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Chiara Ghinami

Publications and source records attributed to Chiara Ghinami.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

Stateful Embedded Fuzzing with Peripheral-Accurate SystemC Virtual Prototypes

The increasing complexity of embedded software has made comprehensive manual testing impractical, motivating the use of automated techniques such as fuzzing. Coverage-guided fuzzers like AFL++ have shown strong results for conventional software but remain challenging to apply effectively in embedded contexts, where peripheral behaviors play critical roles. Existing approaches either use fast user-mode simulators, sacrificing peripheral realism, or rely on full-system simulators with manual instrumentation, limiting applicability to large-scale software. In this work, we present a novel framework that integrates AFL++ with a stateful SystemC-TLM virtual prototype to enable realistic fuzzing of embedded software. Fuzzer-generated inputs are injected directly into peripheral models, allowing peripherals to trigger natural side effects such as interrupts and FIFO updates. By integrating fuzzing with full-system simulation, our framework advances the effectiveness of pre-silicon testing for embedded systems. Results on embedded workloads show that our approach eliminates false positives while maintaining comparable code coverage and execution performance as state-of-the-art tools.

cs.SE

Leveraging SystemC-TLM-based Virtual Prototypes for Embedded Software Fuzzing

SystemC-based virtual prototypes have emerged as widely adopted tools to test software ahead of hardware availability, reducing the time-to-market and improving software reliability. Recently, fuzzing has become a popular method for automated software testing due to its ability to quickly identify corner-case errors. However, its application to embedded software is still limited. Simulator tools can help bridge this gap by providing a more powerful and controlled execution environment for testing. Existing solutions, however, often tightly couple fuzzers with built-in simulators that lack support for hardware peripherals and offer limited flexibility, restricting their ability to test embedded software. To address these limitations, we present a framework that allows the integration of American-Fuzzy-Lop-based fuzzers and SystemC-based simulators. The framework provides a harness to decouple the adopted fuzzer and simulator. In addition, it intercepts peripheral accesses and queries the fuzzer for values, effectively linking peripheral behavior to the fuzzer. This solution enables flexible interchangeability of peripherals within the simulation environment and supports the interfacing of different SystemC-based virtual prototypes. The flexibility of the proposed solution is demonstrated by integrating the harness with different simulators and by testing various softwares.

cs.SE

Exploiting the Lock: Leveraging MiG-V's Logic Locking for Secret-Data Extraction

The MiG-V was designed for high-security applications and is the first commercially available logic-locked RISC-V processor on the market. In this context logic locking was used to protect the RISC-V processor design during the untrusted manufacturing process by using key-driven logic gates to obfuscate the original design. Although this method defends against malicious modifications, such as hardware Trojans, logic locking's impact on the RISC-V processor's data confidentiality during runtime has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we evaluate the impact of logic locking on data confidentiality. By altering the logic locking key of the MiG-V while running SSL cryptographic algorithms, we identify data leakages resulting from the exploitation of the logic locking hardware. We show that changing a single bit of the logic locking key can expose 100% of the cryptographic encryption key. This research reveals a critical security flaw in logic locking, highlighting the need for comprehensive security assessments beyond logic locking key-recovery attacks.

cs.CR

QTFlow: Quantitative Timing-Sensitive Information Flow for Security-Aware Hardware Design on RTL

In contemporary Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools, security often takes a backseat to the primary goals of power, performance, and area optimization. Commonly, the security analysis is conducted by hand, leading to vulnerabilities in the design remaining unnoticed. Security-aware EDA tools assist the designer in the identification and removal of security threats while keeping performance and area in mind. Cutting-edge methods employ information flow analysis to identify inadvertent information leaks in design structures. Current information leakage detection methods use quantitative information flow analysis to quantify the leaks. However, handling sequential circuits poses challenges for state-of-the-art techniques due to their time-agnostic nature, overlooking timing channels, and introducing false positives. To address this, we introduce QTFlow, a timing-sensitive framework for quantifying hardware information leakages during the design phase. Illustrating its effectiveness on open-source benchmarks, QTFlow autonomously identifies timing channels and diminishes all false positives arising from time-agnostic analysis when contrasted with current state-of-the-art techniques.

cs.CR