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Christian Lindenmeier

Publications and source records attributed to Christian Lindenmeier.

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WarpGuard: Towards Control-Flow Attestation for Heterogeneous CPU-GPU Execution

Heterogeneous CPU-GPU workloads are increasingly used in safety-critical embedded systems, yet no existing approach provides joint attestation of their execution. Prior Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) techniques focus on CPU-side CFA, while GPU attestation is limited to static, load-time verification and does not provide runtime guarantees. As a result, runtime attacks on GPU kernels and violations of the CPU-GPU interaction contract remain unaddressed. We present WarpGuard, the first composite CFA framework for heterogeneous CPU-GPU workloads. WarpGuard verifies execution against a unified control-flow graph (CFG) that captures both CPU and GPU components. It extends prior CFA techniques in two ways: it enables runtime CFA of GPU kernels by tracing their execution against kernel-specific CFGs, and it monitors kernel launch events and enforces per-call site policies to detect violations at the CPU-GPU boundary. These extensions address challenges arising from GPU parallelism and cross-device interactions. We implement WarpGuard using software-based instrumentation, requiring no specialized hardware or binary modifications. Our evaluation on an NVIDIA Jetson Orin Nano shows that WarpGuard detects GPU-side control-flow and cross-boundary attacks. Across microbenchmarks, SPECAccel, and eight TensorRT inference workloads, WarpGuard incurs moderate overheads, suggesting practicality for embedded safety-critical settings.

cs.CR

Telekommunikations\"uberwachung am Scheideweg: Zur Regulierbarkeit des Zugriffes auf verschl\"usselte Kommunikation

Personal communication using technical means is protected by telecommunications secrecy. Any interference with this fundamental right requires a legal basis, which has existed for many years for traditional communication services in the form of telecommunications surveillance (TK\"U, {\S} 100a StPO) and appears to be widely accepted by society. The basis for the implementation of TK\"U is the obligation of telecommunications providers to provide interception interfaces. However, the technical implementation of telecommunications has changed significantly as a result of the Internet. Messenger services and Voice over IP telephony are increasingly competing with traditional telephone services. The use of strong end-to-end encryption made possible by this technology is increasingly posing problems for law enforcement agencies, as only cryptographically encrypted content is accessible via the interception interfaces provided to date. Against the backdrop of current discussions on socalled ``chat control'' and its limited social acceptance, this article addresses the question of whether and, if so, how the cooperation obligations of the technical actors involved can be sensibly regulated in the case of encrypted communication.

cs.CY