arXiv subjects

Chinmay Maheshwari

Publications and source records attributed to Chinmay Maheshwari.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Orchestrating Level-$K$ Policies Against Unknown Opponents in Partially-Observable Dynamic Games

Level-$K$ reasoning generates a hierarchy of policies specialized to opponents with different reasoning levels. When an opponent's level is unknown, a common deployment rule estimates that level and selects the corresponding response. In a dynamic, partially-observed game, this selection is repeated, with each choice shaping subsequent states and observations. The response associated with the most likely opponent level need not maximize expected return from the current history. We formulate this deployment problem as dynamic orchestration of a fixed, pretrained policy library in a partially observable Markov game. We compare classification-based orchestrators (CBOs) trained using offline data or on-policy data aggregation with a reinforcement-learning-based orchestrator (RLBO) trained to maximize expected discounted return. In pursuit-evasion experiments, on-policy training improves classification and return, yet RLBO achieves higher return than the on-policy and offline CBOs. Given a pretrained library, RLBO also reaches performance comparable to a policy trained directly over the pursuers' action space with fewer training timesteps. These findings support treating a hierarchy of level-$K$ policies as a resource for orchestration, not a prescription for deployment.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Distributed Algorithms for $α$-Potential Functions in General-Sum Games

We study the problem of computing the tightest $α$-potential approximation of a general-sum game over continuous action spaces, within a prescribed class of potential functions and when each player has access only to its own utility function. The difficulty is twofold: the approximation error involves a worst-case search over an infinite set of unilateral deviations, and the required utility information is distributed across players. For a linear-in-parameters potential class, we use an exact finite-tuple reformulation that separates the problem into a global outer search over deviation tuples and distributed convex inner problems. We develop a primal--dual inner oracle tailored to this structure and establish a uniform one-sided accuracy guarantee. This oracle can be combined with global outer search to obtain an end-to-end guarantee on the outer optimization error. We also develop a projected zeroth-order outer method as a computationally lighter alternative for higher-dimensional problems. Numerical experiments illustrate the accuracy--computation tradeoff between the two outer-search methods and show that the proposed optimization framework can improve upon analytical $α$-potential constructions.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Nash Approximation Gap in Truncated Infinite-horizon Partially Observable Markov Games

Partially Observable Markov Games (POMGs) provide a general framework for modeling multi-agent sequential decision-making under asymmetric information. A common approach is to reformulate a POMG as a fully observable Markov game over belief states, where the state is the conditional distribution of the system state and agents' private information given common information, and actions correspond to mappings (prescriptions) from private information to actions. However, this reformulation is intractable in infinite-horizon settings, as both the belief state and action spaces grow with the accumulation of information over time. We propose a finite-memory truncation framework that approximates infinite-horizon POMGs by a finite-state, finite-action Markov game, where agents condition decisions only on finite windows of common and private information. Under suitable filter stability (forgetting) conditions, we show that any Nash equilibrium of the truncated game is an $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium of the original POMG, where $\varepsilon \to 0$ as the truncation length increases.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Resilient Decentralized Ergodic Coverage for Scalable Multi-Robot Systems in Unknown Time-Varying Environments

Maintaining situational awareness in high-stakes multi-robot applications requires balancing exploration of unobserved regions with sustained monitoring of changing Regions of Interest (ROIs), often under unknown and time-varying distributions, partial observability, and limited communication. We propose a decentralized multi-agent coverage framework that serves as a high-level planning strategy, in which each agent computes an adaptive ergodic policy, implemented via a Markov-chain, that tracks an updated belief over the underlying importance map. Beliefs are maintained online via Gaussian Process (GP) regression from local noisy observations exchanged with neighbors. The resulting policy drives agents to spend time in ROIs in proportion to their estimated importance, while preserving sufficient exploration to detect and adapt to time-varying environmental changes. Unlike existing approaches that assume known importance maps, centralized coordination, or a static environment, our framework addresses the combined challenges of unknown, time-varying distributions under a decentralized, partially observable setting. We further show that our framework is robust to communication and memory degradation, robot loss, and can scale up to hundreds of robots.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

EXOTIC: An Exact, Optimistic, Tree-Based Algorithm for Min-Max Optimization

Min-max optimization arises in many domains such as game theory, adversarial machine learning, etc. For these problems, gradient-based methods are well understood and enjoy strong guarantees. However, in the absence of convexity or concavity, existing approaches study convergence to an approximate saddle point or first-order stationary points, which may be arbitrarily far from global optima. In this work, we present an algorithmic framework for computing the global minimax value in convex--non-concave and non-convex--concave min-max optimization. For convex--non-concave min-max problems, we use a reformulation that transforms the problem into a non-concave--convex max-min optimization problem with suitably defined feasible sets and objective function. This reformulation can be viewed as an extension of Sion's minimax theorem to the convex--non-concave setting. We then introduce EXOTIC -- an Exact, Optimistic, Tree-based algorithm for solving the reformulated max-min problem. EXOTIC combines an iterative convex optimization solver for the inner minimization with an optimistic hierarchical tree search for the outer maximization, inspired by StroquOOL~\cite{bartlett2019simple}. Unlike StroquOOL, which assumes stochastic zero-mean noisy evaluations, EXOTIC handles deterministic, biased, and budget-dependent evaluation errors arising from finite-time solutions of the inner convex subproblems. We establish an upper bound on its optimality gap. The same framework also applies to non-convex--concave min-max optimization. Empirically, EXOTIC outperforms gradient-based methods on popular benchmarks from the literature. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of EXOTIC by computing security strategies in multi-player games with three or more players -- a computationally challenging task that, to our knowledge, no prior method solves exactly.

math.OC↗

arXiv2026

NePPO: Near-Potential Policy Optimization for General-Sum Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is increasingly used to design learning-enabled agents that interact in shared environments. However, training MARL algorithms in general-sum games remains challenging: learning dynamics can become unstable, and convergence guarantees typically hold only in restricted settings such as two-player zero-sum or fully cooperative games. Moreover, when agents have heterogeneous and potentially conflicting preferences, it is unclear what system-level objective should guide learning. In this paper, we propose a new MARL pipeline called Near-Potential Policy Optimization (NePPO) for computing approximate Nash equilibria in mixed cooperative--competitive environments. The core idea is to learn a player-independent potential function such that the Nash equilibrium of a cooperative game with this potential as the common utility approximates a Nash equilibrium of the original game. To this end, we introduce a novel MARL objective such that minimizing this objective yields the best possible potential function candidate and consequently an approximate Nash equilibrium of the original game. We develop an algorithmic pipeline that minimizes this objective using zeroth-order gradient descent and returns an approximate Nash equilibrium policy. We empirically show the superior performance of this approach compared to popular baselines such as IPPO and MAPPO.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Game-to-Real Gap: Quantifying the Effect of Model Misspecification in Network Games

Game-theoretic models and solution concepts provide rigorous tools for predicting collective behavior in multi-agent systems. In practice, however, different agents may rely on different game-theoretic models to design their strategies. As a result, when these heterogeneous models interact, the realized outcome can deviate substantially from the outcome each agent expects based on its own local model. In this work, we introduce the game-to-real gap, a new metric that quantifies the impact of such model misspecification in multi-agent environments. The game-to-real gap is defined as the difference between the utility an agent actually obtains in the multi-agent environment (where other agents may have misspecified models) and the utility it expects under its own game model. Focusing on quadratic network games, we show that misspecifications in either (i) the external shock or (ii) the player interaction network can lead to arbitrarily large game-to-real gaps. We further develop novel network centrality measures that allow exact evaluation of this gap in quadratic network games. Our analysis reveals that standard network centrality measures fail to capture the effects of model misspecification, underscoring the need for new structural metrics that account for this limitation. Finally, through illustrative numerical experiments, we show that existing centrality measures in network games may provide a counterintuitive understanding of the impact of model misspecification.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Evader-Agnostic Team-Based Pursuit Strategies in Partially-Observable Environments

We consider a scenario where a team of two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) pursue an evader UAV within an urban environment. Each agent has a limited view of their environment where buildings can occlude their field-of-view. Additionally, the pursuer team is agnostic about the evader in terms of its initial and final location, and the behavior of the evader. Consequently, the team needs to gather information by searching the environment and then track it to eventually intercept. To solve this multi-player, partially-observable, pursuit-evasion game, we develop a two-phase neuro-symbolic algorithm centered around the principle of bounded rationality. First, we devise an offline approach using deep reinforcement learning to progressively train adversarial policies for the pursuer team against fictitious evaders. This creates $k$-levels of rationality for each agent in preparation for the online phase. Then, we employ an online classification algorithm to determine a "best guess" of our current opponent from the set of iteratively-trained strategic agents and apply the best player response. Using this schema, we improved average performance when facing a random evader in our environment.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Coordinated Autonomous Drones for Human-Centered Fire Evacuation in Partially Observable Urban Environments

Autonomous drone technology holds significant promise for enhancing search and rescue operations during evacuations by guiding humans toward safety and supporting broader emergency response efforts. However, their application in dynamic, real-time evacuation support remains limited. Existing models often overlook the psychological and emotional complexity of human behavior under extreme stress. In real-world fire scenarios, evacuees frequently deviate from designated safe routes due to panic and uncertainty. To address these challenges, this paper presents a multi-agent coordination framework in which autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) assist human evacuees in real-time by locating, intercepting, and guiding them to safety under uncertain conditions. We model the problem as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), where two heterogeneous UAV agents, a high-level rescuer (HLR) and a low-level rescuer (LLR), coordinate through shared observations and complementary capabilities. Human behavior is captured using an agent-based model grounded in empirical psychology, where panic dynamically affects decision-making and movement in response to environmental stimuli. The environment features stochastic fire spread, unknown evacuee locations, and limited visibility, requiring UAVs to plan over long horizons to search for humans and adapt in real-time. Our framework employs the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm with recurrent policies to enable robust decision-making in partially observable settings. Simulation results demonstrate that the UAV team can rapidly locate and intercept evacuees, significantly reducing the time required for them to reach safety compared to scenarios without UAV assistance.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Convergence of Decentralized Actor-Critic Algorithm in General-sum Markov Games

Markov games provide a powerful framework for modeling strategic multi-agent interactions in dynamic environments. Traditionally, convergence properties of decentralized learning algorithms in these settings have been established only for special cases, such as Markov zero-sum and potential games, which do not fully capture real-world interactions. In this paper, we address this gap by studying the asymptotic properties of learning algorithms in general-sum Markov games. In particular, we focus on a decentralized algorithm where each agent adopts an actor-critic learning dynamic with asynchronous step sizes. This decentralized approach enables agents to operate independently, without requiring knowledge of others' strategies or payoffs. We introduce the concept of a Markov Near-Potential Function (MNPF) and demonstrate that it serves as an approximate Lyapunov function for the policy updates in the decentralized learning dynamics, which allows us to characterize the convergent set of strategies. We further strengthen our result under specific regularity conditions and with finite Nash equilibria.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

α-RACER: Real-Time Algorithm for Game-Theoretic Motion Planning and Control in Autonomous Racing using Near-Potential Function

Autonomous racing extends beyond the challenge of controlling a racecar at its physical limits. Professional racers employ strategic maneuvers to outwit other competing opponents to secure victory. While modern control algorithms can achieve human-level performance by computing offline racing lines for single-car scenarios, research on real-time algorithms for multi-car autonomous racing is limited. To bridge this gap, we develop game-theoretic modeling framework that incorporates the competitive aspect of autonomous racing like overtaking and blocking through a novel policy parametrization, while operating the car at its limit. Furthermore, we propose an algorithmic approach to compute the (approximate) Nash equilibrium strategy, which represents the optimal approach in the presence of competing agents. Specifically, we introduce an algorithm inspired by recently introduced framework of dynamic near-potential function, enabling real-time computation of the Nash equilibrium. Our approach comprises two phases: offline and online. During the offline phase, we use simulated racing data to learn a near-potential function that approximates utility changes for agents. This function facilitates the online computation of approximate Nash equilibria by maximizing its value. We evaluate our method in a head-to-head 3-car racing scenario, demonstrating superior performance compared to several existing baselines.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2025

Independent and Decentralized Learning in Markov Potential Games

We study a multi-agent reinforcement learning dynamics, and analyze its asymptotic behavior in infinite-horizon discounted Markov potential games. We focus on the independent and decentralized setting, where players do not know the game parameters, and cannot communicate or coordinate. In each stage, players update their estimate of Q-function that evaluates their total contingent payoff based on the realized one-stage reward in an asynchronous manner. Then, players independently update their policies by incorporating an optimal one-stage deviation strategy based on the estimated Q-function. Inspired by the actor-critic algorithm in single-agent reinforcement learning, a key feature of our learning dynamics is that agents update their Q-function estimates at a faster timescale than the policies. Leveraging tools from two-timescale asynchronous stochastic approximation theory, we characterize the convergent set of learning dynamics.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Markov $α$-Potential Games

We propose a new framework of Markov $α$-potential games to study Markov games. We show that any Markov game with finite-state and finite-action is a Markov $α$-potential game, and establish the existence of an associated $α$-potential function. Any optimizer of an $α$-potential function is shown to be an $α$-stationary Nash equilibrium. We study two important classes of practically significant Markov games, Markov congestion games and the perturbed Markov team games, via the framework of Markov $α$-potential games, with explicit characterization of an upper bound for $α$ and its relation to game parameters. Additionally, we provide a semi-infinite linear programming based formulation to obtain an upper bound for $α$ for any Markov game. Furthermore, we study two equilibrium approximation algorithms, namely the projected gradient-ascent algorithm and the sequential maximum improvement algorithm, along with their Nash regret analysis, and corroborate the results with numerical experiments.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Privacy Preserving Mechanisms for Coordinating Airspace Usage in Advanced Air Mobility

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations are expected to transform air transportation while challenging current air traffic management practices. By introducing a novel market-based mechanism, we address the problem of on-demand allocation of capacity-constrained airspace to AAM vehicles with heterogeneous and private valuations. We model airspace and air infrastructure as a collection of contiguous regions with constraints on the number of vehicles that simultaneously enter, stay, or exit each region. Vehicles request access to the airspace with trajectories spanning multiple regions at different times. We use the graph structure of our airspace model to formulate the allocation problem as a path allocation problem on a time-extended graph. To ensure the cost information of AAM vehicles remains private, we introduce a novel mechanism that allocates each vehicle a budget of "air-credits" and anonymously charges prices for traversing the edges of the time-extended graph. We seek to compute a competitive equilibrium that ensures that: (i) capacity constraints are satisfied, (ii) a strictly positive resource price implies that the sector capacity is fully utilized, and (iii) the allocation is integral and optimal for each AAM vehicle given current prices, without requiring access to individual vehicle utilities. However, a competitive equilibrium with integral allocations may not always exist. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence and computation of a fractional-competitive equilibrium, where allocations can be fractional. Building on these theoretical insights, we propose a distributed, iterative, two-step algorithm that: 1) computes a fractional competitive equilibrium, and 2) derives an integral allocation from this equilibrium. We validate the effectiveness of our approach in allocating trajectories for two emerging urban air mobility services: drone delivery and air taxis.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2025

Adaptive Incentive Design with Learning Agents

We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference between the player's marginal cost and the operator's marginal cost at each time step. The proposed mechanism updates the incentives on a slower timescale compared to the players' learning dynamics, resulting in a two-timescale coupled dynamical system. Notably, this mechanism is agnostic to the specific learning dynamics used by players to update their strategies. We show that any fixed point of this adaptive incentive mechanism corresponds to the optimal incentive mechanism, ensuring that the Nash equilibrium coincides with the socially optimal strategy. Additionally, we provide sufficient conditions under which the adaptive mechanism converges to a fixed point. Our results apply to both atomic and non-atomic games. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism, we verify the convergence conditions in two practically relevant classes of games: atomic aggregative games and non-atomic routing games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Understanding the Impact of Coalitions between EV Charging Stations

The rapid growth of electric vehicles (EVs) is driving the expansion of charging infrastructure globally. As charging stations become ubiquitous, their substantial electricity consumption can influence grid operation and electricity pricing. Naturally, \textit{some} groups of charging stations, which could be jointly operated by a company, may coordinate to decide their charging profile. While coordination among all charging stations is ideal, it is unclear if coordination of some charging stations is better than no coordination. In this paper, we analyze this intermediate regime between no and full coordination of charging stations. We model EV charging as a non-cooperative aggregative game, where each station's cost is determined by both monetary payments tied to reactive electricity prices on the grid and its sensitivity to deviations from a desired charging profile. We consider a solution concept that we call $\mathcal{C}$-Nash equilibrium, which is tied to a coalition $\mathcal{C}$ of charging stations coordinating to reduce their costs. We provide sufficient conditions, in terms of the demand and sensitivity of charging stations, to determine when independent (aka uncoordinated) operation of charging stations could result in lower overall costs to charging stations, coalition and charging stations outside the coalition. Somewhat counter to common intuition, we show numerical instances where allowing charging stations to operate independently is better than coordinating a subset of stations as a coalition. Jointly, these results provide operators of charging stations insights into how to coordinate their charging behavior, and open several research directions.

math.OC↗

arXiv2024

Incentive-Compatible Vertiport Reservation in Advanced Air Mobility: An Auction-Based Approach

The rise of advanced air mobility (AAM) is expected to become a multibillion-dollar industry in the near future. Market-based mechanisms are touted to be an integral part of AAM operations, which comprise heterogeneous operators with private valuations. In this work, we study the problem of designing a mechanism to coordinate the movement of electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft, operated by multiple operators each having heterogeneous valuations associated with their fleet, between vertiports, while enforcing the arrival, departure, and parking constraints at vertiports. Particularly, we propose an incentive-compatible and individually rational vertiport reservation mechanism that maximizes a social welfare metric, which encapsulates the objective of maximizing the overall valuations of all operators while minimizing the congestion at vertiports. Additionally, we improve the computational tractability of designing the reservation mechanism by proposing a mixed binary linear programming approach that leverages the network flow structure.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2024

Congestion Pricing for Efficiency and Equity: Theory and Applications to the San Francisco Bay Area

Congestion pricing, while adopted by many cities to alleviate traffic congestion, raises concerns about widening socioeconomic disparities due to its disproportionate impact on low-income travelers. We address this concern by proposing a new class of congestion pricing schemes that not only minimize total travel time, but also incorporate an equity objective, reducing disparities in the relative change in travel costs across populations with different incomes, following the implementation of tolls. Our analysis builds on a congestion game model with heterogeneous traveler populations. We present four pricing schemes that account for practical considerations, such as the ability to charge differentiated tolls to various traveler populations and the option to toll all or only a subset of edges in the network. We evaluate our pricing schemes in the calibrated freeway network of the San Francisco Bay Area. We demonstrate that the proposed congestion pricing schemes improve both the total travel time and the equity objective compared to the current pricing scheme. Our results further show that pricing schemes charging differentiated prices to traveler populations with varying value-of-time lead to a more equitable distribution of travel costs compared to those that charge a homogeneous price to all.

cs.GT↗