arXiv subjects

Christian Kroer

Publications and source records attributed to Christian Kroer.

At least 91 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

arXiv2021

First-Order Methods for Wasserstein Distributionally Robust MDP

Markov decision processes (MDPs) are known to be sensitive to parameter specification. Distributionally robust MDPs alleviate this issue by allowing for \emph{ambiguity sets} which give a set of possible distributions over parameter sets. The goal is to find an optimal policy with respect to the worst-case parameter distribution. We propose a framework for solving Distributionally robust MDPs via first-order methods, and instantiate it for several types of Wasserstein ambiguity sets. By developing efficient proximal updates, our algorithms achieve a convergence rate of $O\left(NA^{2.5}S^{3.5}\log(S)\log(ε^{-1})ε^{-1.5} \right)$ for the number of kernels $N$ in the support of the nominal distribution, states $S$, and actions $A$; this rate varies slightly based on the Wasserstein setup. Our dependence on $N,A$ and $S$ is significantly better than existing methods, which have a complexity of $O\left(N^{3.5}A^{3.5}S^{4.5}\log^{2}(ε^{-1}) \right)$. Numerical experiments show that our algorithm is significantly more scalable than state-of-the-art approaches across several domains.

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arXiv2021

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division

Linear Fisher markets are a fundamental economic model with applications in fair division as well as large-scale Internet markets. In the finite-dimensional case of $n$ buyers and $m$ items, a market equilibrium can be computed using the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. Motivated by large-scale Internet advertising and fair division applications, this paper considers a generalization of a linear Fisher market where there is a finite set of buyers and a continuum of items. We introduce generalizations of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program and its dual to this infinite-dimensional setting, which leads to Banach-space optimization problems. We establish existence of optimal solutions, strong duality, as well as necessity and sufficiency of KKT-type conditions. All these properties are established via non-standard arguments, which circumvent the limitations of duality theory in optimization over infinite-dimensional Banach spaces. Furthermore, we show that there exists a pure equilibrium allocation, i.e., a division of the item space. When the item space is a closed interval and buyers have piecewise linear valuations, we show that the Eisenberg-Gale-type convex program over the infinite-dimensional allocations can be reformulated as a finite-dimensional convex conic program, which can be solved efficiently using off-the-shelf optimization software based on primal-dual interior-point methods. Based on our convex conic reformulation, we develop the first polynomial-time cake-cutting algorithm that achieves Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and proportionality. For general buyer valuations or a very large number of buyers, we propose computing market equilibrium using stochastic dual averaging, which finds approximate equilibrium prices with high probability. Finally, we discuss how the above results easily extend to the case of quasilinear utilities.

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arXiv2021

Faster Game Solving via Predictive Blackwell Approachability: Connecting Regret Matching and Mirror Descent

Blackwell approachability is a framework for reasoning about repeated games with vector-valued payoffs. We introduce predictive Blackwell approachability, where an estimate of the next payoff vector is given, and the decision maker tries to achieve better performance based on the accuracy of that estimator. In order to derive algorithms that achieve predictive Blackwell approachability, we start by showing a powerful connection between four well-known algorithms. Follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) and online mirror descent (OMD) are the most prevalent regret minimizers in online convex optimization. In spite of this prevalence, the regret matching (RM) and regret matching+ (RM+) algorithms have been preferred in the practice of solving large-scale games (as the local regret minimizers within the counterfactual regret minimization framework). We show that RM and RM+ are the algorithms that result from running FTRL and OMD, respectively, to select the halfspace to force at all times in the underlying Blackwell approachability game. By applying the predictive variants of FTRL or OMD to this connection, we obtain predictive Blackwell approachability algorithms, as well as predictive variants of RM and RM+. In experiments across 18 common zero-sum extensive-form benchmark games, we show that predictive RM+ coupled with counterfactual regret minimization converges vastly faster than the fastest prior algorithms (CFR+, DCFR, LCFR) across all games but two of the poker games, sometimes by two or more orders of magnitude.

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arXiv2021

Scalable First-Order Methods for Robust MDPs

Robust Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are a powerful framework for modeling sequential decision-making problems with model uncertainty. This paper proposes the first first-order framework for solving robust MDPs. Our algorithm interleaves primal-dual first-order updates with approximate Value Iteration updates. By carefully controlling the tradeoff between the accuracy and cost of Value Iteration updates, we achieve an ergodic convergence rate of $O \left( A^{2} S^{3}\log(S)\log(ε^{-1}) ε^{-1} \right)$ for the best choice of parameters on ellipsoidal and Kullback-Leibler $s$-rectangular uncertainty sets, where $S$ and $A$ is the number of states and actions, respectively. Our dependence on the number of states and actions is significantly better (by a factor of $O(A^{1.5}S^{1.5})$) than that of pure Value Iteration algorithms. In numerical experiments on ellipsoidal uncertainty sets we show that our algorithm is significantly more scalable than state-of-the-art approaches. Our framework is also the first one to solve robust MDPs with $s$-rectangular KL uncertainty sets.

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arXiv2020

First-Order Methods for Large-Scale Market Equilibrium Computation

Market equilibrium is a solution concept with many applications such as digital ad markets, fair division, and resource sharing. For many classes of utility functions, equilibria can be captured by convex programs. We develop simple first-order methods suitable for solving these convex programs for large-scale markets. We focus on three practically-relevant utility classes: linear, quasilinear, and Leontief utilities. Using structural properties of market equilibria under each utility class, we show that the corresponding convex programs can be reformulated as optimization of a structured smooth convex function over a polyhedral set, for which projected gradient achieves linear convergence. To do so, we utilize recent linear convergence results under weakened strong-convexity conditions, and further refine the relevant constants in existing convergence results. Then, we show that proximal gradient (a generalization of projected gradient) with a practical linesearch scheme achieves linear convergence under the Proximal-PL condition, a recently developed error bound condition for convex composite problems. For quasilinear utilities, we show that Mirror Descent applied to a new convex program achieves sublinear last-iterate convergence and yields a form of Proportional Response dynamics, an elegant, interpretable algorithm for computing market equilibria originally developed for linear utilities. Numerical experiments show that Proportional Response dynamics is highly efficient for computing approximate market equilibria, while projected gradient with linesearch can be much faster when higher-accuracy solutions are needed.

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arXiv2020

Evaluating and Rewarding Teamwork Using Cooperative Game Abstractions

Can we predict how well a team of individuals will perform together? How should individuals be rewarded for their contributions to the team performance? Cooperative game theory gives us a powerful set of tools for answering these questions: the Characteristic Function (CF) and solution concepts like the Shapley Value (SV). There are two major difficulties in applying these techniques to real world problems: first, the CF is rarely given to us and needs to be learned from data. Second, the SV is combinatorial in nature. We introduce a parametric model called cooperative game abstractions (CGAs) for estimating CFs from data. CGAs are easy to learn, readily interpretable, and crucially allow linear-time computation of the SV. We provide identification results and sample complexity bounds for CGA models as well as error bounds in the estimation of the SV using CGAs. We apply our methods to study teams of artificial RL agents as well as real world teams from professional sports.

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arXiv2020

Increasing Iterate Averaging for Solving Saddle-Point Problems

Many problems in machine learning and game theory can be formulated as saddle-point problems, for which various first-order methods have been developed and proven efficient in practice. Under the general convex-concave assumption, most first-order methods only guarantee an ergodic convergence rate, that is, the uniform averages of the iterates converge at a $O(1/T)$ rate in terms of the saddle-point residual. However, numerically, the iterates themselves can often converge much faster than the uniform averages. This observation motivates increasing averaging schemes that put more weight on later iterates, in contrast to the usual uniform averaging. We show that such increasing averaging schemes, applied to various first-order methods, are able to preserve the $O(1/T)$ convergence rate with no additional assumptions or computational overhead. Extensive numerical experiments on zero-sum game solving, market equilibrium computation and image denoising demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes. In particular, the increasing averages consistently outperform the uniform averages in all test problems by orders of magnitude. When solving matrix and extensive-form games, increasing averages consistently outperform the last iterates as well. For matrix games, a first-order method equipped with increasing averaging outperforms the highly competitive CFR$^+$ algorithm.

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arXiv2020

Limited Lookahead in Imperfect-Information Games

Limited lookahead has been studied for decades in perfect-information games. We initiate a new direction via two simultaneous deviation points: generalization to imperfect-information games and a game-theoretic approach. We study how one should act when facing an opponent whose lookahead is limited. We study this for opponents that differ based on their lookahead depth, based on whether they, too, have imperfect information, and based on how they break ties. We characterize the hardness of finding a Nash equilibrium or an optimal commitment strategy for either player, showing that in some of these variations the problem can be solved in polynomial time while in others it is PPAD-hard, NP-hard, or inapproximable. We proceed to design algorithms for computing optimal commitment strategies---for when the opponent breaks ties favorably, according to a fixed rule, or adversarially. We then experimentally investigate the impact of limited lookahead. The limited-lookahead player often obtains the value of the game if she knows the expected values of nodes in the game tree for some equilibrium---but we prove this is not sufficient in general. Finally, we study the impact of noise in those estimates and different lookahead depths.

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arXiv2020

Stochastic Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games

Monte-Carlo counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) is the state-of-the-art algorithm for solving sequential games that are too large for full tree traversals. It works by using gradient estimates that can be computed via sampling. However, stochastic methods for sequential games have not been investigated extensively beyond MCCFR. In this paper we develop a new framework for developing stochastic regret minimization methods. This framework allows us to use any regret-minimization algorithm, coupled with any gradient estimator. The MCCFR algorithm can be analyzed as a special case of our framework, and this analysis leads to significantly-stronger theoretical on convergence, while simultaneously yielding a simplified proof. Our framework allows us to instantiate several new stochastic methods for solving sequential games. We show extensive experiments on three games, where some variants of our methods outperform MCCFR.

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arXiv2019

Robust Market Equilibria with Uncertain Preferences

The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences, have a budget of real or fake currency, and a set of prices for items and allocations is computed that sets demand equal to supply. An important real world issue with such mechanisms is that individual valuations are often only imperfectly known. In this paper, we show how concepts from classical market equilibrium can be extended to reflect such uncertainty. We show that in linear, divisible Fisher markets a robust market equilibrium (RME) always exists; this also holds in settings where buyers may retain unspent money. We provide theoretical analysis of the allocative properties of RME in terms of envy and regret. Though RME are hard to compute for general uncertainty sets, we consider some natural and tractable uncertainty sets which lead to well behaved formulations of the problem that can be solved via modern convex programming methods. Finally, we show that very mild uncertainty about valuations can cause RME allocations to outperform those which take estimates as having no underlying uncertainty.

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arXiv2019

Optimistic Regret Minimization for Extensive-Form Games via Dilated Distance-Generating Functions

We study the performance of optimistic regret-minimization algorithms for both minimizing regret in, and computing Nash equilibria of, zero-sum extensive-form games. In order to apply these algorithms to extensive-form games, a distance-generating function is needed. We study the use of the dilated entropy and dilated Euclidean distance functions. For the dilated Euclidean distance function we prove the first explicit bounds on the strong-convexity parameter for general treeplexes. Furthermore, we show that the use of dilated distance-generating functions enable us to decompose the mirror descent algorithm, and its optimistic variant, into local mirror descent algorithms at each information set. This decomposition mirrors the structure of the counterfactual regret minimization framework, and enables important techniques in practice, such as distributed updates and pruning of cold parts of the game tree. Our algorithms provably converge at a rate of $T^{-1}$, which is superior to prior counterfactual regret minimization algorithms. We experimentally compare to the popular algorithm CFR+, which has a theoretical convergence rate of $T^{-0.5}$ in theory, but is known to often converge at a rate of $T^{-1}$, or better, in practice. We give an example matrix game where CFR+ experimentally converges at a relatively slow rate of $T^{-0.74}$, whereas our optimistic methods converge faster than $T^{-1}$. We go on to show that our fast rate also holds in the Kuhn poker game, which is an extensive-form game. For games with deeper game trees however, we find that CFR+ is still faster. Finally we show that when the goal is minimizing regret, rather than computing a Nash equilibrium, our optimistic methods can outperform CFR+, even in deep game trees.

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arXiv2019

Scalable Fair Division for 'At Most One' Preferences

Allocating multiple scarce items across a set of individuals is an important practical problem. In the case of divisible goods and additive preferences a convex program can be used to find the solution that maximizes Nash welfare (MNW). The MNW solution is equivalent to finding the equilibrium of a market economy (aka. the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes, CEEI) and thus has good properties such as Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility in the large. Unfortunately, this equivalence (and nice properties) breaks down for general preference classes. Motivated by real world problems such as course allocation and recommender systems we study the case of additive `at most one' (AMO) preferences - individuals want at most 1 of each item and lotteries are allowed. We show that in this case the MNW solution is still a convex program and importantly is a CEEI solution when the instance gets large but has a `low rank' structure. Thus a polynomial time algorithm can be used to scale CEEI (which is in general PPAD-hard) for AMO preferences. We examine whether the properties guaranteed in the limit hold approximately in finite samples using several real datasets.

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arXiv2019

Fair Division Without Disparate Impact

We consider the problem of dividing items between individuals in a way that is fair both in the sense of distributional fairness and in the sense of not having disparate impact across protected classes. An important existing mechanism for distributionally fair division is competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). Unfortunately, CEEI will not, in general, respect disparate impact constraints. We consider two types of disparate impact measures: requiring that allocations be similar across protected classes and requiring that average utility levels be similar across protected classes. We modify the standard CEEI algorithm in two ways: equitable equilibrium from equal incomes, which removes disparate impact in allocations, and competitive equilibrium from equitable incomes which removes disparate impact in attained utility levels. We show analytically that removing disparate impact in outcomes breaks several of CEEI's desirable properties such as envy, regret, Pareto optimality, and incentive compatibility. By contrast, we can remove disparate impact in attained utility levels without affecting these properties. Finally, we experimentally evaluate the tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and disparate impact in a recommender-system based market.

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arXiv2019

Robust Multi-agent Counterfactual Prediction

We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions. Existing methods (e.g. structural estimation, inverse reinforcement learning) make counterfactual predictions by constructing a model of the game, adding the assumption that agents' behavior comes from optimizing given some goals, and then inverting observed actions to learn agent's underlying utility function (a.k.a. type). Once the agent types are known, making counterfactual predictions amounts to solving for the equilibrium of the counterfactual environment. This approach imposes heavy assumptions such as rationality of the agents being observed, correctness of the analyst's model of the environment/parametric form of the agents' utility functions, and various other conditions to make point identification possible. We propose a method for analyzing the sensitivity of counterfactual conclusions to violations of these assumptions. We refer to this method as robust multi-agent counterfactual prediction (RMAC). We apply our technique to investigating the robustness of counterfactual claims for classic environments in market design: auctions, school choice, and social choice. Importantly, we show RMAC can be used in regimes where point identification is impossible (e.g. those which have multiple equilibria or non-injective maps from type distributions to outcomes).

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arXiv2019

Regret Circuits: Composability of Regret Minimizers

Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale problems; it was recently used in breakthrough results for large-scale extensive-form game solving. This was achieved by composing simplex regret minimizers into an overall regret-minimization framework for extensive-form game strategy spaces. In this paper we study the general composability of regret minimizers. We derive a calculus for constructing regret minimizers for composite convex sets that are obtained from convexity-preserving operations on simpler convex sets. We show that local regret minimizers for the simpler sets can be combined with additional regret minimizers into an aggregate regret minimizer for the composite set. As one application, we show that the CFR framework can be constructed easily from our framework. We also show ways to include curtailing (constraining) operations into our framework. For one, they enables the construction of CFR generalization for extensive-form games with general convex strategy constraints that can cut across decision points.

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arXiv2019

Stable-Predictive Optimistic Counterfactual Regret Minimization

The CFR framework has been a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games in practice. However, the theoretical rate at which past CFR-based algorithms converge to the Nash equilibrium is on the order of $O(T^{-1/2})$, where $T$ is the number of iterations. In contrast, first-order methods can be used to achieve a $O(T^{-1})$ dependence on iterations, yet these methods have been less successful in practice. In this work we present the first CFR variant that breaks the square-root dependence on iterations. By combining and extending recent advances on predictive and stable regret minimizers for the matrix-game setting we show that it is possible to leverage "optimistic" regret minimizers to achieve a $O(T^{-3/4})$ convergence rate within CFR. This is achieved by introducing a new notion of stable-predictivity, and by setting the stability of each counterfactual regret minimizer relative to its location in the decision tree. Experiments show that this method is faster than the original CFR algorithm, although not as fast as newer variants, in spite of their worst-case $O(T^{-1/2})$ dependence on iterations.

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arXiv2018

Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium

Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive refinement concepts is quasi-perfect equilibrium. While quasi-perfection has been studied in extensive-form games, it is poorly understood in Stackelberg settings---that is, settings where a leader can commit to a strategy---which are important for modeling, for example, security games. In this paper, we introduce the axiomatic definition of quasi-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium. We develop a broad class of game perturbation schemes that lead to them in the limit. Our class of perturbation schemes strictly generalizes prior perturbation schemes introduced for the computation of (non-Stackelberg) quasi-perfect equilibria. Based on our perturbation schemes, we develop a branch-and-bound algorithm for computing a quasi-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium. It leverages a perturbed variant of the linear program for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium. Experiments show that our algorithm can be used to find an approximate quasi-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium in games with thousands of nodes.

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arXiv2018

Solving Large Sequential Games with the Excessive Gap Technique

There has been tremendous recent progress on equilibrium-finding algorithms for zero-sum imperfect-information extensive-form games, but there has been a puzzling gap between theory and practice. First-order methods have significantly better theoretical convergence rates than any counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) variant. Despite this, CFR variants have been favored in practice. Experiments with first-order methods have only been conducted on small- and medium-sized games because those methods are complicated to implement in this setting, and because CFR variants have been enhanced extensively for over a decade they perform well in practice. In this paper we show that a particular first-order method, a state-of-the-art variant of the excessive gap technique---instantiated with the dilated entropy distance function---can efficiently solve large real-world problems competitively with CFR and its variants. We show this on large endgames encountered by the Libratus poker AI, which recently beat top human poker specialist professionals at no-limit Texas hold'em. We show experimental results on our variant of the excessive gap technique as well as a prior version. We introduce a numerically friendly implementation of the smoothed best response computation associated with first-order methods for extensive-form game solving. We present, to our knowledge, the first GPU implementation of a first-order method for extensive-form games. We present comparisons of several excessive gap technique and CFR variants.

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