arXiv subjects

Christian Schroeder de Witt

Publications and source records attributed to Christian Schroeder de Witt.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2026

A Note on the Strategic Confinement Problem

Lampson's confinement problem asks how to prevent a program that processes confidential information from leaking it to a third party. We introduce the strategic confinement problem, which arises when the communicating parties are strategic agents with shared coordination resources. In this setting, residual communication capacity can be concentrated on low-entropy, high-impact predicates of the confidential data. Consequently, bounds on information leakage need not induce corresponding bounds on worst-case harm: a channel with negligible capacity may still suffice to select damaging outcomes. We argue that systems of learnt strategic agents naturally instantiate this problem because they do not admit complete behavioural specifications, their learnt conventions generally cannot be predicted or reproduced by an external observer, and sufficiently capable agents can construct covert communication schemes that are difficult to detect or eliminate. Our contribution is therefore not a new theory of communication, but a reinterpretation of confinement in the presence of strategic agents. Classical confinement bounds what information may flow; strategic confinement highlights that this need not bound what strategic agents can jointly achieve.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents

AI agents are beginning to interact with each other directly and across internet platforms and physical environments, creating security challenges beyond traditional cybersecurity and AI safety frameworks. Free-form protocols are essential for AI's task generalization but enable new threats like secret collusion and coordinated swarm attacks. Network effects can rapidly spread privacy breaches, disinformation, jailbreaks, and data poisoning, while multi-agent dispersion and stealth optimization help adversaries evade oversight - creating novel persistent threats at a systemic level. Despite their critical importance, these security challenges remain understudied, with research fragmented across disparate fields including AI security, multi-agent learning, complex systems, cybersecurity, game theory, distributed systems, and technical AI governance. We introduce multi-agent security, a new field dedicated to securing networks of AI agents against threats that emerge or amplify through their interactions - whether direct or indirect via shared environments - with each other, humans, and institutions, and characterise fundamental security-utility and security-security trade-offs across both distributed and decentralised settings. Our preliminary work (1) taxonomizes the threat landscape arising from interacting AI agents, (2) offers applications to multi-agent security for work across diffuse subfields, and (3) proposes a unified research agenda addressing open challenges in designing secure agent systems and interaction environments. By identifying these gaps, we aim to guide research in this critical area to unlock the socioeconomic potential of large-scale agent deployment, foster public trust, and mitigate national security risks in critical infrastructure and defense contexts.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2026

A Decision-Theoretic Formalisation of Steganography With Applications to LLM Monitoring

Large language models are beginning to show steganographic capabilities. Such capabilities could allow misaligned models to evade oversight mechanisms. Yet principled methods to detect and quantify such behaviours are lacking. Classical definitions of steganography, and detection methods based on them, require a known reference distribution of non-steganographic signals. For the case of steganographic reasoning in LLMs, knowing such a reference distribution is not feasible; this renders these approaches inapplicable. We propose an alternative, \textbf{decision-theoretic view of steganography}. Our central insight is that steganography creates an asymmetry in usable information between agents who can and cannot decode the hidden content (present within a steganographic signal), and this otherwise latent asymmetry can be inferred from the agents' observable actions. To formalise this perspective, we introduce generalised $\mathcal{V}$-information: a utilitarian framework for measuring the amount of usable information within some input. We use this to define the \textbf{steganographic gap} -- a measure that quantifies steganography by comparing the downstream utility of the steganographic signal to agents that can and cannot decode the hidden content. We empirically validate our formalism, and show that it can be used to detect, quantify, and mitigate steganographic reasoning in LLMs.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Architecture Matters for Multi-Agent Security

Multi-agent systems (MAS), composed of networks of two or more autonomous AI agents, have become increasingly popular in production deployments, yet introduce security risks that do not arise in single-agent settings. Even if individual agents exhibit robust security, architectural decisions governing their coordination can create attack surfaces that have not been systematically characterized. In this work, we present an empirical study of how MAS design decisions shape the tradeoff between task performance and attack resistance. Across three agentic environments (browser, desktop, and code) and 13 architectural configurations, we use stagewise evaluations that distinguish planning refusal, execution-stage interception, partial harmful execution, and successful attack completion to study three key design choices: (i) agent roles, which determine how authority and responsibility are allocated; (ii) communication topology, which shapes how and when agents interact; and (iii) memory, which determines the context and state visibility accessible to each agent. We find that multi-agent architectures are more vulnerable than standalone agents in the majority of configurations, with attack success rates varying by up to 3.8x at comparable or higher benign accuracy, and that no single design is universally safer. These results motivate the development of further evaluations that move beyond the security properties of a single agent.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

LongCoT: Benchmarking Long-Horizon Chain-of-Thought Reasoning

As language models are increasingly deployed for complex autonomous tasks, their ability to reason accurately over longer horizons becomes critical. An essential component of this ability is planning and managing a long, complex chain-of-thought (CoT). We introduce LongCoT, a scalable benchmark of 2,500 expert-designed problems spanning chemistry, mathematics, computer science, chess, and logic to isolate and directly measure the long-horizon CoT reasoning capabilities of frontier models. Problems consist of a short input with a verifiable answer; solving them requires navigating a graph of interdependent steps that span tens to hundreds of thousands of reasoning tokens. Each local step is individually tractable for frontier models, so failures reflect long-horizon reasoning limitations. At release, the best models achieve <10% accuracy (GPT 5.2: 9.8%; Gemini 3 Pro: 6.1%) on LongCoT, revealing a substantial gap in current capabilities. Overall, LongCoT provides a rigorous measure of long-horizon reasoning, tracking the ability of frontier models to reason reliably over extended periods.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Towards Understanding Multimodal Fine-Tuning: Spatial Features

Contemporary Vision-Language Models (VLMs) achieve strong performance on a wide range of tasks by pairing a vision encoder with a pre-trained language model, fine-tuned for visual-text inputs. Yet despite these gains, it remains unclear how language backbone representations adapt during multimodal training and when vision-specific capabilities emerge. In this work, we present the first mechanistic analysis of VLM adaptation. Using stage-wise model diffing, a technique that isolates representational changes introduced during multimodal fine-tuning, we reveal how a language model learns to "see". We first identify vision-preferring features that emerge or reorient during fine-tuning. We then show that a selective subset of these features reliably encodes spatial relations, revealed through controlled shifts to spatial prompts. Finally, we trace the causal activation of these features to a small group of attention heads. Our findings show that stage-wise model diffing reveals when and where spatially grounded multimodal features arise. It also provides a clearer view of modality fusion by showing how visual grounding reshapes features that were previously text-only. This methodology enhances the interpretability of multimodal training and provides a foundation for understanding and refining how pretrained language models acquire vision-grounded capabilities.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

VET Your Agent: Towards Host-Independent Autonomy via Verifiable Execution Traces

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled a new generation of autonomous agents that operate over sustained periods and manage sensitive resources on behalf of users. Trusted for their ability to act without direct oversight, such agents are increasingly considered in high-stakes domains including financial management, dispute resolution, and governance. Yet in practice, agents execute on infrastructure controlled by a host, who can tamper with models, inputs, or outputs, undermining any meaningful notion of autonomy. We address this gap by introducing VET (Verifiable Execution Traces), a formal framework that achieves host-independent authentication of agent outputs and takes a step toward host-independent autonomy. Central to VET is the Agent Identity Document (AID), which specifies an agent's configuration together with the proof systems required for verification. VET is compositional: it supports multiple proof mechanisms, including trusted hardware, succinct cryptographic proofs, and notarized TLS transcripts (Web Proofs). We implement VET for an API-based LLM agent and evaluate our instantiation on realistic workloads. We find that for today's black-box, secret-bearing API calls, Web Proofs appear to be the most practical choice, with overhead typically under 3$\times$ compared to direct API calls, while for public API calls, a lower-overhead TEE Proxy is often sufficient. As a case study, we deploy a verifiable trading agent that produces proofs for each decision and composes Web Proofs with a TEE Proxy. Our results demonstrate that practical, host-agnostic authentication is already possible with current technology, laying the foundation for future systems that achieve full host-independent autonomy.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Sensitivity Analysis for Climate Science with Generative Flow Models

Sensitivity analysis is a cornerstone of climate science, essential for understanding phenomena ranging from storm intensity to long-term climate feedbacks. However, computing these sensitivities using traditional physical models is often prohibitively expensive in terms of both computation and development time. While modern AI-based generative models are orders of magnitude faster to evaluate, computing sensitivities with them remains a significant bottleneck. This work addresses this challenge by applying the adjoint state method for calculating gradients in generative flow models. We apply this method to the cBottle generative model, trained on ERA5 and ICON data, to perform sensitivity analysis of any atmospheric variable with respect to sea surface temperatures. We quantitatively validate the computed sensitivities against the model's own outputs. Our results provide initial evidence that this approach can produce reliable gradients, reducing the computational cost of sensitivity analysis from weeks on a supercomputer with a physical model to hours on a GPU, thereby simplifying a critical workflow in climate science. The code can be found at https://github.com/Kwartzl8/cbottle_adjoint_sensitivity.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Hidden in Plain Text: Emergence & Mitigation of Steganographic Collusion in LLMs

The rapid proliferation of frontier model agents promises significant societal advances but also raises concerns about systemic risks arising from unsafe interactions. Collusion to the disadvantage of others has been identified as a central form of undesirable agent cooperation. The use of information hiding (steganography) in agent communications could render such collusion practically undetectable. This underscores the need for investigations into the possibility of such behaviours emerging and the robustness corresponding countermeasures. To investigate this problem we design two approaches -- a gradient-based reinforcement learning (GBRL) method and an in-context reinforcement learning (ICRL) method -- for reliably eliciting sophisticated LLM-generated linguistic text steganography. We demonstrate, for the first time, that unintended steganographic collusion in LLMs can arise due to mispecified reward incentives during training. Additionally, we find that standard mitigations -- both passive oversight of model outputs and active mitigation through communication paraphrasing -- are not fully effective at preventing this steganographic communication. Our findings imply that (i) emergence of steganographic collusion is a plausible concern that should be monitored and researched, and (ii) preventing emergence may require innovation in mitigation techniques.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Fundamental Limitations in Pointwise Defences of LLM Finetuning APIs

LLM developers have imposed technical interventions to prevent fine-tuning misuse attacks, attacks where adversaries evade safeguards by fine-tuning the model using a public API. Previous work has established several successful attacks against specific fine-tuning API defences. In this work, we show that defences of fine-tuning APIs that seek to detect individual harmful training or inference samples ('pointwise' detection) are fundamentally limited in their ability to prevent fine-tuning attacks. We construct 'pointwise-undetectable' attacks that repurpose entropy in benign model outputs (e.g. semantic or syntactic variations) to covertly transmit dangerous knowledge. Our attacks are composed solely of unsuspicious benign samples that can be collected from the model before fine-tuning, meaning training and inference samples are all individually benign and low-perplexity. We test our attacks against the OpenAI fine-tuning API, finding they succeed in eliciting answers to harmful multiple-choice questions, and that they evade an enhanced monitoring system we design that successfully detects other fine-tuning attacks. We encourage the community to develop defences that tackle the fundamental limitations we uncover in pointwise fine-tuning API defences.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

DEEDEE: Fast and Scalable Out-of-Distribution Dynamics Detection

Deploying reinforcement learning (RL) in safety-critical settings is constrained by brittleness under distribution shift. We study out-of-distribution (OOD) detection for RL time series and introduce DEEDEE, a two-statistic detector that revisits representation-heavy pipelines with a minimal alternative. DEEDEE uses only an episodewise mean and an RBF kernel similarity to a training summary, capturing complementary global and local deviations. Despite its simplicity, DEEDEE matches or surpasses contemporary detectors across standard RL OOD suites, delivering a 600-fold reduction in compute (FLOPs / wall-time) and an average 5% absolute accuracy gain over strong baselines. Conceptually, our results indicate that diverse anomaly types often imprint on RL trajectories through a small set of low-order statistics, suggesting a compact foundation for OOD detection in complex environments.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Delta-Influence: Unlearning Poisons via Influence Functions

Addressing data integrity challenges, such as unlearning the effects of data poisoning after model training, is necessary for the reliable deployment of machine learning models. State-of-the-art influence functions, such as EK-FAC and TRAK, often fail to accurately attribute abnormal model behavior to the specific poisoned training data responsible for the data poisoning attack. In addition, traditional unlearning algorithms often struggle to effectively remove the influence of poisoned samples, particularly when only a few affected examples can be identified. To address these challenge, we introduce $Δ$-Influence, a novel approach that leverages influence functions to trace abnormal model behavior back to the responsible poisoned training data using as little as just one poisoned test example. $Δ$-Influence applies data transformations that sever the link between poisoned training data and compromised test points without significantly affecting clean data. This allows $Δ$-Influence to detect large negative shifts in influence scores following data transformations, a phenomenon we term as influence collapse, thereby accurately identifying poisoned training data. Unlearning this subset, e.g. through retraining, effectively eliminates the data poisoning. We validate our method across three vision-based poisoning attacks and three datasets, benchmarking against five detection algorithms and five unlearning strategies. We show that $Δ$-Influence consistently achieves the best unlearning across all settings, showing the promise of influence functions for corrective unlearning. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/Ruby-a07/delta-influence

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

h1: Bootstrapping LLMs to Reason over Longer Horizons via Reinforcement Learning

Large language models excel at short-horizon reasoning tasks, but performance drops as reasoning horizon lengths increase. Existing approaches to combat this rely on inference-time scaffolding or costly step-level supervision, neither of which scales easily. In this work, we introduce a scalable method to bootstrap long-horizon reasoning capabilities using only existing, abundant short-horizon data. Our approach synthetically composes simple problems into complex, multi-step dependency chains of arbitrary length. We train models on this data using outcome-only rewards under a curriculum that automatically increases in complexity, allowing RL training to be scaled much further without saturating. Empirically, our method generalizes remarkably well: curriculum training on composed 6th-grade level math problems (GSM8K) boosts accuracy on longer, competition-level benchmarks (GSM-Symbolic, MATH-500, AIME) by up to 2.06x. It also transfers significantly to diverse out-of-distribution ReasoningGym domains and long-context benchmarks, indicating broader generalization. Importantly, our long-horizon improvements are significantly higher than baselines even at high pass@k, showing that models can learn new reasoning paths under RL. Theoretically, we show that curriculum RL with outcome rewards achieves an exponential improvement in sample complexity over full-horizon training, providing training signal comparable to dense supervision. h1 therefore introduces an efficient path towards scaling RL for long-horizon problems using only existing data.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

MALT: Improving Reasoning with Multi-Agent LLM Training

Large Language Models (LLMs) often produce answers with a single chain-of-thought, which restricts their ability to explore reasoning paths or self-correct flawed outputs in complex tasks. In this paper, we introduce MALT (Multi-Agent LLM Training), a novel post-training strategy that divides the reasoning process into generation, verification, and refinement steps using a sequential pipeline of heterogeneous agents. During data generation, each agent is repeatedly sampled to form a multi-agent search tree, where final outputs are graded against ground-truth data. We then apply value iteration to propagate reward signals back to each role-conditioned model, automatically producing multi-agent post-training data without human or teacher-model supervision. Our off-policy approach allows each agent to specialize by learning from correct and incorrect trajectories, ultimately improving the end-to-end reasoning chain. On MATH, GSM8K, and CSQA, MALT surpasses the same baseline LLM with a relative improvement of 15.66%, 7.42%, and 9.40% respectively, making it an important advance towards multi-agent cooperative training.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

MAD-Sherlock: Multi-Agent Debate for Visual Misinformation Detection

One of the most challenging forms of misinformation involves pairing images with misleading text to create false narratives. Existing AI-driven detection systems often require domain-specific finetuning, limiting generalizability, and offer little insight into their decisions, hindering trust and adoption. We introduce MAD-Sherlock, a multi-agent debate system for out-of-context misinformation detection. MAD-Sherlock frames detection as a multi-agent debate, reflecting the diverse and conflicting discourse found online. Multimodal agents collaborate to assess contextual consistency and retrieve external information to support cross-context reasoning. Our framework is domain- and time-agnostic, requiring no finetuning, yet achieves state-of-the-art accuracy with in-depth explanations. Evaluated on NewsCLIPpings, VERITE, and MMFakeBench, it outperforms prior methods by 2%, 3%, and 5%, respectively. Ablation and user studies show that the debate and resultant explanations significantly improve detection performance and improve trust for both experts and non-experts, positioning MAD-Sherlock as a robust tool for autonomous citizen intelligence.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Architecting Resilient LLM Agents: A Guide to Secure Plan-then-Execute Implementations

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become increasingly capable of automating complex, multi-step tasks, the need for robust, secure, and predictable architectural patterns is paramount. This paper provides a comprehensive guide to the ``Plan-then-Execute'' (P-t-E) pattern, an agentic design that separates strategic planning from tactical execution. We explore the foundational principles of P-t-E, detailing its core components - the Planner and the Executor - and its architectural advantages in predictability, cost-efficiency, and reasoning quality over reactive patterns like ReAct (Reason + Act). A central focus is placed on the security implications of this design, particularly its inherent resilience to indirect prompt injection attacks by establishing control-flow integrity. We argue that while P-t-E provides a strong foundation, a defense-in-depth strategy is necessary, and we detail essential complementary controls such as the Principle of Least Privilege, task-scoped tool access, and sandboxed code execution. To make these principles actionable, this guide provides detailed implementation blueprints and working code references for three leading agentic frameworks: LangChain (via LangGraph), CrewAI, and AutoGen. Each framework's approach to implementing the P-t-E pattern is analyzed, highlighting unique features like LangGraph's stateful graphs for re-planning, CrewAI's declarative tool scoping for security, and AutoGen's built-in Docker sandboxing. Finally, we discuss advanced patterns, including dynamic re-planning loops, parallel execution with Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), and the critical role of Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) verification, to offer a complete strategic blueprint for architects, developers, and security engineers aiming to build production-grade, resilient, and trustworthy LLM agents.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Extending the OWASP Multi-Agentic System Threat Modeling Guide: Insights from Multi-Agent Security Research

We propose an extension to the OWASP Multi-Agentic System (MAS) Threat Modeling Guide, translating recent anticipatory research in multi-agent security (MASEC) into practical guidance for addressing challenges unique to large language model (LLM)-driven multi-agent architectures. Although OWASP's existing taxonomy covers many attack vectors, our analysis identifies gaps in modeling failures, including, but not limited to: reasoning collapse across planner-executor chains, metric overfitting, unsafe delegation escalation, emergent covert coordination, and heterogeneous multi-agent exploits. We introduce additional threat classes and scenarios grounded in practical MAS deployments, highlighting risks from benign goal drift, cross-agent hallucination propagation, affective prompt framing, and multi-agent backdoors. We also outline evaluation strategies, including robustness testing, coordination assessment, safety enforcement, and emergent behavior monitoring, to ensure complete coverage. This work complements the framework of OWASP by expanding its applicability to increasingly complex, autonomous, and adaptive multi-agent systems, with the goal of improving security posture and resilience in real world deployments.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2025

Secret Collusion among AI Agents: Multi-Agent Deception via Steganography

Recent capability increases in large language models (LLMs) open up applications in which groups of communicating generative AI agents solve joint tasks. This poses privacy and security challenges concerning the unauthorised sharing of information, or other unwanted forms of agent coordination. Modern steganographic techniques could render such dynamics hard to detect. In this paper, we comprehensively formalise the problem of secret collusion in systems of generative AI agents by drawing on relevant concepts from both AI and security literature. We study incentives for the use of steganography, and propose a variety of mitigation measures. Our investigations result in a model evaluation framework that systematically tests capabilities required for various forms of secret collusion. We provide extensive empirical results across a range of contemporary LLMs. While the steganographic capabilities of current models remain limited, GPT-4 displays a capability jump suggesting the need for continuous monitoring of steganographic frontier model capabilities. We conclude by laying out a comprehensive research program to mitigate future risks of collusion between generative AI models.

cs.AI↗