arXiv subjects

Chris Kenyon

Publications and source records attributed to Chris Kenyon.

25 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2014

Regulatory-Compliant Derivatives Pricing is Not Risk-Neutral

Regulations impose idiosyncratic capital and funding costs for holding derivatives. Capital requirements are costly because derivatives desks are risky businesses; funding is costly in part because regulations increase the minimum funding tenor. Idiosyncratic costs mean no single measure makes derivatives martingales for all market participants. Hence Regulatory-compliant pricing is not risk-neutral. This has implications for exit prices and mark-to-market.

q-fin.PR↗

arXiv2014

VAR and ES/CVAR Dependence on data cleaning and Data Models: Analysis and Resolution

Historical (Stressed-) Value-at-Risk ((S)VAR), and Expected Shortfall (ES), are widely used risk measures in regulatory capital and Initial Margin, i.e. funding, computations. However, whilst the definitions of VAR and ES are unambiguous, they depend on input distributions that are data-cleaning- and Data-Model-dependent. We quantify the scale of these effects from USD CDS (2004--2014), and from USD interest rates (1989--2014, single-curve setup before 2004, multi-curve setup after 2004), and make two standardisation proposals: for data; and for Data-Models. VAR and ES are required for lifetime portfolio calculations, i.e. collateral calls, which cover a wide range of market states. Hence we need standard, i.e. clean, complete, and common (i.e. identical for all banks), market data also covering this wide range of market states. This data is historically incomplete and not clean hence data standardization is required. Stressed VAR and ES require moving market movements during a past (usually not recent) window to current, and future, market states. All choices (e.g. absolute difference, relative, relative scaled by some function of market states) implicitly define a Data Model for transformation of extreme market moves (recall that 99th percentiles are typical, and the behaviour of the rest is irrelevant). Hence we propose standard Data Models. These are necessary because different banks have different stress windows. Where there is no data, or a requirement for simplicity, we propose standard lookup tables (one per window, etc.). Without this standardization of data and Data Models we demonstrate that VAR and ES are complex derivatives of subjective choices.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2013

Collateral-Enhanced Default Risk

Changes in collateralization have been implicated in significant default (or near-default) events during the financial crisis, most notably with AIG. We have developed a framework for quantifying this effect based on moving between Merton-type and Black-Cox-type structural default models. Our framework leads to a single equation that emcompasses the range of possibilities, including collateralization remargining frequency (i.e. discrete observations). We show that increases in collateralization, by exposing entities to daily mark-to-market volatility, enhance default probability. This quantifies the well-known problem with collateral triggers. Furthermore our model can be used to quantify the degree to which central counterparties, whilst removing credit risk transmission, systematically increase default risk.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2013

DVA for Assets

The effect of self-default on the valuation of liabilities and derivatives (DVA) has been widely discussed but the effect on assets has not received similar attention. Any asset whose value depends on the status, or existence, of the firm will have a DVA. We extend (Burgard and Kjaer 2011) to provide a hedging strategy for such assets and provide an in-depth example from the balance sheet (Goodwill). We calibrate our model to seven US banks over the crisis period of mid-2007 to 2011. This suggests that their reported profits would have changed significantly if DVA on assets, as well as liabilities, was included - unless the DVA was hedged.

q-fin.PR↗

arXiv2012

Will Central Counterparties become the New Rating Agencies?

Central Counterparties (CCPs) are widely promoted as a requirement for safe banking with little dissent except on technical grounds (such as proliferation of CCPs). Whilst CCPs can have major operational positives, we argue that CCPs have many of the business characteristics of Rating Agencies, and face similar business pressures. Thus we see a risk that prices from CCPs may develop the characteristics attributed to ratings from Rating Agency pre-crisis. Business over-reliance on ratings of questionable accuracy is seen as a cause of the financial crisis. We see the potential for same situation to be repeated with prices from CCPs. Thus the regulatory emphasis on CCPs, rather than on collateralization, may create the preconditions for an avoidable repeat of the financial crisis.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2012

CDS pricing under Basel III: capital relief and default protection

Basel III introduces new capital charges for CVA. These charges, and the Basel 2.5 default capital charge can be mitigated by CDS. Therefore, to price in the capital relief that CDS contracts provide, we introduce a CDS pricing model with three legs: premium; default protection; and capital relief. If markets are complete, with no CDS bond basis, then CDSs can be replicated by taking short positions in risky floating bonds issued by the reference entity and a riskless bank account. If these conditions do not hold, then it is theoretically possible that the capital relief that CDSs provide may be priced in. Thus our model provides bounds on the CDS-implied hazard rates when markets are incomplete. Under simple assumptions we show that 20% to over 50% of observed CDS spread could be due to priced in capital relief. Given that this is different for IMM and non-IMM banks will we see differential pricing?

q-fin.PR↗

arXiv2010

Completing CVA and Liquidity: Firm-Level Positions and Collateralized Trades

Bilateral CVA as currently implement has the counterintuitive effect of profiting from one's own widening CDS spreads, i.e. increased risk of default, in practice. The unified picture of CVA and liquidity introduced by Morini & Prampolini 2010 has contributed to understanding this. However, there are two significant omissions for practical implementation that come from the same source, i.e. positions not booked in usual position-keeping systems. The first omission is firm-level positions that change value upon firm default. An example is Goodwill which is a line item on balance sheets and typically written down to zero on default. Another example would be firm Equity. The second omission relates to collateralized positions. When these positions are out of the money in future, which has a positive probability, they will require funding that cannot be secured using the position itself. These contingent future funding positions are usually not booked in any position-keeping system. We show here how to include these two types of positions and thus help to complete the unified picture of CVA and liquidity. For a particular large complex financial institution that profited $2.5B from spread widening we show that including Goodwill would have resulted in a $4B loss under conservative assumptions. Whilst we cannot make a similar assessment for its collateralized derivative portfolio we calculate both the funding costs and the CVA from own default for a range of swaps and find that CVA was a positive contribution in the examples.

q-fin.PR↗