arXiv subjects

Christof Ferreira Torres

Publications and source records attributed to Christof Ferreira Torres.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

The Express Lane to Spam and Centralization: An Empirical Analysis of Arbitrum's Timeboost

DeFi applications are vulnerable to MEV, where specialized actors profit by reordering or inserting transactions. To mitigate latency races and internalize MEV revenue, Arbitrum introduced Timeboost, an auction-based transaction sequencing mechanism that grants short-term priority access to an express lane. In this paper, we present the first large-scale empirical study of Timeboost, analyzing over 48.5 million express lane transactions and 494 thousand auctions between January 2025 and April 2026. Our results reveal five main findings. First, express lane control is highly centralized, with three entities winning 99.74% of auctions. Second, while express lane access provides earlier inclusion, it is currently mainly used for CEX-DEX arbitrage, limiting the value of priority access for other types of MEV extraction. Third, approximately 30% of timeboosted transactions revert, indicating that Timeboost does not effectively mitigate MEV inefficiencies such as spam. Fourth, secondary markets for reselling express lane rights struggle to sustain themselves due to poor execution reliability and unsustainable economics. Finally, auction competition declined as secondary markets introduced dedicated CEX-DEX execution lanes, enabling pay-per-transaction instead of pay-per-round billing and leading to steadily reduced revenue for the Arbitrum DAO. Taken together, these findings show that Timeboost fails to deliver on its stated goals of fairness, decentralization, and internalizing long term revenue for the DAO. Instead, it currently allows for collusion and narrows adoption, highlighting the limitations of auction-based ordering as a mechanism for fair transaction sequencing in rollups.

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arXiv2026

No Place to Hide: An Analysis on Protected Order Flow Sandwich Attacks

Front-running has long plagued Ethereum's public mempool, earning it the nickname of a "dark forest", where predators lurk for profitable transactions. In response, Ethereum and other blockchain ecosystems increasingly rely on private RPCs and native protections to shield transactions from adversaries, which we refer to as protected order flow. Yet the effectiveness of these mechanisms in preventing front-running, and what trust assumptions they entail, remain poorly understood. In this work, we conduct the first longitudinal, three-year measurement study of sandwich attacks against protected order flow across six blockchains: Ethereum, Solana, Tron, Base, Arbitrum, and Monad. We introduce detection heuristics that capture wide attacks, both within and across blocks, and filter on bot behavior to distinguish sandwiches from legitimate trading activity. We identify 28.0 million sandwich attacks on Solana, 38,567 on Tron, 30,607 on Ethereum, and 1,889 on Base against transactions intended to be protected from front-running. Reorged blocks expose a further 2,875 Ethereum victims. Unlike conventional public-mempool sandwiches, these attacks rarely occur tightly around their victims and, outside Solana, are carried out by a small number of entities. Our analysis uncovers exposures at every layer: validator- and application-level exposure on Solana, order-flow auctions and reorged blocks on Ethereum, first-come-first-served ordering that fails to prevent latency-based front-running on Tron, and both an RPC bug that exposes pending transactions and predictable victim behavior on Base. These findings show that existing front-running protections can provide substantially weaker guarantees than users expect, highlighting the need for stronger end-to-end defenses against sandwich attacks.

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arXiv2026

IntentFuzz: A Protocol-Aware Fuzzer for Automated Invariant Violation Detection in Intent-Based Cross-Chain Bridges

Cross-chain bridges move value between blockchains. Intent-based bridges are a variant where a solver fulfills a user's declared outcome and an off-chain settlement layer later reconciles the fill against the deposit. Existing smart-contract fuzzers and static analyzers only flag known-bad code patterns or require protocol-specific hand-written assertions. This work formalizes a taxonomy separating invariant violations, safety properties a contract must enforce locally, from settlement exposures legitimately delegated to the off-chain settlement layer, and proposes IntentFuzz: a protocol-aware fuzzer that recovers a bridge's intent structure and deposit/fill function roles directly from unannotated Solidity source, then synthesizes multi-step fuzz sequences using an LLM-based fallback to help build call arguments. IntentFuzz recovers the correct intent structure in 9/9 benchmark protocols and classifies deposit and fill functions with 100% recall and 82% combined precision; across a corpus of 77 manually labeled contracts, it reaches 79.5% bridge-classification precision and 97.2% recall, and among confirmed bridges, struct selection reaches 88.6% precision and recall while deposit and fill classification each reach 100% recall. On 23 planted-bug mutants, IntentFuzz attains 100% recall and 100% precision, executing 273 templates (507 transactions in a median of 14ms per template). Across 24 real-world deployments, it confirms 17 genuine invariant violations under heuristic-only input generation, rising to 22 with its LLM-assisted tier enabled, spanning eight vulnerable GitHub repositories, each finding reproducible against public, deployed bytecode.

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arXiv2026

Financial Dynamics and Interconnected Risk of Liquid Restaking

Decentralized finance introduces new business models and use cases as part of digital finance. Restaking has recently emerged as a transformative mechanism in DeFi, promising extra yields but introducing complex and interconnected risks. The paper monitors the current restaking landscape, empirically analyzes the revenue drivers of a liquid restaking protocol, and conducts a technical investigation on the emitted risk arising from the interconnection between liquid restaking and other protocols. The revenue dynamics of Renzo Protocol are analyzed by employing an OLS regression model, Granger-causality and random forest feature importance tests. Our results identify that revenue is primarily predicted by the value locked in the underlying EigenLayer ecosystem, the yield of Renzo protocol's liquid restaking token and the multi-blockchain expansion of that token. The multi-blockchain expansion of the liquid restaking token presents a double-edged sword: bridging to other networks is crucial for user adoption, but it adds the bridge risks to the existing risks of restaking. We investigate the cross-contamination risk between different DeFi services and the liquid restaking protocol. By mapping the asset flow across the decentralized finance ecosystem, it is detected that the bridge risk of the current size of Renzo's liquid-restaking assets does not impose a systemic risk on the current restaking and staking ecosystem. To address the potential consequences of the emphasized interconnection risks, we introduce two hypothetical scenarios and a stress test, assuming a large number of compromised liquid restaking tokens and a smart contract logic failure in a DeFi protocol. Considering the overall liquid-restaking protocols and the growing interconnection, this analysis requires further work to explore the growing complexities.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2026

There Will Be Spam: Characterizing State-Invariant Transactions and Speculative MEV

Blockchains rely on transparency and immutability to ensure trust, but these guarantees come at the cost of an ever-growing ledger that increasingly threatens decentralization by making it more expensive to store and maintain the full transaction history. In this work, we introduce state-invariant transactions, defined as transactions whose inclusion or removal does not affect the resulting blockchain state beyond transaction fees. We argue that these transactions constitute a form of on-chain spam because they consume execution, bandwidth, storage, and blockspace without contributing to the final ledger state. We present the first large-scale measurement of state-invariant transactions across Ethereum, Optimism, and Base, identifying nearly 1.4 billion such transactions. While only 2.6% of Ethereum transactions are state-invariant, they account for 24% of transactions on Optimism and 37% on Base, representing a significant source of unnecessary resource consumption on Layer-2 blockchains. We show that speculative Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) is the dominant source of state-invariant transactions on Optimism and Base, accounting for 57% and 68%, respectively, but is not the only source as previously assumed. Moreover, despite its popularity, speculative MEV is not the most profitable strategy once the costs of state-invariant transactions are considered. Beyond MEV, we identify substantial malicious activity, with address poisoning campaigns accounting for 53% of non-reverted state-invariant transactions on Ethereum. Our findings suggest that mitigating state-invariant transactions could substantially reduce blockchain resource consumption and transaction costs while limiting phishing campaigns and other forms of blockchain abuse.

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arXiv2026

Signals and Spoils: Speculative Oracle Extractable Value in the Era of Cross-Chain Interoperability

A new form of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV), termed speculative MEV, has emerged across Layer-2 blockchains. Unlike Ethereum mainnet, many Layer-2 systems lack a public mempool, forcing extraction strategies to become probabilistic: searchers emit multiple identical transactions hoping to capture an opportunity first. This generates substantial transaction spam, increasing fees and wasting block space. We investigate speculative Oracle Extractable Value (OEV), a form of MEV associated with liquidating undercollateralized loans via speculative backrunning of oracle price updates. We propose a methodology for detecting speculative liquidations in the wild and apply it across Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism. On October 10, 2025, we identify 64 speculative liquidators on Aave (57% of all detected liquidators) and 831 successful speculative liquidations (39% of all successful liquidations across the three chains). We further examine whether latency differences in oracle price feed updates across blockchains can be exploited for cross-chain OEV. Specifically, we ask whether a searcher can observe oracle updates on one chain and frontrun liquidation opportunities on another. We systematically analyze Chainlink Decentralized Oracle Network (DON) configurations (deviation thresholds, heartbeat intervals, and submitted price observations) across Arbitrum, Base, Ethereum, and Optimism. Our dataset comprises 63 Chainlink feeds, 12,009 price updates, and over 100,000 oracle observations linked to 2,986 Aave liquidations. We show that independent DONs consume largely identical off-chain price data nearly simultaneously yet publish updates at different times, creating statistically predictable cross-chain exploitation windows. We demonstrate that Chainlink updates on Optimism can predict subsequent updates on Arbitrum and Base, enabling speculative cross-chain OEV extraction.

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arXiv2026

Exploiting Liquidity Exhaustion Attacks in Intent-Based Cross-Chain Bridges

Intent-based cross-chain bridges have emerged as an alternative to traditional interoperability protocols by allowing off-chain entities (\emph{solvers}) to immediately fulfill users' orders by fronting their own liquidity. While improving user experience, this approach introduces new systemic risks, such as solver liquidity concentration and delayed settlement. In this paper, we propose a new class of attacks called \emph{liquidity exhaustion attacks} and a replay-based parameterized attack simulation framework. We analyze 3.5 million cross-chain intents that moved \$9.24B worth of tokens between June and November 2025 across three major protocols (Mayan Swift, Across, and deBridge), spanning nine blockchains. For rational attackers, our results show that protocols with higher solver profitability, such as deBridge, are vulnerable under current parameters: 210 historical attack instances yield a mean net profit of \$286.14, with 80.5\% of attacks profitable. In contrast, Across remains robust in all tested configurations due to low solver margins and very high liquidity, while Mayan Swift is generally secure but becomes vulnerable under stress-test conditions. Under byzantine attacks, we show that it is possible to suppress availability across all protocols, causing dozens of failed intents and solver profit losses of up to \$978 roughly every 16 minutes. Finally, we propose an optimized attack strategy that exploits patterns in the data to reduce attack costs by up to 90.5\% compared to the baseline, lowering the barrier to liquidity exhaustion attacks.

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arXiv2025

Rolling in the Shadows: Analyzing the Extraction of MEV Across Layer-2 Rollups

The emergence of decentralized finance has transformed asset trading on the blockchain, making traditional financial instruments more accessible while also introducing a series of exploitative economic practices known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). Concurrently, decentralized finance has embraced rollup-based Layer-2 solutions to facilitate asset trading at reduced transaction costs compared to Layer-1 solutions such as Ethereum. However, rollups lack a public mempool like Ethereum, making the extraction of MEV more challenging. In this paper, we investigate the prevalence and impact of MEV on Ethereum and prominent rollups such as Arbitrum, Optimism, and zkSync over a nearly three-year period. Our analysis encompasses various metrics including volume, profits, costs, competition, and response time to MEV opportunities. We discover that MEV is widespread on rollups, with trading volume comparable to Ethereum. We also find that, although MEV costs are lower on rollups, profits are also significantly lower compared to Ethereum. Additionally, we examine the prevalence of sandwich attacks on rollups. While our findings did not detect any sandwiching activity on popular rollups, we did identify the potential for cross-layer sandwich attacks facilitated by transactions that are sent across rollups and Ethereum. Consequently, we propose and evaluate the feasibility of three novel attacks that exploit cross-layer transactions, revealing that attackers could have already earned approximately 2 million USD through cross-layer sandwich attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2025

Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance

Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against centralized exchanges (CEXes), whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them the primary venue for price discovery. As trading volume migrates on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges (DEXes) will become the canonical mechanism for price alignment. Yet, despite its importance to DeFi-and the on-chain transparency making real activity tractable in a way CEX-to-DEX arbitrage is not-existing research remains confined to conceptual overviews and hypothetical opportunity analyses. We study cross-chain arbitrage with a profit-cost model and a year-long measurement. The model shows that opportunity frequency, bridging time, and token depreciation determine whether inventory- or bridge-based execution is more profitable. Empirically, we analyze one year of transactions (September 2023 - August 2024) across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling 868.64 million USD volume. Activity clusters on Ethereum-centric L1-L2 pairs, grows 5.5x over the study period, and surges-higher volume, more trades, lower fees-after the Dencun upgrade (March 13, 2024). Most trades use pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, underscoring the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is high: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one alone captures almost 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. We conclude that cross-chain arbitrage fosters vertical integration, centralizing sequencing infrastructure and economic power and thereby exacerbating censorship, liveness, and finality risks; decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are critical to countering these threats.

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arXiv2024

Analyzing the Impact of Copying-and-Pasting Vulnerable Solidity Code Snippets from Question-and-Answer Websites

Ethereum smart contracts are executable programs deployed on a blockchain. Once deployed, they cannot be updated due to their inherent immutability. Moreover, they often manage valuable assets that are worth millions of dollars, making them attractive targets for attackers. The introduction of vulnerabilities in programs due to the reuse of vulnerable code posted on Q&A websites such as Stack Overflow is not a new issue. However, little effort has been made to analyze the extent of this issue on deployed smart contracts. In this paper, we conduct a study on the impact of vulnerable code reuse from Q&A websites during the development of smart contracts and provide tools uniquely fit to detect vulnerable code patterns in complete and incomplete Smart Contract code. This paper proposes a pattern-based vulnerability detection tool that is able to analyze code snippets (i.e., incomplete code) as well as full smart contracts based on the concept of code property graphs. We also propose a methodology that leverages fuzzy hashing to quickly detect code clones of vulnerable snippets among deployed smart contracts. Our results show that our vulnerability search, as well as our code clone detection, are comparable to state-of-the-art while being applicable to code snippets. Our large-scale study on 18,660 code snippets reveals that 4,596 of them are vulnerable, out of which 616 can be found in 7,852 deployed smart contracts. These results highlight that the reuse of vulnerable code snippets is indeed an issue in currently deployed smart contracts.

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arXiv2023

Ethereum's Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities

With Ethereum's transition from Proof-of-Work to Proof-of-Stake in September 2022 came another paradigm shift, the Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) scheme. PBS was introduced to decouple the roles of selecting and ordering transactions in a block (i.e., the builder), from those validating its contents and proposing the block to the network as the new head of the blockchain (i.e., the proposer). In this landscape, proposers are the validators in the Proof-of-Stake consensus protocol, while now relying on specialized block builders for creating blocks with the highest value for the proposer. Additionally, relays act as mediators between builders and proposers. We study PBS adoption and show that the current landscape exhibits significant centralization amongst the builders and relays. Further, we explore whether PBS effectively achieves its intended objectives of enabling hobbyist validators to maximize block profitability and preventing censorship. Our findings reveal that although PBS grants validators the opportunity to access optimized and competitive blocks, it tends to stimulate censorship rather than reduce it. Additionally, we demonstrate that relays do not consistently uphold their commitments and may prove unreliable. Specifically, proposers do not always receive the complete promised value, and the censorship or filtering capabilities pledged by relays exhibit significant gaps.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2023

Is Your Wallet Snitching On You? An Analysis on the Privacy Implications of Web3

With the recent hype around the Metaverse and NFTs, Web3 is getting more and more popular. The goal of Web3 is to decentralize the web via decentralized applications. Wallets play a crucial role as they act as an interface between these applications and the user. Wallets such as MetaMask are being used by millions of users nowadays. Unfortunately, Web3 is often advertised as more secure and private. However, decentralized applications as well as wallets are based on traditional technologies, which are not designed with privacy of users in mind. In this paper, we analyze the privacy implications that Web3 technologies such as decentralized applications and wallets have on users. To this end, we build a framework that measures exposure of wallet information. First, we study whether information about installed wallets is being used to track users online. We analyze the top 100K websites and find evidence of 1,325 websites running scripts that probe whether users have wallets installed in their browser. Second, we measure whether decentralized applications and wallets leak the user's unique wallet address to third-parties. We intercept the traffic of 616 decentralized applications and 100 wallets and find over 2000 leaks across 211 applications and more than 300 leaks across 13 wallets. Our study shows that Web3 poses a threat to users' privacy and requires new designs towards more privacy-aware wallet architectures.

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arXiv2022

A Flash(bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools

The rise of Ethereum has lead to a flourishing decentralized marketplace that has, unfortunately, fallen victim to frontrunning and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) activities, where savvy participants game transaction orderings within a block for profit. One popular solution to address such behavior is Flashbots, a private pool with infrastructure and design goals aimed at eliminating the negative externalities associated with MEV. While Flashbots has established laudable goals to address MEV behavior, no evidence has been provided to show that these goals are achieved in practice. In this paper, we measure the popularity of Flashbots and evaluate if it is meeting its chartered goals. We find that (1) Flashbots miners account for over 99.9% of the hashing power in the Ethereum network, (2) powerful miners are making more than $2\times$ what they were making prior to using Flashbots, while non-miners' slice of the pie has shrunk commensurately, (3) mining is just as centralized as it was prior to Flashbots with more than 90% of Flashbots blocks coming from just two miners, and (4) while more than 80% of MEV extraction in Ethereum is happening through Flashbots, 13.2% is coming from other private pools.

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arXiv2022

Elysium: Context-Aware Bytecode-Level Patching to Automatically Heal Vulnerable Smart Contracts

Fixing bugs is easiest by patching source code. However, source code is not always available: only 0.3% of the ~49M smart contracts that are currently deployed on Ethereum have their source code publicly available. Moreover, since contracts may call functions from other contracts, security flaws in closed-source contracts may affect open-source contracts as well. However, current state-of-the-art approaches that operate on closed-source contracts (i.e., EVM bytecode), such as EVMPatch and SmartShield, make use of purely hard-coded templates that leverage fix patching patterns. As a result, they cannot dynamically adapt to the bytecode that is being patched, which severely limits their flexibility and scalability. For instance, when patching integer overflows using hard-coded templates, a particular patch template needs to be employed as the bounds to be checked are different for each integer size. In this paper, we propose Elysium, a scalable approach towards automatic smart contract repair at the bytecode level. Elysium combines template-based and semantic-based patching by inferring context information from bytecode. Elysium is currently able to patch 7 different types of vulnerabilities in smart contracts automatically and can easily be extended with new templates and new bug-finding tools. We evaluate its effectiveness and correctness using 3 different datasets by replaying more than 500K transactions on patched contracts. We find that Elysium outperforms existing tools by patching at least 30% more contracts correctly. Finally, we also compare the overhead of Elysium in terms of deployment and transaction cost. In comparison to other tools, we find that generally Elysium minimizes the runtime cost (i.e., transaction cost) up to a factor of 1.7, for only a marginally higher deployment cost, where deployment cost is a one-time cost as compared to the runtime cost.

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arXiv2021

Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum Blockchain

Ethereum prospered the inception of a plethora of smart contract applications, ranging from gambling games to decentralized finance. However, Ethereum is also considered a highly adversarial environment, where vulnerable smart contracts will eventually be exploited. Recently, Ethereum's pool of pending transaction has become a far more aggressive environment. In the hope of making some profit, attackers continuously monitor the transaction pool and try to frontrun their victims' transactions by either displacing or suppressing them, or strategically inserting their transactions. This paper aims to shed some light into what is known as a dark forest and uncover these predators' actions. We present a methodology to efficiently measure the three types of frontrunning: displacement, insertion, and suppression. We perform a large-scale analysis on more than 11M blocks and identify almost 200K attacks with an accumulated profit of 18.41M USD for the attackers, providing evidence that frontrunning is both, lucrative and a prevalent issue.

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arXiv2021

ConFuzzius: A Data Dependency-Aware Hybrid Fuzzer for Smart Contracts

Smart contracts are Turing-complete programs that are executed across a blockchain. Unlike traditional programs, once deployed, they cannot be modified. As smart contracts carry more value, they become more of an exciting target for attackers. Over the last years, they suffered from exploits costing millions of dollars due to simple programming mistakes. As a result, a variety of tools for detecting bugs have been proposed. Most of these tools rely on symbolic execution, which may yield false positives due to over-approximation. Recently, many fuzzers have been proposed to detect bugs in smart contracts. However, these tend to be more effective in finding shallow bugs and less effective in finding bugs that lie deep in the execution, therefore achieving low code coverage and many false negatives. An alternative that has proven to achieve good results in traditional programs is hybrid fuzzing, a combination of symbolic execution and fuzzing. In this work, we study hybrid fuzzing on smart contracts and present ConFuzzius, the first hybrid fuzzer for smart contracts. ConFuzzius uses evolutionary fuzzing to exercise shallow parts of a smart contract and constraint solving to generate inputs that satisfy complex conditions that prevent evolutionary fuzzing from exploring deeper parts. Moreover, ConFuzzius leverages dynamic data dependency analysis to efficiently generate sequences of transactions that are more likely to result in contract states in which bugs may be hidden. We evaluate the effectiveness of ConFuzzius by comparing it with state-of-the-art symbolic execution tools and fuzzers for smart contracts. Our evaluation on a curated dataset of 128 contracts and 21K real-world contracts shows that our hybrid approach detects more bugs (up to 23%) while outperforming state-of-the-art in terms of code coverage (up to 69%), and that data dependency analysis boosts bug detection up to 18%.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2021

The Eye of Horus: Spotting and Analyzing Attacks on Ethereum Smart Contracts

In recent years, Ethereum gained tremendously in popularity, growing from a daily transaction average of 10K in January 2016 to an average of 500K in January 2020. Similarly, smart contracts began to carry more value, making them appealing targets for attackers. As a result, they started to become victims of attacks, costing millions of dollars. In response to these attacks, both academia and industry proposed a plethora of tools to scan smart contracts for vulnerabilities before deploying them on the blockchain. However, most of these tools solely focus on detecting vulnerabilities and not attacks, let alone quantifying or tracing the number of stolen assets. In this paper, we present Horus, a framework that empowers the automated detection and investigation of smart contract attacks based on logic-driven and graph-driven analysis of transactions. Horus provides quick means to quantify and trace the flow of stolen assets across the Ethereum blockchain. We perform a large-scale analysis of all the smart contracts deployed on Ethereum until May 2020. We identified 1,888 attacked smart contracts and 8,095 adversarial transactions in the wild. Our investigation shows that the number of attacks did not necessarily decrease over the past few years, but for some vulnerabilities remained constant. Finally, we also demonstrate the practicality of our framework via an in-depth analysis on the recent Uniswap and Lendf.me attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges

Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) allow parties to participate in financial markets while retaining full custody of their funds. However, the transparency of blockchain-based DEX in combination with the latency for transactions to be processed, makes market-manipulation feasible. For instance, adversaries could perform front-running -- the practice of exploiting (typically non-public) information that may change the price of an asset for financial gain. In this work we formalize, analytically exposit and empirically evaluate an augmented variant of front-running: sandwich attacks, which involve front- and back-running victim transactions on a blockchain-based DEX. We quantify the probability of an adversarial trader being able to undertake the attack, based on the relative positioning of a transaction within a blockchain block. We find that a single adversarial trader can earn a daily revenue of over several thousand USD when performing sandwich attacks on one particular DEX -- Uniswap, an exchange with over 5M USD daily trading volume by June 2020. In addition to a single-adversary game, we simulate the outcome of sandwich attacks under multiple competing adversaries, to account for the real-world trading environment.

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