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Chinmay Karande

Publications and source records attributed to Chinmay Karande.

5 recordsLinked to original sources

Market Equilibrium with Transaction Costs

Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. Price differences might occur due to various reasons such as shipping costs, trade restrictions and price discrimination. To model such scenarios, we supplement the classical Fisher model of a market by introducing {\em transaction costs}. For every buyer $i$ and every good $j$, there is a transaction cost of $\cij$; if the price of good $j$ is $p_j$, then the cost to the buyer $i$ {\em per unit} of $j$ is $p_j + \cij$. This allows the same good to be sold at different (effective) prices to different buyers. We provide a combinatorial algorithm that computes $ε$-approximate equilibrium prices and allocations in $O\left(\frac{1}ε(n+\log{m})mn\log(B/ε)\right)$ operations - where $m$ is the number goods, $n$ is the number of buyers and $B$ is the sum of the budgets of all the buyers.

cs.GT

Single Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations

We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be expressed as $v_if(S)$, where $v_i$ is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function $f$ is publicly known. Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For an ad shown in a set $S$ of ad-slots, $f(S)$ is, say, the number of {\em unique} viewers reached by the ad, and $v_i$ is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b) From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function simplifies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more amenable to better approximation factors. We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts any $α$-approximation non-truthful algorithm ($α\leq 1$) for this problem into $Ω(\fracα{\log{n}})$ and $Ω(α)$-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respectively.

cs.GT

Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching and Single-bid Budgeted Allocations

We study the following vertex-weighted online bipartite matching problem: $G(U, V, E)$ is a bipartite graph. The vertices in $U$ have weights and are known ahead of time, while the vertices in $V$ arrive online in an arbitrary order and have to be matched upon arrival. The goal is to maximize the sum of weights of the matched vertices in $U$. When all the weights are equal, this reduces to the classic \emph{online bipartite matching} problem for which Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani gave an optimal $\left(1-\frac{1}{e}\right)$-competitive algorithm in their seminal work~\cite{KVV90}. Our main result is an optimal $\left(1-\frac{1}{e}\right)$-competitive randomized algorithm for general vertex weights. We use \emph{random perturbations} of weights by appropriately chosen multiplicative factors. Our solution constitutes the first known generalization of the algorithm in~\cite{KVV90} in this model and provides new insights into the role of randomization in online allocation problems. It also effectively solves the problem of \emph{online budgeted allocations} \cite{MSVV05} in the case when an agent makes the same bid for any desired item, even if the bid is comparable to his budget - complementing the results of \cite{MSVV05, BJN07} which apply when the bids are much smaller than the budgets.

cs.DS

Polynomially Correlated Knapsack is NP-complete

0-1 Knapsack is a fundamental NP-complete problem. In this article we prove that it remains NP-complete even when the weights of the objects in the packing constraints and their values in the objective function satisfy specific stringent conditions: the values are integral powers of the weights of the objects.

cs.CC

The Effect of Malice on the Social Optimum in Linear Load Balancing Games

In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1-f) and f fraction of the flow in a load balancing game. SOC tries to minimize the total cost faced by her players while MAL tries to maximize the same. If the latencies are linear, we show that this 2-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we show that one of the optimal strategies for MAL is to play selfishly: let the f fraction of the flow be sent as when the flow was controlled by infinitesimal players playing selfishly and reaching a Nash equilibrium. This shows that a malicious player cannot cause more harm in this game than a set of selfish agents. We also introduce the notion of Cost of Malice - the ratio of the cost faced by SOC at equilibrium to (1-f)OPT, where OPT is the social optimum minimizing the cost of all the players. In linear load balancing games we bound the cost of malice by (1+f/2).

cs.GT