NIST, and CAISI refine AI assurance frameworks under the AI Action Plan. Our focus concerns the open scientific problem of misalignment and its implications on AI model behavior. Specifically, misalignment and scheming capabilities can be a red flag indicating AI model insufficient reliability and governability. To address the national security threats arising from misalignment, we recommend that DoW and the IC strategically leverage existing testing and evaluation pipelines and their OT authority to future proof the principles of AI model reliability and AI model governability through a suite of scheming and control evaluations.

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AI Behind Closed Doors: a Primer on The Governance of Internal Deployment

The most advanced future AI systems will first be deployed inside the frontier AI companies developing them. According to these companies and independent experts, AI systems may reach or even surpass human intelligence and capabilities by 2030. Internal deployment is, therefore, a key source of benefits and risks from frontier AI systems. Despite this, the governance of the internal deployment of highly advanced frontier AI systems appears absent. This report aims to address this absence by priming a conversation around the governance of internal deployment. It presents a conceptualization of internal deployment, learnings from other sectors, reviews of existing legal frameworks and their applicability, and illustrative examples of the type of scenarios we are most concerned about. Specifically, it discusses the risks correlated to the loss of control via the internal application of a misaligned AI system to the AI research and development pipeline, and unconstrained and undetected power concentration behind closed doors. The report culminates with a small number of targeted recommendations that provide a first blueprint for the governance of internal deployment.

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Pre-Deployment Information Sharing: A Zoning Taxonomy for Precursory Capabilities

High-impact and potentially dangerous capabilities can and should be broken down into early warning shots long before reaching red lines. Each of these early warning shots should correspond to a precursory capability. Each precursory capability sits on a spectrum indicating its proximity to a final high-impact capability, corresponding to a red line. To meaningfully detect and track capability progress, we propose a taxonomy of dangerous capability zones (a zoning taxonomy) tied to a staggered information exchange framework that enables relevant bodies to take action accordingly. In the Frontier AI Safety Commitments, signatories commit to sharing more detailed information with trusted actors, including an appointed body, as appropriate (Commitment VII). Building on our zoning taxonomy, this paper makes four recommendations for specifying information sharing as detailed in Commitment VII. (1) Precursory capabilities should be shared as soon as they become known through internal evaluations before deployment. (2) AI Safety Institutes (AISIs) should be the trusted actors appointed to receive and coordinate information on precursory components. (3) AISIs should establish adequate information protection infrastructure and guarantee increased information security as precursory capabilities move through the zones and towards red lines, including, if necessary, by classifying the information on precursory capabilities or marking it as controlled. (4) High-impact capability progress in one geographical region may translate to risk in other regions and necessitates more comprehensive risk assessment internationally. As such, AISIs should exchange information on precursory capabilities with other AISIs, relying on the existing frameworks on international classified exchanges and applying lessons learned from other regulated high-risk sectors.

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Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI scheming

We sketch how developers of frontier AI systems could construct a structured rationale -- a 'safety case' -- that an AI system is unlikely to cause catastrophic outcomes through scheming. Scheming is a potential threat model where AI systems could pursue misaligned goals covertly, hiding their true capabilities and objectives. In this report, we propose three arguments that safety cases could use in relation to scheming. For each argument we sketch how evidence could be gathered from empirical evaluations, and what assumptions would need to be met to provide strong assurance. First, developers of frontier AI systems could argue that AI systems are not capable of scheming (Scheming Inability). Second, one could argue that AI systems are not capable of posing harm through scheming (Harm Inability). Third, one could argue that control measures around the AI systems would prevent unacceptable outcomes even if the AI systems intentionally attempted to subvert them (Harm Control). Additionally, we discuss how safety cases might be supported by evidence that an AI system is reasonably aligned with its developers (Alignment). Finally, we point out that many of the assumptions required to make these safety arguments have not been confidently satisfied to date and require making progress on multiple open research problems.

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Foundations for the Future: Institution building for the purpose of Artificial Intelligence governance

Governance efforts for artificial intelligence (AI) are taking on increasingly more concrete forms, drawing on a variety of approaches and instruments from hard regulation to standardisation efforts, aimed at mitigating challenges from high-risk AI systems. To implement these and other efforts, new institutions will need to be established on a national and international level. This paper sketches a blueprint of such institutions, and conducts in-depth investigations of three key components of any future AI governance institutions, exploring benefits and associated drawbacks: (1) purpose, relating to the institution's overall goals and scope of work or mandate; (2) geography, relating to questions of participation and the reach of jurisdiction; and (3) capacity, the infrastructural and human make-up of the institution. Subsequently, the paper highlights noteworthy aspects of various institutional roles specifically around questions of institutional purpose, and frames what these could look like in practice, by placing these debates in a European context and proposing different iterations of a European AI Agency. Finally, conclusions and future research directions are proposed.

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The ghost of AI governance past, present and future: AI governance in the European Union

The received wisdom is that artificial intelligence (AI) is a competition between the US and China. In this chapter, the author will examine how the European Union (EU) fits into that mix and what it can offer as a third way to govern AI. The chapter presents this by exploring the past, present and future of AI governance in the EU. Section 1 serves to explore and evidence the EUs coherent and comprehensive approach to AI governance. In short, the EU ensures and encourages ethical, trustworthy and reliable technological development. This will cover a range of key documents and policy tools that lead to the most crucial effort of the EU to date: to regulate AI. Section 2 maps the EUs drive towards digital sovereignty through the lens of regulation and infrastructure. This covers topics such as the trustworthiness of AI systems, cloud, compute and foreign direct investment. In Section 3, the chapter concludes by offering several considerations to achieve good AI governance in the EU.

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Actionable Principles for Artificial Intelligence Policy: Three Pathways

In the development of governmental policy for artificial intelligence (AI) that is informed by ethics, one avenue currently pursued is that of drawing on AI Ethics Principles. However, these AI Ethics Principles often fail to be actioned in governmental policy. This paper proposes a novel framework for the development of Actionable Principles for AI. The approach acknowledges the relevance of AI Ethics Principles and homes in on methodological elements to increase their practical implementability in policy processes. As a case study, elements are extracted from the development process of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI of the European Commissions High Level Expert Group on AI. Subsequently, these elements are expanded on and evaluated in light of their ability to contribute to a prototype framework for the development of Actionable Principles for AI. The paper proposes the following three propositions for the formation of such a prototype framework: (1) preliminary landscape assessments; (2) multi-stakeholder participation and cross-sectoral feedback; and, (3) mechanisms to support implementation and operationalizability.

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Bridging the Gap: the case for an Incompletely Theorized Agreement on AI policy

Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) raises a wide array of ethical and societal concerns. Accordingly, an appropriate policy approach is needed today. While there has been a wave of scholarship in this field, the research community at times appears divided amongst those who emphasize near-term concerns, and those focusing on long-term concerns and corresponding policy measures. In this paper, we seek to map and critically examine this alleged gulf, with a view to understanding the practical space for inter-community collaboration on AI policy. This culminates in a proposal to make use of the legal notion of an incompletely theorized agreement. We propose that on certain issue areas, scholars working with near-term and long-term perspectives can converge and cooperate on selected mutually beneficial AI policy projects all the while maintaining divergent perspectives.

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A survey of the European Union's artificial intelligence ecosystem

Compared to other global powers, the European Union (EU) is rarely considered a leading player in the development of artificial intelligence (AI). Why is this, and does this in fact accurately reflect the activities of the EU? What would it take for the EU to take a more leading role in AI? This report surveys core components of the current AI ecosystem of the EU, providing the crucial background context for answering these questions.

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Toward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims

With the recent wave of progress in artificial intelligence (AI) has come a growing awareness of the large-scale impacts of AI systems, and recognition that existing regulations and norms in industry and academia are insufficient to ensure responsible AI development. In order for AI developers to earn trust from system users, customers, civil society, governments, and other stakeholders that they are building AI responsibly, they will need to make verifiable claims to which they can be held accountable. Those outside of a given organization also need effective means of scrutinizing such claims. This report suggests various steps that different stakeholders can take to improve the verifiability of claims made about AI systems and their associated development processes, with a focus on providing evidence about the safety, security, fairness, and privacy protection of AI systems. We analyze ten mechanisms for this purpose--spanning institutions, software, and hardware--and make recommendations aimed at implementing, exploring, or improving those mechanisms.

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