The Bretton Woods Experience and ERM
Historical examination of the Bretton Woods system allows comparisons to be made with the current evolution of the EMS.
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Publications and source records attributed to Chris Kirrane.
Historical examination of the Bretton Woods system allows comparisons to be made with the current evolution of the EMS.
This paper describes the opportunities and also the difficulties of EMU with regard to international monetary cooperation. Even though the institutional and intellectual assistance to the coordination of monetary policy in the EU will probably be strengthened with the EMU, among the shortcomings of the Maastricht Treaty concerns the relationship between the founder members and those countries who wish to remain outside monetary union.
This paper examines the history of previous examples of EMU from the viewpoint that state actors make decisions about whether to participate in a monetary union based on rational self-interest concerning costs and benefits to their national economies. Illustrative examples are taken from nineteenth century German, Italian and Japanese attempts at monetary integration with early twentieth century ones from the Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union and contemporary ones from the West African Monetary Union and the European Monetary System. Lessons learned from the historical examples will be used to identify issues that could arise with the move towards closer EMU in Europe.
Monetary integration has both costs and benefits. Europeans have a strong aversion to exchange rate instability. From this perspective, the EMS has shown its limits and full monetary union involving a single currency appears to be a necessity. This is the goal of the EMU project contained in the Maastricht Treaty. This paper examines the pertinent choices: independence of the Central Bank, budgetary discipline and economic policy coordination. Therefore, the implications of EMU for the economic policy of France will be examined. If the external force disappears, the public sector still cannot circumvent its solvency constraint. The instrument of national monetary policy will not be available so the absorption of asymmetric shocks will require greater wage flexibility and fiscal policy will play a greater role. The paper includes three parts. The first concerns the economic foundations of monetary union and the costs it entails. The second is devoted to the institutional arrangements under the Treaty of Maastricht. The third examines the consequences of monetary union for the economy and the economic policy of France.